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ABSTRACT

A crucial phenomenon during the last two decades has been the transformation of 
social governance. New orientations in social policy have radically altered the roles of 
the state, market and civil society in social provision. The thesis proposes a framework 
for understanding this transformation of social governance that links political leaders’ 
strategic calculations to the particular political challenges they face as a result of 
changes in the socioeconomic environment as well as to the ideas and institutions that 
shape their reform attempts. Importantly, it shows how the “pluralist” social policy 
approach that was initiated by governments all over the developing world in the 1990s 
may  lead  to  different  modes  of  social  governance  with  contrasting  effects  on  state-
society relations. By drawing on a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile, the 
thesis shows how this is highly contingent on regime institutions. In Argentina, regime 
institutions provide politicians with wide discretion in distributing social funds. The 
result has been a populist mode of social governance in which neo-clientelism serves 
to politicize the linkages between the political elites and subaltern sectors. In Chile, by 
contrast, regime institutions provide politicians with very little discretion in distributing 
social funds. This has resulted in a technocratic mode of social governance in which 
neo-pluralism serves to depoliticize the linkages between the political elites and 
subaltern sectors. Both outcomes differ markedly from widely made assumptions that 
couple the pluralist social policy approach with more participatory governance and 
poor people’s empowerment.
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CHAPTERONE

THEPOLITICSOFTRANSFORMINGSOCIALGOVERNANCE
 
A crucial phenomenon during the last two decades has been the transformation of 
social governance, i.e. the methods for managing and distributing social welfare. New 
orientations in social policy have radically altered the roles of the state, market and 
civil society in relation to social provision. Few countries have remained immune to the 
pivotal trends towards privatization, decentralization and targeting of social welfare. A 
major development has also been the new emphasis on participation as a key principle 
around which to organize social welfare provision. The implications of this new social 
policy approach are profound. Changes in social services and programs not only affect 
daily living conditions and levels of social integration, but they also have far-reaching 
effects on the nature of linkages between state and society. Indeed, at the center of 
this global wave of social policy reform is the remolding of state-society relations. 
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Latin America has been at the forefront of this policy revolution. In the beginning 
of  the  1990s  most  governments  in  the  region  initiated  reforms  that  sought  to  
transform social governance. Major emphasis was put on poverty alleviation and the 
creation of social programs that relied heavily on the involvement of civil society 
organizations. In contrast to traditional state-based welfare schemes that operated 
almost exclusively from the public sphere, the new social policy approach was 
designed to provide incentives for private actors to organize social provision through 
non-profit and for-profit organizations. It included the design of demand-driven 
subsidies for anti-poverty projects, co-participation schemes based on partnerships 
between different levels of government, private enterprises, NGOs and community 
organizations in defining program priorities and financing projects, as well as the 
decentralization of policy implementation to local governments, community groups 
and social organizations.  
As such, these new pluralist social policies1 marked a significant departure from the 
corporatist social policies that dominated in Latin America until the 1970s. At the same 
time, it signalled the re-emergence of the social question as a real concern in Latin 
America, after the “lost decade” of the 1980s, when economic adjustment and 
austerity policies dominated the policy agenda to the detriment of social issues.2 By 
the 1990s, a remarkable consensus had emerged about the need to go beyond 
economic reform and the mere reliance on the “trickle down” effects of economic 
                                                             
1 It is often referred to as “New Social Policy” (e.g. Molyneux, 2008), but the term says little about the 
nature of these social policies. “Pluralist” social policy is more descriptive. 
2 To be sure, privatization, decentralization and targeting formed part of the structural adjustment 
policies in the 1980s, but a major shift to a more participatory approach and a preoccupation with issues 
of social equity and poverty alleviation can be discerned from the beginning of the 1990s onwards.   
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growth to alleviate poverty. Instead, the new social agenda put emphasis on fighting 
poverty head-on through social policy and participatory anti-poverty programs.3 
Despite the obvious importance of this redefinition of social policy for economic, 
political and social life, scholarly attention has mainly focused on economic policy and 
efforts to remold the role of the state in the economy.4 Social sector policies have 
received much less attention as a facet of larger development strategies in Latin 
America and elsewhere.5 The research usually concerns the technical dimensions of 
social policy. The World Bank, the IDB and the different UN agencies, among others, 
have produced numerous studies that deal with how the social sectors should be 
reorganized so as to put social spending into more effective and equitable use. This 
body of research, however, reveals little about the political interests and processes 
that drive reform initiatives, how these initiatives may become diluted or blocked in 
the process of implementation, or the political effects of social reforms. In order to 
develop an understanding of social reform politics in developing countries it is 
imperative to look beyond merely the technical and juridical aspects of social policy 
formation. 
This study contributes to our general understanding of the political aspects of 
social policy and social reform efforts. It shows how social policy is deployed as a 
strategic asset to manage state-society relations. Political elites commonly attempt to 
mold state-society relations to fit the interests they represent and ensure 
governability. In this respect an important tool is provided by social policy. It functions 
as  a  means  to  co-opt  and  control  subaltern  sectors.  These  are  often  viewed  as  an  
                                                             
3 For an overview, see Grindle (2000); Barrientos, Gideon and Molyneux (2008), and Molyneux (2008). 
See also Raczynski (1995a; 1998). 
4 E.g. Haggard and Kaufman (1992); Smith, Acuña, and Gamarra (1994); Geddes (1995); Oxhorn and Starr 
(1998); Teichman (2001); Weyland (2002). 
5 For some recent literature, see Tulchin and Garland (2000); Abel and Lewis (2002); Haagh and Helgo 
(2002); and Kaufman and Nelson (2004). 
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active or potential threat to political order, requiring pre-empting and controlling 
measures.  At  the  same  time,  they  may  be  viewed  as  a  potentially  powerful  base  for  
political and socioeconomic development, requiring measures to mobilize and co-opt 
(O’Donnell, 1977). The different social policy approaches by which political leaders 
attempt to manage such state-society relations range from the use of paternalistic, 
state-based welfare programs to the encouragement of autonomous, self-help 
solutions.  
Up until the late nineteenth century in Latin America, social policy was of little use 
for the political elites. Patron-client relations served as an effective check on lower 
class social forces. Social provision was largely confined to philanthropic welfarism in 
which the Catholic Church played a central role. This philanthropic social policy 
approach was “designed to support the colonial state treating the urban and rural poor 
with paternalistic but disciplinary benevolence” (Molyneux, 2008: 777). The corporatist 
social policy approach that  emerged  from  the  1920s  was  designed  to  use  social  
benefits as a means to control and channel the increasing mobilization of subaltern 
sectors.  It  involved  the  gradual  expansion  of  social  security  benefits  to  the  most  
organized and vocal groups in society in exchange for subordination to the system of 
corporatist controls. Major emphasis was put on supply-driven mechanisms in which 
the state took the central role along corporate interests and groups. Standardized 
welfare schemes were developed with little adaptation to local conditions. Hardly any 
space was given to private markets and community initiatives. Finally, from the late 
1980s, a new set of social policies has been brought to the fore in an effort to recast 
linkages between state and society along more pluralist lines. The pluralist social policy 
approach has brought new actors into social provision by increasing the participation 
of private companies, NGOs and other third sector organizations. Emphasis has been 
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put on demand-driven mechanisms in which citizens themselves engage in setting 
priorities for social policy and implementing social projects. A central element has 
become the targeting of social programs that are demand-driven and decentralized to 
allow for increased participation, co-responsibility and local variation. Targeting, 
decentralization and pluralization of service providers, along with greater reliance on 
the market and the participation of beneficiaries have become central components of 
social policy.   
My study looks at this transformation of social governance in Argentina and Chile. 
It shows how it has evolved in conjunction with changes in the socioeconomic, 
ideational and political-institutional environment. Political leaders respond to such 
changes by adopting new social policies by which to manage state-society relations. In 
the process, reformist leaders often delegate considerable authority over policy 
reform to technocratic experts so as to be able to bypass vested interests and facilitate 
the implementation of reform. Yet this process is conditioned by regime institutions in 
important ways. Depending on regime institutions, the political outcome of reform 
efforts may vary considerably across cases. 
The central focus of this study is on the pluralist social policy approach – why it was 
adopted, how it was implemented, and what its political implications are. A central 
tenet of pluralist reform has been the prioritization of poverty relief. In Argentina and 
Chile a host of new agencies and programs were set up to target the poor and promote 
their participation in the resolution of social problems. The study examines these 
initiatives, such as FOSIS in Chile and Plan Trabajar in Argentina, using them as a lens 
through which to examine larger questions regarding the relationship between 
pluralist social policy reform and state-society relations. Anti-poverty initiatives play a 
critical role in forging links between state actors and impoverished societal groups. For 
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subaltern sectors such as the poor, anti-poverty policy has a vital impact on their levels 
and forms of integration to political life. For the political elites, anti-poverty policy 
functions as a strategic asset in forging political support and social control. More than 
just providing technical solutions to problems of poverty, anti-poverty policy is a 
means to “govern the poor”.  
Drawing on the comparison of Argentina and Chile, the analysis shows how 
pluralist social reform may result in different modes of social governance with far-
reaching effects on social integration and political development. Inherent in these 
modes of social governance are the relationships that link society with the state on the 
social policy arena. In Argentina, the new social policy approach has facilitated the 
establishment of neo-clientelist relationships between the political elites and subaltern 
sectors. Targeted and participatory social programs have been politically manipulated 
to facilitate clientelistic incorporation of the poor, helping populist leaders maintain a 
popular constituency despite macroeconomic reforms that sharpen inequalities and 
drive up unemployment. Participation has thus mainly taken the form of clientelist 
brokerage whereby civil society organizations are enlisted to act as middlemen in 
doling out benefits to political loyalists. At the same time, the new clientelistic ties 
serve to politicize the linkages between the political elites and subaltern sectors. These 
linkages constitute mechanisms through which subaltern sectors can make demands 
upon the state and whom the politicians compete to command. The case of Argentina 
suggests that such a populist mode of social governance is inherently unstable as it 
feeds overspending and is prone to sudden outbursts of counter-mobilization.  
In Chile, by contrast, the new social policy approach has provided for the 
establishment of neo-pluralist relationships through which the state is able to control 
social-demand making and set the terms for civil society participation in social 
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policymaking. Unlike Argentina, Chilean technocrats remain in charge of implementing 
the new social policies providing for a highly non-partisan and technical process in 
allocating benefits from the new targeted and participatory programs. Participation 
mainly revolves around project implementation. NGOs and community organizations 
are invited to submit project proposals and compete for anti-poverty funds on the 
highly technical terms set by the welfare bureaucracy. The aim with these project 
competitions is to develop innovative and cost-effective programs of social 
development. At the same time, by introducing competitive tendering as a major 
mechanism for allocating social funds, civil society organizations are provided with 
strong incentives to adjust their agendas so as to be able to compete for these funds. 
In the process, they often come to downplay some of their earlier political functions as 
advocacy groups for the subaltern sectors and reduce their demands on the 
government. As such, these new “participatory” structures serve to depoliticize the 
linkages between state and society and help deflect popular mobilization away from 
encompassing political activity towards grassroots social efforts. By inviting NGOs and 
community groups to take over responsibility for welfare provision and incorporate 
them into funding relationships in which they mainly acquire the role of implementers 
of social programs, the state is thus able to impose greater political discipline upon civil 
society.  The  case  of  Chile  suggests  that  while  such  a  technocratic  mode  of  social  
governance provides pluralistic access to social benefits, technocratic control over the 
distribution of benefits serves to depoliticize social policymaking making it difficult for 
subaltern sectors to demand encompassing social change.  
In explaining these contrasting outcomes, the study finds that regime institutions 
play a major role. Regime institutions shape the political process – the actors that are 
included, their powers, and their incentives and constraints. In Chile, a centralist-
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unitary regime structure coupled with a “protected” type of democracy that provides 
for strong checks and balances gives technocratic experts extensive control over the 
policymaking process and prevents politicians from politically manipulating social 
funds. By contrast, in Argentina, a decentralized-federal regime structure coupled with 
a “delegative” type of democracy that provides for weak checks and balances puts 
technocratic experts in a weak position and gives politicians, both at the national and 
sub-national levels, opportunities to divert social funds for populist and clientelist 
purposes. Depending on regime institutions, pluralist social policy reform may thus 
end up supporting both populist as well as technocratic modes of social governance. 
Both outcomes differ markedly from assumptions that couple the new social policy 
approach with more effective popular participation and representation in the social 
policy arena.  
To summarize, this study attempts to make a number of contributions to existing 
literature on social policymaking and state-society relations in developing countries. 
First, it contributes to our general understanding of the political aspects of social 
policy. By showing how the evolution of social welfare provision is intrinsically linked 
to larger issues of governance, the present study highlights the importance of looking 
beyond merely technical and juridical aspects of social policy formation. Second, and 
related to the above, it provides a theoretical framework for understanding the politics 
of transforming social governance. The framework is relevant to scholars and activists 
interested in issues of governance and state reform. It links governments’ strategic and 
instrumental calculations to the particular political challenges they face as a result of 
changes in the socioeconomic environment as well as to the ideas and institutions that 
shape the process of transforming social governance. Third, by drawing on a 
comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile, the present study refines the literature 
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that hitherto has tended to highlight external influences in explaining social policy 
reform.  It  shows  how  explanations  of  social  policy  change  must  also  pay  close  
attention to the domestic level and how the impact of external influences is filtered 
through domestic contexts and power constellations. Crucially, it shows how the 
process of pluralist social policy reform may result in widely different political 
outcomes. As such, it addresses the critically important debate about the 
consequences of the new pluralist social policy approach. 
  

THEPLURALISTAPPROACHANDITSINITIATION
A major issue in this study concerns the shift to a pluralist social policy approach. The 
pluralist approach refers to social policy orientations that are designed to promote 
institutional pluralism in welfare provision. In this approach, a diverse set of actors 
(different levels of government, private enterprises, NGOs and community 
organizations) collaborate in setting and implementing social policy priorities. This 
contrasts with the corporatist approach that relies on “massive welfare bureaucracies 
to manage social demands channeled in a highly centralized fashion through political 
parties and labor unions” (Garland, 2000: 2). In the corporatist approach nationally 
standardized welfare schemes are administered by the public sector, providing for a 
centralized, bureaucratic and sectorally segmented system of welfare provision. In 
Latin America, this approach contributed to a system ruled by corporate interests and 
political patronage. Adequate social protection was confined to those in formal 
employment, while large segments of the population, especially urban poor and rural 
workers in the informal sector, remained excluded from social services.  
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The new pluralist approach represents a radically different relationship between 
government agencies and the popular sectors. Central government no longer plays 
such a dominant role in managing social welfare. Pluralist social policies are designed 
to pave the way for flexible, targeted and participatory welfare schemes that respond 
more effectively to diverse local needs and demands. These objectives are typically 
associated with reforms based on the devolution of social service provision to lower 
tiers of government and the private sector, the introduction of market mechanisms 
such as vouchers, microcredit and competitive tendering, and re-directing social 
spending towards targeted programs that make use of the participation of civil society 
organizations. Pluralist reforms focuses on increasing collaboration with the private 
sector in social affairs and creating space for new intermediaries between the 
government and the subaltern sectors, such as NGOs and community organizations. An 
important instrument of the pluralist approach is the organization of public bids in 
which local community organizations or NGOs are invited to develop project proposals 
and compete for funding. The idea is a system that is energetic, flexible and efficient in 
managing diverse social needs and demands. 
Little is known about the political foundations for this policy change. A prominent 
view suggests that the shift to a pluralist approach can be attributed to “globalization” 
and the influence exerted by international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and the IDB as well as international donors. These international actors began to 
push strongly for the new social policy approach in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see 
Bräutigam and Segarra, 2007; also Mackintosh, 1995; Cortés, 2008). The background to 
this newfound international concern with social policy and poverty alleviation lay in 
the negative experiences with adjustment strategies in the wake of the debt crisis (see 
Grindle, 2000). It was also part of the wider reformulation of the development 
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paradigm that shifted “from a cruder market-based model of state-society interaction 
that shaped development programs after the debt crisis, toward more sophisticated 
and deeply political analyses of the type of state and society required to sustain 
economic and political development” (Segarra, 1997: 495). Throughout, it prompted 
an interest in the potential of social participation. “The political turbulence that 
accompanied structural adjustment programs in many developing countries made 
working with social actors increasingly important, either to promote consensus over 
the course of economic reforms or to increase effective aid delivery in alleviating 
poverty and softening the impact of structural reforms on the poor” (Bräutigam and 
Segarra, 2007: 152).  
The World Bank played a central role in the development of this new paradigm. 
Focusing on the development problems in Africa, World Bank policy analysts came to 
the conclusion that the development crisis had not only to do with imprudent fiscal 
structures, but also the lack of state capacity and “good governance” (World Bank, 
1989). What was needed above all was building a “pluralistic institutional structure” 
and creating intermediaries - NGOs and grassroots organizations - between the 
government and the people (World Bank, 1989; 1992; see also Williams and Young, 
1994). This clearly marked a watershed in the emergence of “second-generation 
reforms” and the greatly expanded interest in the role of civil society in promoting 
better governance. This interest was reinforced by academic research regarding the 
positive role of civil associations in development and democratic governance (e.g. 
Bebbington and Thiele, 1993; Putnam, 1993). All in all, these intellectual developments 
among international agencies spearheaded the renewal of donor strategies and 
conditions. 
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According to many arguments, the pressures and influence of the World Bank and 
other international actors has played a critical role in the shift to a new social policy 
approach in developing countries, including Latin America.6 One line of argument, 
often associated with economic-structuralists, emphasizes the financial “leverage” 
borne by IFIs (Stallings, 1992; also Laurell, 2000; Goldman, 2005; Huber, 2005). IFIs 
constitute important channels of financial assistance and it is assumed that this makes 
for a powerful instrument that can be used to impose policies such as structural 
adjustment and new practices on reluctant governments in need of aid. As this 
argument goes, “international agencies promise financial support in exchange for 
specified policy changes, threatening to withdraw aid if these conditions are not met” 
(Hunter and Brown, 2000: 117).  
Yet, much recent scholarship casts doubt on the assumption that international 
agencies have exerted a strong influence on the enactment of social reform in 
developing countries (Hunter and Brown, 2000; Weyland, 2003; Kaufman and Nelson, 
2004;  Bräutigam  and  Segarra,  2007).  Financial  aid  seems  to  affect  reform  politics  in  
ways more complex than the fairly simple notion of IFI leverage suggests. The evidence 
shows that governments retain powerful levers to block pressure from international 
organizations. External pressures for specific social policy measures are usually 
ineffective, unless they coincide with domestic priorities. Especially in technically 
complex and politically sensitive policy areas, such as social policy, IFI conditionality is 
a rather blunt instrument that limits the influence that the World Bank and other 
similar international organizations can exert over decision-making. Social policy reform 
                                                             
6 For  a  discussion,  see  Weyland (2003).  Also  Bräutigam and Segarra  (2007),  and  Kaufman and Nelson  
(2004).  
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often requires far-reaching institutional reorganization and agreement between many 
different branches of government, some of which do not respond to external pressure.  
Another line of argument, associated with ideational theorists, does not stress so 
much the financial leverage borne by IFIs as their role in diffusing “knowledge” and 
ideas among policy-makers in developing countries (Bräutigam and Segarra, 2007; see 
also Weyland,  2003).  In  this  view, major  international  actors  such as the World Bank 
act as “teachers” who transmit knowledge and policy ideas to developing countries 
“through the research they conduct, the publications they circulate, the training 
sessions they offer, the technical assistance they provide, and the speeches their 
leaders make” (Hunter and Brown, 2000: 118). In this process, domestic technocrats 
assume an important role as interlocutors for the transfer of external policy 
preferences. Through concepts such as international “policy networks” (Teichman, 
2001)  and  “epistemic  communities”  (Haas,  1992)  this  argument  is  better  able  to  link  
the international and domestic level in explaining the shift to the new pluralist social 
policy approach. In this view, international technocratic linkages serve as a critical 
gateway to social policy reform, and in the process policy specialists and experts play a 
pivotal role in shaping the reform agenda. Top level technocrats in Latin America have 
often developed strong ties to international policy networks, through education in the 
United States or working for international organizations. Through intense professional 
contacts and “social learning” (Bräutigam and Segarra, 2007) these technocrats often 
come to share IFI views, norms and ideas. Their standing as domestic experts enhances 
their credibility in transmitting policy ideas and from their positions in government 
agencies they come to exert influence over the policymaking process and in 
persuading the executive about the desirability of the new social policies. 
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This argument helps explain the wavelike character of social policy reform in Latin 
America. Indeed, much scholarship supports the view that policy specialists with 
international technocratic linkages play a central role in reform processes (Williamson, 
1994; Centeno and Silva, 1998; Teichman, 2001). As policymaking has become ever 
more complex, the need for professional expertise has increased. Yet, the political 
weight of technocrats should not be exaggerated. Although policy specialists are often 
instrumental in initiating the “import” of foreign models, ideas, and experiences, the 
fate of reform proposals rest decisively with politicians and politics more broadly. As 
pointed out by Weyland (2003: 19-20), technocratic reformers depend on “political 
decisions not only for getting their proposals enacted, but also for their own 
appointment to governmental positions in the first place”. To be successful, 
technocrats need to garner sufficient political support for their reform initiatives. 
While the famous “Chicago Boys”, for instance, almost exclusively depended on the 
benevolence of General Pinochet, democratization has enhanced the number of veto 
players. Also, while first-generation macro-economic reforms can often be put into 
effect fairly swiftly by a tightly knit “change team” of high economic officials with the 
backing of a top political authority, second-generation social reforms usually require 
years to implement and involve a great number of actors at different levels of 
government (Nelson, 2000). This complexity makes for a more overtly political process 
of reform. It helps institute veto opportunities and paves the way for a number of 
potential veto actors who may have an interest in blocking or diluting pluralist social 
policy reform. The literature on the politics of reform has pointed at how interest-
groups with vested interests in the status quo, such as workers’ unions and 
professional associations, come to oppose reform initiatives and complicate 
implementation efforts (Nelson, 2000). Other sources of opposition come from 
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members of the bureaucratic apparatus who are sceptical about change and want to 
maintain established procedures, practices and reward-systems (Weyland, 1996). As 
such, this literature highlights a number of political factors that come to complicate 
reform efforts. The role of internationally linked technocrats thus needs to be 
embedded in a more overtly political explanation.7 
In short, these international-level arguments have usefully highlighted some 
important aspects behind the shift to a pluralist social policy approach, most notably 
the influence of international organizations. But international factors cannot on their 
own account for this shift and the influence of international organizations is 
transmitted in ways more complex than the relatively simple notions of financial 
“leverage” and policy “diffusion” suggest. IFIs have been instrumental in shaping the 
new social agenda and altered ideas regarding social policy. But domestic policymakers 
retain powerful levers over policy choice and their interests do not necessarily reflect 
global economic and ideational forces, but are also shaped by domestic political 
contexts and institutions. Clearly, policy experts are of major importance for the 
content of reform. The detailed design of reform initiatives and proposals are usually 
the  work  of  fairly  small  teams  of  technocrats.  But  in  order  for  their  proposals  to  
prosper, backing from the executive branch remains crucial. Whether and how 
pluralist reforms move forward depend in large part on the constraints and 
opportunities politicians face and their strategic calculations about political gain. Any 
account of the reform process must therefore also pay close attention to the domestic 
level and how the impact of globalization is filtered through domestic contexts and 
power constellations.   
 
                                                             
7 For an example of such an approach in relation to economic reform, see Teichman (2001).  
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POLICYIMPLEMENTATIONANDITSCONSEQUENCES
Another major issue with regard to recent social reform efforts relates to their political 
effects. Changes in social welfare provision have far-reaching consequences for the 
nature of the linkages between state and society. Social policies and programs produce 
structural and institutional linkages between the state and a large body of citizens, 
with profound impacts on social equity, levels of social integration, the forms of 
representation and participation in policymaking, as well as the dynamics of power and 
control. The new pluralist social policies represent a radically different relationship 
between government and civil society, which raises important questions regarding the 
access and influence that the subaltern sectors exercise in this new configuration of 
social welfare provision. Ultimately, the nature of this new relationship has a direct 
bearing on the quality of democracy. 
One hypothesis that merits attention is that the pluralist social policy approach is 
reflected in a more collaborative style of governance. International discourses and 
policies emphasize the need of partnership, collaboration and connections between 
state and societal actors for effective and democratic governance.8 Advocates of the 
pluralist approach argue that it helps to produce new types of links between the state 
and subaltern sectors that allow for more effective citizenship and better 
representation of popular interests. The new institutional mechanisms of public 
participation in social welfare production, such as the design of demand-driven 
subsidies, competitive bids for project funds and co-participation schemes for the 
implementation of social projects, contribute to open up spaces and opportunities for 
subaltern sectors to bargain with state officials over the management of social welfare 
                                                             
8 For a discussion, see Bräutigam and Segarra (2007). See also World Bank (1992); Bebbington and Thiele 
(1993); Newman, Barnes, Sullivan and Knops (2004). 
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resources. The view offers an image of a new mode of social governance in which old 
clientelist and corporatist arrangements for welfare provision have been replaced by 
new pluralist and participatory structures, which link the subaltern sectors and their 
organizations to decision-making centers in the state through “associative networks” 
that “process and reshape contending political claims through relatively open-ended 
and problem-focused interactions” (Chalmers, Martin and Piester, 1997: 545). As such, 
these new welfare networks have helped to extend the boundaries of policymaking to 
a  new  set  of  actors  such  as  NGOs  and  community  organizations  that  are  able  to  
represent the interests of subaltern sectors. The result is a transformation of 
governance from hierarchies to networks and a reconfiguration of political 
representation around more plural institutions. 
But perhaps because this theory originates from public management and social 
policy literatures concerning advanced democratic countries, such as Britain and the 
United States, it underemphasizes problems of policy implementation. This literature 
portrays policy implementation as a relatively straightforward process in which private 
and  local  actors  become  involved  in  the  new  welfare  networks.  It  pays  little  heed  to  
the ways in which pluralist reforms may lend themselves to manipulation and capture, 
particularly in conditions of weak state capacity and underdevelopment. In practice, 
reform initiatives often become diluted in the process of implementation, leading to 
outcomes quite different from those originally intended by reformists (e.g. Grindle, 
1980). In developing countries, the “implementation gap” and principal-agent 
problems are especially confounding. States in developing countries are usually weak 
and riveted by internal factions and struggle over political and administrative turf. In 
addition, local “strongmen” are often able to capture parts of the state and its policies 
for  private ends (see Migdal,  2001).  Hence,  it  is  by no means clear  that  a  shift  to the 
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pluralist social policy approach will automatically result in more open, effective and 
participatory social governance. For the outcome of reform, the process of policy 
implementation is of decisive importance.  
Unfortunately, studies of social policy reform have tended to focus on the process 
of policy design and initiation to the detriment of factors that may aid, dilute or block 
implementation. All too often has it been assumed that once the policy elite have 
mounted the “political will”, reforms will be implemented and the desired results will 
come about. The few studies that pay attention to this implementation gap in social 
policy reform have often pointed to the lack of sufficient technical capabilities and 
organizational resources, especially at decentralized levels of administration (Grindle, 
1997; Tendler, 1997). These observers emphasize the need to strengthen the technical 
and administrative skills of local governments through human-resource training and 
the creation of administrative systems that incorporate incentives for worker 
productivity and norms of commitment and professionalism. Indeed, the nature of 
social policy administration is complex and subject to a multitude of challenges that 
require ongoing adjustment, learning and supervision. 
But the problem of implementation is not only a matter of “getting the policies 
right” and strengthening administrative capacity. Many studies show that the new 
social funds and targeted programs often fall victim to political abuse (Dresser, 1994; 
Roberts, 1995; Penfold-Becerra, 2007). The powers invested in technocratic reformers 
and policy implementers are often not sufficient to overcome politicians bent on 
diverting the policy’s purpose. Also, reformers must often contend with local 
resistance to new rules and practices. Efforts to strengthen social participation and 
pluralistic access to social funds may threaten the interests of local party chiefs, 
governors and district leaders. These actors strive to maintain their local control over 
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political resources. In this, they often come to work at cross-purposes with state 
leaders and policy specialists in charge of social policy reform. In contrast to 
technocratic reformers who are motivated by policy ideas and loyal to the overarching 
technocratic goals of pluralist reform, “topocrats”9 – local political elites – are 
motivated by political survival and loyal to territory. While technocratic reformers view 
the  central  state  as  a  vehicle  to  change  the  rules  for  social  provision  across  the  
country, topocrats seek to maintain their own rules for who gets what, when and how. 
They may have far more to gain from capturing targeted funds for their own political 
use than helping state leaders and technocrats instil pluralistic access to these 
resources. 
Pluralist reform is thus inherently a contentious process in which conflicting 
interests struggle for influence and control. Previous studies offer some clues to what 
have driven the shift to a pluralist social policy approach, but they have largely ignored 
the political motivations and incentives that moud the process of reform. Also, existing 
work comes short of offering sufficient insights about the effects of pluralist reform on 
resulting governance structures and state-society relations. Proponents of the pluralist 
approach herald its modernizing effects on development. They optimistically predict 
that the new policy mechanisms will deepen democracy by opening up the policy 
process for participation and paving the way for more accountable social governance 
(Graham, 1994; Segarra, 1997). By contrast, opponents of the pluralist approach warn 
of its anti-democratic effects. They argue that it is a means of privatizing social welfare 
that will not only minimize the social rights of citizenship, but also raise greater 
obstacles for lower-class political action. These critics assert that the new social policy 
instruments, such as the system with competitive bids for projects funds, places poor 
                                                             
9 See Reilly (1995) for a related discussion of the term. 
28 
 
communities in competition with each other, weakening their capacity for collective 
action. In this view, therefore, the net effect of pluralist reforms has been to atomize 
the subaltern sectors and stifle their political activity (e.g. Schild, 2002).  
Neither perspective pays sufficient attention to the possibility that the political 
outcome of pluralist reform need not be uniform across cases. Indeed, depending on 
political constellations and institutions, the effects of the shift to a pluralist approach 
can be expected to vary significantly between countries and regions. Yet, the role of 
political institutions in explaining diverging modes of social governance has largely 
been ignored. By ordering “the distinctive roles, relations and procedures that mark 
how the parts of the state interact with one another and how they tie into groups both 
inside and outside society” (Migdal, 2001: 246), political institutions have a crucial 
impact on the nature of social governance. As such, however, political institutions are 
never the sole “cause” of political outcomes, but should be seen as a set of intervening 
variables (Immergut, 2002). 
In sum, existing work does not offer a satisfactory framework for understanding 
the transformation of social governance in the wake of the dual transition to 
neoliberalism and democracy. Building such a framework requires new conceptual and 
analytical tools. This is the task of the next section.10    
 
 
THEPOLITICSOFTRANSFORMINGSOCIALGOVERNANCE:FRAMEWORK
This section develops a framework for analyzing the politics of transforming social 
governance, i.e. the methods for managing and distributing social welfare. The 
framework is based on an understanding of social policy as a political asset and a 
                                                             
10 In this, my study draws inspiration from Snyder (2001). 
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resource for governance. There are good reasons for adopting such a political 
perspective.11 First, the distributive consequences of social policymaking give it an 
inherently political dimension. “Benefits designed to increase or stabilize the ‘welfare’ 
of selected groups are created by policies that generate resources out of a combined 
process of enforced savings and income transfers which directly affects overall levels 
of equality and inequality” (Malloy, 1979: 5). These distributive consequences give 
politicians strong incentives to harness social policy for political purposes and gain. 
Benefits from social policy are “scarce goods” and their distribution makes it possible 
for political actors to enlist the support of societal groups and help “generate the 
resources by which to govern” (Bates, 1983: 131). In democratic contexts in particular, 
we  should  thus  expect  politicians  to  try  to  deploy  social  policy  as  a  means  to  build  
support and compete for power.12 
Also, by establishing a set of institutionalized ties between the state and societal 
groups, social policy directly affects structures of political representation and 
participation. As Malloy (1979: 5) has emphasized, social policy “can facilitate or block 
the integration of new or previously excluded social groupings into the mainstream of 
modern social, economic, and political life”. For example, corporatist welfare 
arrangements help institute access for organized interest associations such as labor 
unions to political and administrative power. Under these arrangements, corporatist 
labor organizations often emerge as powerful socio-political actors and the most 
important representatives of popular sector interests. By contrast, pluralist welfare 
arrangements provide relatively more room for NGOs and community organizations by 
                                                             
11 For a discusson of the political aspects of social policy, see Malloy (1979).  
12 For a similar argument, but in relation to regulatory policy, see Snyder (2001: 7). 
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way of decentralizing and targeting social programs. As a result, social welfare systems 
have an important effect on how citizens participate in modern socio-political life.  
Finally, social policy directly connects with the classic political question of 
governability. A basic characteristic of modern capitalist states is the recurrent tension 
between the necessity to sustain capital accumulation and the conflicts over socio-
political inclusion and distribution (Barrett, 1999). The challenge of modern 
governance  is  to  provide  the  conditions  for  capital  accumulation  while  at  the  same  
time ensuring social peace and generating popularity for the existing regime 
(O’Connor, 1973). Social policy functions as an important means for relieving this 
tension between accumulation and legitimation. The challenge of governance is 
particularly daunting for states in developing countries who simultaneously confront 
requests for social justice, political participation and economic growth. An important 
motivation  for  states  to  engage  in  social  policymaking  is  to  be  able  to  manage  this  
multiplicity of contradictory pressures that arise in the process of development 
(Baretta and Douglass, 1977). Modern social protection policies in Western societies, 
such as the program developed by Bismarck in 1883, arguably emerged out of 
concerns for the potentially disruptive effects of market-based economic 
development. Specifically, social welfare policies were linked to the emergence of the 
industrial working class and the need to reorganize the links between society and 
prevailing structures of domination and control. As such, the formulation of social 
protection policies formed a conscious political attempt to reshape state and social 
structures that had been disrupted by emerging industrial capitalism, war and the 
specter of revolution (Malloy, 1991). These social protection policies were not only 
aimed at protecting the underprivileged from hardship, but also as a reformist way of 
dealing with the tension between accumulation and legitimation. 
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The  recognition  that  social  policy  forms  part  of  a  conscious  political  attempt  to  
manage state-society relations and the problem of governance puts political leaders’ 
strategic calculations at the center of analysis. Their strategic calculations will in 
important ways be conditioned by the political challenges that they face as a result of 
changes in the policy environment. Such changes often relate to major economic and 
social transformations to which political leaders must respond. Their choices of social 
policy approach will also in important ways be shaped by prevailing ideas about 
appropriate policy response and course of implementation. Yet political leaders are 
not completely free to adopt any course of action that fit their political interests and 
ideological conceptions of appropriate social governance. They are constrained by 
political institutions that place strict boundaries on their reform strategies that to a 
large extent define their capabilities of overcoming vested interests in the process of 
implementation. To explain the resulting mode of social governance, we thus need a 
framework that links political leaders’ strategic and instrumental calculations to the 
particular policy challenges they face as well as the ideas and institutions that shape 
the process of social reform.  
  
SocioeconomicStructure
The socioeconomic structure helps shape political leaders’ strategic calculations about 
social policy formation. In this respect, the major economic and social changes 
associated broadly with the process of globalization provide a critical backdrop for 
understanding social reform efforts.  
Post-war social welfare arrangements, such as corporatist welfarism in Latin 
America, were sustained by the socioeconomic structures associated with the 
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Keynesian or import-substituting industrialization era.13 During this “golden age” of the 
welfare state, the productive structures “created conditions [in] which relatively 
homogeneous working classes could be organized, and in which organized labor could 
deliver both social peace and working-class votes” (Levitsky, 2003: 5). In this context, 
governments were motivated to design social policies for the benefit of organized 
labor. At the same time, the combination of global economic expansion and the 
Bretton Woods system for regulating international economic relations provided 
governments with the resources and policymaking autonomy to maintain generous 
social protection programs. 
The profound structural changes associated with the decline of the Keynesian-ISI 
model and the shift to neoliberal economic strategies has undermined this mode of 
social governance. First, the fiscal constraints associated with this shift have eroded 
the economic bases of post-war welfare arrangements. Stagflationary pressures and 
rising debt generated fiscal crises that put pressure on governments to cut social 
spending. Subsequent neoliberal economic restructuring has also put strict boundaries 
on social policy options. As economic liberalization proceeds, formerly protected 
economies become confronted with global market forces demanding enhanced 
competitiveness, including cuts in employer contributions to social security schemes. 
The enhanced factor mobility that accompanies liberalization also creates the need to 
attract private investment and diminish the risk of inflation. As a result, governments 
face compelling incentives to cut labor costs through social policy reform.14 
At the same time, changing class structures have eroded the socio-political bases of 
post-war social welfare arrangements. The decline of blue-collar workforces has 
                                                             
13 See Levitsky (2003) for a discussion of how this constellation sustained labor-based political coalitions.  
14 For a discussion, see Brooks (2007). 
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weakened a central pillar on which the traditional welfare state has been built. 
Importantly, the changes in the workforce have usually been accompanied by a decline 
in union membership. “The globalization of production, the decline of mass production 
forms, and the growth of tertiary, informal and self-employed sectors have weakened 
industrial unions and centralized labor confederations” (Levitsky, 2003: 6). Industrial 
unions have increasingly become marginal players in social policymaking. As a 
consequence, the capacity of organized labor to mobilize in support of encompassing 
welfare policies has been severely reduced. Concomitantly with this weakening of 
organized labor, the growth of the urban informal sector in many countries, including 
Latin America, has also provided political elites with compelling incentives to remold 
their relationships with the popular sectors.   
Hence, the major structural transformations associated with the process of 
neoliberal globalization have been an important catalyst for social reform efforts. By 
changing the economic and socio-political bases of social governance, these structural 
transformations put pressure on policymakers to enact social policy reform. To 
maintain social governability, governments need to adjust their social policies to both 
new economic constraints as well as changing structures of social organization. Both 
developments create incentives to adopt a pluralist social policy approach. First, the 
new fiscal constraints associated with neoliberalism makes Keynesian-ISI welfare 
arrangements economically less viable. By shifting to a pluralist social policy approach, 
with its emphasis on targeting and civil society participation, public social spending can 
be cut and redirected toward human and social capital formation, so as to better serve 
the new neoliberal economic model. Second, the changes in social structure associated 
with post-industrialism have created political incentives for governments to 
rearticulate old linkages to the popular sectors. By adopting the pluralist approach, 
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social policy can be used to build new links to civil society organizations and the urban 
poor.      
Yet, the appearance of new structural incentives is no guarantee that policymakers 
will have either the will or the capacity to enact pluralist reform. In fact, much of the 
literature is deeply pessimistic of the chances of successful implementation of social 
reform (Weyland, 1996; Nelson, 2000). In pursuing reformist policies, governments 
need to contend with multiple sources of opposition. Entrenched bureaucrats, 
powerful interest groups, and politicians with vested interests in the status quo will all 
come to resist reform efforts. Reformist governments may lack a sufficiently strong 
political base to pursue social policies that run counter to such vested interests. 
Moreover,  even  if  government  are  able  to  mount  the  political  will  and  capacity  to  
override opposition, state fragmentation in developing countries often complicates 
efforts to implement reform (Migdal, 2001; Weyland, 1996). Lack of administrative 
capacity and oversight, especially at decentralized levels of government, provide 
opportunities to “capture” these new social policies for personal gain. As we shall see, 
much will depend on how political institutions structure the policy process and the 
power invested in reforming technocrats.  
To sum up, focusing on structural transformations helps explain the constraints 
and opportunities political leaders face in trying to manage the problem of 
governance. However, such a focus serves more to reduce the limitations of the range 
of feasible policy approaches than to explain actual enactment of social reform. To 
account for the enactment of pluralist reform, we thus also need to consider additional 
factors. 
 

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PolicyIdeasandExperts
While socioeconomic transformations put pressure on political leaders to enact social 
reform, the specific reform approach is in important ways shaped by prevailing policy 
ideas and norms prescribing the appropriate response to such changes within the 
socioeconomic context. Policy ideas refer here to the organized principles and causal 
beliefs in which the proposals for how to deal with the problems of accumulation and 
legitimation are embedded. They generate interpretations of the very problem and 
thus also “the political terrain within which solutions are debated” (Kurtz, 2002: 294). 
For this study, the most relevant policy idea is the pluralist social policy approach that 
acquired legitimacy and became internalized into domestic political debates against 
the background of the major socioeconomic transformations during the 1980s. 
Policy ideas are not only chosen by policymakers out of ideological conviction but 
for highly pragmatic reasons as well. The combination of increasing pressures from the 
“new social question” and the severe constraints on social spending provided by the 
neoliberal model has precipitated a search among policymakers for ways “to do more 
with less”. Within this context, the pluralist approach presents chief executives with a 
credible option for how to renew social policymaking to fit the new socioeconomic 
structures and help recast state-society linkages.   
However, before reforms may be adopted, the new policy idea must come to the 
attention of leading policymakers and become “perceived as an attractive option for 
reform” (Brooks, 2007: 37). The dissemination of the pluralist paradigm was 
spearheaded globally by the World Bank, along with international agencies such as the 
IDB, various UN organizations, and other international donors and think-tanks. By 
playing a central role in the training of experts, these organizations help form 
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international “policy networks”15 and “epistemic communities” that shape the 
intellectual and technical tools that domestic policy experts apply in social 
policymaking. As defined by Haas (1992: 3), an epistemic community is “a network of 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area”. 
From their positions in state agencies these internationally-linked technocratic experts 
exert influence on domestic social policy by diffusing ideas about “appropriate policy”, 
framing the way decision-makers think of the policymaking context, and constrain the 
set of acceptable policy measures (Chwieroth, 2005).  
Technocrats are policy experts who gain influence from their claim to objective 
knowledge on the basis of their credentials, education and professional experience. 
They are concerned with formulating policies to serve the state as a whole, as opposed 
to the interests of particular groups. This appeal to encompassing state interests 
distinguishes technocratic rule from conventional politics where policies are often 
proposed or defended to serve factionalist goals (Centeno and Silva, 1998). As 
opposed to politicians who base their actions on calculations about re-election, 
technocrats look to technical criteria for guidance to optimal decision-making. Hence, 
in contrast with most interest groups, technocratic experts do not derive their power 
from the satisfaction of particularistic demands, but from their credibility as 
transmitters of objective knowledge and their ability to fulfil specified policy functions 
independently from vested interests. Hence, policy experts play a critical role in the 
process  of  social  reform.  To  the  extent  that  they  are  able  to  form  coherent  “change  
teams” (Waterbury, 1992) and receive backing from the chief executive, they may 
                                                             
15 See Teichman (2001). 
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exert considerable influence over the design of reform proposals and their 
implementation.  
But why would presidents delegate authority over the reform process to 
technocratic change teams? Due to the changes in socioeconomic context, chief 
executives are under pressure to enact social reform. However, considering the 
distributive consequences of social policy changes, the reform process is likely to raise 
strong opposition from vested interests. By deploying technocratic change teams, chief 
executives try to bypass attempts by such vested interests to resist or overturn reform. 
Unlike more entrenched bureaucrats, these technocratic experts are not driven to 
protect institutional turf but to dismantle and remake the old social policy model in 
accordance with their pluralist vision of social governance. As such, technocratic 
change teams can more easily be insulated from legislative and interest group 
pressures, as well as from routine bureaucratic processes, allowing for technically 
sound and swift enactment of reform. Also, as members of international policy 
networks, technocratic experts are ideally placed to tap international sources of 
development finance and aid, providing additional funding for social projects during 
times of fiscal austerity. Often these policy technocrats also have extensive 
connections with civil society organizations, helping the formation of relations with 
major NGOs and other social actors, and facilitating their co-optation.  
Hence, a central element of chief executives’ strategies to pursue social reform is 
the use of technocratic change teams empowered to bring about policy change. During 
the 1990s, political leaders in a number of developing countries have delegated 
authority over policy change to such teams of pluralist technocrats. But the outcome 
of reform efforts is by no means certain. Successful implementation of the new 
pluralist model of social provision is no mean feat. Pluralist change teams will have to 
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compete with other policymakers and presidential advisors for influence. In particular, 
economic policymakers may have different views on what reforms are needed. In 
addition, politicians, bureaucrats and organized labor all have their own interests in 
trying to capture reform. The change teams’ ability to control the reform process will  
in important ways determine the fate of reform.   
Crucially, this ability is also determined by regime institutions. Technocratic 
reformers operate within a web of politically consequential institutions that may limit 
reform achievements (Williams, 2002). Not all institutional contexts are equally 
conducive to implementing pluralist reforms. Technocratic reformers often discover 
that existing regime institutions are “stacked” against them, weakening their control of 
policy implementation. While traditional opponents to pluralist reforms such as labor 
unions have been weakened, technocratic reformers still depend on presidential 
backing for successful implementation of the pluralist approach. Chief executives may 
face strong political incentives to divert pluralist social projects for populist goals. Also, 
depending on institutional context, in order to implement the pluralist approach 
reformers may depend on local political elites. In politico-institutional contexts where 
politicians’ incentives to use patronage to achieve their political goals are high and 
controls on discretionary spending are weak, the pluralist approach may facilitate 
“neopopulist” strategies and new forms of clientelism (see Roberts, 1995, and 
Weyland, 1996b, 1999a). Hence, in order to understand the reform process, especially 
its outcome, it is necessary to pay close attention to institutional structure. 
 
RegimeInstitutions
Regime institutions are the procedural rules, both formal and informal, that define 
how the establishment and conduct of government is territorially and politically 
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organized. The political regime regulates the selection and behavior of public 
authorities. The territorial regime specifies the division of powers between national 
government and the governments of sub-national territorial units (Gibson, 2008). As 
such, regime institutions create constraints and opportunities for different actors in 
social policymaking, and structure their relations with one another. Like all institutions, 
regime institutions favor some actors over others, providing greater or fewer 
opportunities to influence social policy reform. By the same token, regime institutions 
will also shape politicians’ incentives by defining their room of maneuver in pursuing 
their goals. By structuring political interaction in ways that limit what some actors can 
do, and enable others to do things that they could not do under a different regime, 
regime institutions have an important impact on the politics of transforming social 
governance (Williams, 2002).  
Figure 1.1 illustrates four types of territorial regime. These are divided on the basis 
of two common analytical dimensions for distinguishing between territorial regimes: 
the degree of centralization versus decentralization, and federal versus unitary 
systems. 
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Figure1.1   TypesofTerritorialRegime 
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The type of territorial regime is important as it defines the authority of topocrats – 
sub-national political actors - in social policymaking. In contrast to technocratic 
reformers, topocrats are not foremost loyal to national goals and universalistic 
principles, but to territory and the protection of their political turf. As such, they often 
have diametrically opposite interests from pluralist reformers and may come to 
impose severe constraints on the central government in its efforts to implement the 
pluralist approach. The greater the authority of such local powers, the more difficult it 
will be for the center to impose its will on the localities and regions. For example, in 
decentralized federal regimes (lower right quadrant), topocrats are crucial actors in 
social governance as they hold authority over vital political resources. Not only may 
topocrats hold authority over aspects of social policy in their jurisdictions, but they 
also play an important role in the politics of national coalition building. In order to 
consolidate governability, win elections and carry out major reforms, chief executives 
need to build viable national coalitions. In a context of decentralized federalism, 
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topocrats, with their abundant supplies of voters and legislators, exercise considerable 
leverage. As a result, central government reformers will need to compromise with 
these local powers. The effects of such political bargaining between central state 
officials and topocrats may constitute a formidable obstacle to the successful 
implementation of pluralist reform. At the very least, technocratic reformers will find 
their control over the implementation process circumscribed by such political 
interests.  
By contrast, in centralized-unitary regimes (upper left quadrant) topocrats have 
limited opportunities to assert their interests’ vis-à-vis the central state. Structures of a 
largely “prefectoral” character ensures a high degree of political and administrative 
control from the center over regions and localities. In case of local resistance, central 
state actors can make use of such prefectoral structures to impose pluralist reforms. 
On  the  whole,  chief  executives  have  less  need  to  engage  in  territorial  politics  and  
bargaining games with topocrats as these are not likely to command any vital political 
resources.16 When presidents do not depend on topocrats for political survival, they 
are more likely to insulate social change teams from topocratic interests. This paves 
the way for technocratic reformers to assert control over the process of 
implementation. Depending on presidential backing, pluralist technocrats may become 
empowered with great autonomy to implement the pluralist approach and transform 
social governance.   
Besides territorial regime institutions, political regime institutions will also shape 
the policy making process. At the most general level, we may distinguish between 
authoritarian and democratic regimes. In authoritarian regimes chief executives face 
few constraints in enacting social reform. As a result, social policy is likely to reflect the 
                                                             
16 For a discussion of territorial politics, see Gibson (2004; 2008).  
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interests and political styles of the top leadership and their advisors. In an 
authoritarian context, technocratic change teams will have greater autonomy from 
topocratic and societal interests. Yet, internal cracks between top leadership often 
complicate reform efforts. Depending on the institutional structure of the decision-
making process, particularly the extent to which power has been concentrated with 
one reformist dictator as against a junta structure, reformists may be bogged down by 
more conservative leadership elements. In any case, the political outcome of the 
reform process is not likely to reflect a pluralist framework. While authoritarian 
institutions are conducive to the dismantling of the old corporatist mode of social 
governance, these very same institutions make the adoption of the pluralist approach 
less urgent. Social disruptions and opposition can be muted by the circumcision of 
political and civil rights, and if necessary by force. Policymakers in authoritarian 
regimes, therefore, have less incentive to use the pluralist approach to social 
policymaking as a strategic approach to manage state-society relations and the 
problem of governance.    
By contrast, in democratic regimes repression is not an option. Instead, social 
policy provides an important means to manage state-society relations and the problem 
of governance. To the extent that the pre-democratic regime has dismantled the old 
social policy approach, democratization will put pressure on the new political leaders 
to deal with the social question. This presents democratic leaders with a delicate 
dilemma. They will need to attract voter support by catering to the large mass of poor 
people expecting social improvements, but due to economic constraints, they will have 
little leeway to increase or redistribute social benefits. Moreover, the lifting of 
prohibitions on social and political organization raises the specter of mass mobilization 
against austerity policies. Stripped from old corporatist mechanisms for regulating 
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social demands and pressures, the new political elites will need to find new ways to 
manage state-society relations. Under such circumstances, the pluralist approach 
provides an attractive option. By targeting social assistance and incorporating civil 
society  organizations  in  the  implementation  of  social  programs,  new  ties  can  be  
established  with  the  subaltern  sectors.  As  such,  in  addition  to  major  structural  and  
ideological transformations, and in conjunction with such changes, recent transitions 
to democracy have also provided important impulses to enact pluralist reform. 
However, important variations exist between democracies with regard to their 
institutional configuration and such variations will condition the process of 
implementing pluralist reform. O’Donnell (1994, 1999), among others, has called 
attention to institutions of public accountability and how important these are for 
understanding differences among democracies. The concept of public accountability 
refers to the answerability and responsibility of public officials. Institutions of public 
accountability thus denote constraints placed on the behavior of public officials by 
agencies and constituencies with the capacity to demand an accounting of such 
officials and/or the power to apply sanctions on them. These institutions limit the use 
and sanction the abuse of political power. Hence, accountability “rests largely on the 
effectiveness of the sanctions and the capacity of accountability institutions to monitor 
the actions, decisions, and private interests of public officials” (World Bank, 2000: 40). 
O’Donnell’s seminal discussion distinguishes between “vertical” and “horizontal” 
dimensions of public accountability in democracies.17 The  former  refers  to  the  
accountability of state agents to citizens, while the latter refers to the accountability 
                                                             
17 I refer here to O’Donnell (1994, 1999). For further explorations on this theme, see Mainwaring and 
Welna (2003), Przeworski, Manin, and Stokes (1999); and Schedler, Diamond, and Plattner (1999).  
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between different branches of the state to one another.18 Vertical accountability 
results from properly institutionalized elections that are designed to insert popular 
power into the state. It implies a representative relationship between the citizens and 
their elected officials who have been authorized to exercise governmental power on 
citizens’ behalf. Through the electoral mechanism, citizens can hold governments 
responsible for their actions, producing governments that are accountable and 
responsive to public interests. For this mechanism of vertical accountability to be 
effective, elections not only need to be free, fair, competitive and inclusive – a 
prerequisite for any political democracy – but also, de facto, empower elected officers 
with decision-making authority over government policy. Scholars of democratization 
have repeatedly noted how “reserved domains”, “tutelary powers” and “violent 
participation” may infringe upon the ability of citizens to exercise vertical control. Also, 
“institutionalized bias” with respect to electoral rules may weaken the mechanism 
through which citizens act to demand responsiveness of governmental policies to their 
preferences. Such “perverse institutionalization” is designed to restrict popular power 
and, thus, repel threats to elite interests by electoral democracy. Hence, a prerequisite 
of strong vertical accountability is the proper institutionalization of meaningful 
elections in the sense of them being consequential.  
With respect to social policymaking, institutions of vertical accountability will thus 
shape politicians’ strategies to enact social reform. In regimes with strong institutions 
of vertical accountability, incumbents are immediately accountable to popular 
                                                             
18 Conceptions of vertical and horizontal accountability largely correspond to the electoral and 
constitutional dimensions of liberal democracy, respectively. For a discussion, see Wigell (2008). 
Scholars have repeatedly emphasized how third-wave democracies vary along these two dimensions, 
scoring  “high”  on  one  dimension  and  low  on  the  other  or  vice  versa.  This  calls  for  a  typology  of  
democracies, whereby the effects of such differences on social reform politics can be assessed. Such a 
typology can readily be constructed on the basis of O’Donnell’s insightful conceptualization of 
democratic accountability. 
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interests and will face compelling incentives to respond to societal demands. In such a 
context, social reform projects are likely to reflect politicians’ need to attract electoral 
support and pander to societal interest groups. By contrast, in regimes with weak 
institutions of vertical accountability, popular interests hold weaker leverage over 
government policy. Through “perverse institutionalization”, incumbents are 
constrained by elite interests that may come to exert decisive influence over social 
reform strategies. 
Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, results from the constitutional checks 
and balances that are designed to prevent democracy from degenerating into electoral 
autocracy. It implies that governmental actions do not infringe the law and due 
process. Through a system of intrastate checks and balances that delimit state activity 
into rigorously circumscribed competencies, governmental actions are held in check 
under the rule of law. According to O’Donnell (1999: 39), for mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability to be effective, “there must exist state agencies that are authorized and 
willing to oversee, control, redress, and if need be sanction unlawful actions by other 
state agencies”. As such, a prerequisite of strong horizontal accountability is an 
effective system of separation of powers and checks and balances. It includes the 
classic institutions of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary; but in 
contemporary democracies it also extends to various oversight agencies such as 
ombudsmen, general accounting offices, fiscalías, and the like. Such agencies of 
horizontal control must not only have constitutional authority but also, de facto, 
sufficient autonomy with respect to other branches of government, particularly the 
executive, in order to be able to fulfil their function in upholding the rule of law.  
With a view to social policymaking, strong institutions of horizontal accountability 
are thus essential for preventing and deterring clientelist practices and the 
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discretionary use of social funds. They impose constraints on politicians as to how 
social  policy can be used to further their  private and political  goals.  By contrast,  in  a  
context of weak institutions of horizontal accountability politicians are free to use 
social policy resources in a clientelistic manner to improve their political or electoral 
backing. Indeed, as the likely costs for transgressing “the codes of conduct” are low, 
rational politicians will have an incentive to capture these social funds for clientelist 
ends. 
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The type of democratic regime will thus have an important effect on the process of 
implementing the pluralist approach. This can readily be understood by utilizing the 
typology illustrated in Figure 1.2. For example, in “delegative” democracies, strong 
institutions of vertical accountability put pressure on government leaders to respond 
to popular demands. At the same time, weak institutions of horizontal accountability 
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give these leaders wide discretion in allocating social funds. Under such circumstances, 
the process of implementing the pluralist approach is likely to follow a populist 
trajectory in which pluralist reforms are strategically manipulated for electoral 
purposes. Targeted funds are designed to provide selective access for supporters in 
clientelistic fashion and participatory mechanisms are fitted to co-opt civil society 
organizations. When combined with decentralized federalism, such discretion extends 
to  topocrats  who  face  similar  incentives  to  make  use  of  a  “delegative  mandate”  to  
consolidate clientelistic networks in their respective “fiefdoms”. Unchecked by agents 
of horizontal control such as legislatures, judiciaries or accounting offices, topocrats 
face compelling incentives to capture pluralist reforms and allocate these resources 
using clientelist rather than universal criteria.  
By contrast, in “protected” democracies, institutions such as tutelary powers, 
reserved domains and other non-majoritarian prerogatives constrain government 
leaders in responding to popular demands and pressures. Instead, government leaders 
are forced to share authority over social policy with elite actors. At the same time, 
strong institutions of horizontal accountability help prevent “capture” of social policy. 
Agencies of horizontal control such as controllers, fiscalías, ombudsmen, accounting 
offices, and legislative committees are charged with effective powers to monitor and 
sanction wrongdoings which helps to deter clientelistic usage of social funds and 
invokes universalistic rules of conduct in allocating social policy resources. In a 
protected democracy, politicians have few means to strategically manipulate pluralist 
reforms for their immediate political purposes. Instead, the implementation of the 
pluralist approach is likely to follow a highly technocratic trajectory in which rational-
bureaucratic criteria prevail over political considerations. Such technocratic 
governance in protected democracies is all the more prevalent when combined with 
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unitary centralism, a system in which topocrats have very few means to influence the 
enactment of social policy. Under such circumstances, sub-national government is 
largely reduced to an extension of central state bureaucracy.   
 
PoliticalOutcome:ModesofSocialGovernance
This study argues that the structural and ideological changes associated with the 
demise of the state-centric matrix have provided important impulses for policymakers 
to initiate pluralist social policy reforms. The shift from state-led to market-oriented 
economic strategies has rendered corporatism increasingly obsolete as an approach to 
organize state-society relations. Organized labor, a bastion of corporatist mediation, 
has been dramatically weakened by these economic changes. At the same time, the 
reconstitution of social organization around base-level activity has provided incentives 
for political elites to adjust their agendas to be able to make inroads into these new 
potential social constituencies and build new links to intermediary organizations in the 
wake  of  the  demise  of  corporatism.  These  economic  and  social  changes  were  
exacerbated in Latin America as a result of the debt crisis and structural adjustment 
policies that put severe constraints on social policy options. Political leaders have been 
forced to look for new methods and policies to manage the dilemma between 
accumulation and legitimation. In many parts of the region, re-democratization has 
made it even more imperative for governments to address perceived needs and 
demands, as voters put high hopes on democracy to solve the social question. The 
solution for maximizing both economic and political returns from the distribution of 
scarce social funding has been to target the increasing mass of urban poor and devolve 
the implementation of social programs to NGOs and community organizations.  
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Coupled with these socioeconomic transformations are the ideational changes that 
have cemented the predominance of the pluralist approach. In conjunction with the 
rise of neoliberalism, the old corporatist social policy approach has been discredited, 
being seen as corrupt, inflexible and inefficient. In this process, social policy experts 
have played an important role as transmitters of pluralist social policy ideas and 
proposals. Under pressure from structural changes to enact social reform, political 
leaders find it convenient to delegate authority over the enactment of reform to 
technocratic experts so as to be able to bypass vested interests and present the reform 
project with appeals to “objective knowledge”.   
However, the political outcome of such pluralist social policy initiatives is by no 
means uniform across cases. This study argues that the politics of pluralist reform 
leads  to  divergent  modes  of  social  governance.  Social  governance  refers  to  the  
methods for managing and distributing social welfare. As such, social governance has a 
direct bearing on state-society relations. Modes of social governance thus articulate 
ways of managing state-society relations and the problem of governance. Depending 
on trajectories of implementation, pluralist reform may end up supporting both 
populist as well as technocratic solutions to the problem of governance. As such, the 
political outcome will differ markedly from the theoretical assumptions coupling the 
pluralist approach with participatory modes of social governance. Even if reformist 
politicians initiating the new social policy approach are committed to pluralist 
inclusion, patronage politicians and topocrats may have strong incentives to try to 
“milk” the reforms in the implementation phase, thus potentially corroding its 
participatory goals and principles. Also, reformist technocrats in charge of the 
enactment  of  social  reform  may  want  to  retain  control  over  the  policy  process,  and  
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thus effectively exclude societal actors from vital policymaking arenas. Mode of social 
governance thus has a major importance for issues of citizenship and social change.       
At one end we find technocratic modes of social governance that provide for “neo-
pluralist” inclusion of subaltern sectors and in which social funds are allocated on the 
basis of predominantly non-partisan and technical criteria. Neo-pluralism refers here 
to the structures that link society with the state on the social policy arena. Its pluralist 
aspect comes from the absence of any state-imposed representational monopolies 
characteristic of corporatism. “Organized labour becomes one actor among many, 
albeit weaker, with fewer privileges and in a less-unified form than in the past” 
(Oxhorn, 1998: 200). Like classical pluralism, neo-pluralism provides for voluntary 
participation in the administration of social programs and invokes free competition for 
access to social funds. However, unlike classical pluralism, neo-pluralism is 
characterized by its strong technocratic bent through which the state is able to control 
social-demand making and set the terms for civil society participation in social 
policymaking. Societal participation mainly revolves around policy implementation. 
NGOs and community organizations are invited to submit project proposals and 
compete for funds on the highly technical terms set by the welfare bureaucracy. The 
aim with such competition is to develop innovative and cost-effective programs of 
social development. At the same time, by introducing competitive tendering as a major 
mechanism for allocating social funds, these organizations are provided with strong 
incentives to adjust their agendas so as to be able to compete for these funds. In the 
process, they often come to downplay some of their earlier political functions as 
advocacy groups for the subaltern sectors and reduce their demands on the 
government. As such, these structures serve to depoliticize the links between state 
and society, and help deflect popular mobilization away from encompassing political 
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activity towards grass-roots social efforts. By inviting NGOs and community groups to 
take over responsibility for welfare provision and incorporate them into funding 
relationships in which they mainly acquire the role of implementers of social programs, 
the state is thus able to impose greater political discipline upon civil society. 
Consequently, even though these organizations help to establish institutionalized ties 
between the subaltern sectors on the one hand, and the state on the other, they lead 
neither to increased pluralistic pressure group politics nor to class polarization.  
Hence, as a political outcome of pluralist reform, technocratic modes of social 
governance differ markedly from the rhetoric that connects the pluralist approach with 
participatory governance and the empowerment of the poor. Technocratic governance 
does not exclude participation; indeed, it makes community groups share 
responsibility for government policies by devolving welfare tasks to them. But these 
participatory mechanisms do not empower subaltern sectors to effectively articulate 
encompassing social demands. In technocratic modes of social governance 
participation is structured by the technocrats within the welfare bureaucracy, who 
remain in charge of policy design and spending priorities. Participation is reduced to 
the process of program implementation. While these structures allow for the 
rationalization of social policymaking by instituting technical criteria into the 
administration of social welfare, this de-politicization concomitantly provokes apathy 
and de-mobilization among the subaltern sectors. As opportunities to challenge 
decision-making are few, subaltern sectors have few incentives to mobilize. Also, 
pluralistic competition between civil society groups for access to social benefits often 
lead to atomization and fragmentation of social organization. The system of contract-
based funding helps to institute competitive relationships between subaltern sectors 
as community leaders and their organizations compete for the scarce resources 
52 
 
offered by the welfare bureaucracy. These competitive relationships work against 
social capital formation as some neighbourhoods may become included into social 
programs, while other similar and adjacent neighbourhoods are left out. Moreover, 
because of the highly technical requirements for participation, those most in need of 
assistance, but who lack the capabilities of taking advantage of participatory 
opportunities, often become excluded. Under these circumstances, business groups 
and more technically endowed NGOs often acquire advantages in competitive biddings 
for tendering contracts. In summary, while technocratic modes of social governance 
provide for pluralistic access to social benefits, scarce resources and technocratic 
control over the distribution of benefits serve to depoliticize social policymaking 
making it hard for subaltern sectors to demand encompassing social change.  
At the other end we find populist modes of social governance that provide for 
“neo-clientelist” inclusion of subaltern sectors, in which social funds are allocated on 
the basis of predominantly partisan and political criteria. Clientelism refers to 
relationships of political subordination in exchange for material rewards. It entails the 
use of selective benefits through which leaders attempt to command political loyalty. 
By entering clientelist networks, subaltern sectors acquire some degree of resources 
and security. In traditional clientelism, the freedom of the clients in choosing to enter 
or exit these patron-client relationships, and on which terms, is severely constrained. 
“The patron usually held virtual monopoly over the means of livelihood of his clients, 
so that not entering or exiting the relation was often prohibitively costly” (Piattoni, 
2001b: 12). However, in neo-clientelism, the clients are not “forced” to enter clientelist 
networks, but choose to do so in order to gain privileged access to public resources 
and make demands upon the state. Also, neo-clientelistic ties are less individualistic. 
As Gay (1998: 14) has emphasized, clientelism is increasingly: “A means to pursue the 
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delivery of collective as opposed to individual goods. This means that political 
clienteles are less likely to assume the form of loose clusters of independently 
negotiated dyads than organizations, communities or even whole regions that fashion 
relationships or reach understandings with politicians, public officials and 
administrations”. Neo-clientelism can thus be seen as a strategy whereby politicians 
(the patrons) try to gain and maintain power by distributing divisible benefits to 
subaltern sectors, while the subaltern sectors try to obtain selective access to state-
administered goods by granting their vote to the politicians (Piattoni, 2001a). In 
populist modes of social governance, social benefits are allocated according to partisan 
and political criteria, which enable the establishment of such neo-clientelist 
relationships. Participation thus mainly takes the form of clientelist brokerage whereby 
civil society organizations are enlisted to act as middlemen in doling out particular 
benefits to political loyalists. The aim is to marginalise political opposition and build 
local bases of political support. Pluralist reforms, such as targeting and 
decentralization, are politically manipulated to facilitate clientelistic incorporation of 
the poor. At the same time, such clientelistic ties serve to politicize the linkages 
between the political elites and subaltern sectors. These linkages constitute 
mechanisms through which the multiple categories of subaltern sectors can make 
demands upon the state and whom the political elites compete to command. This 
process feeds political mobilization as political elites dole out particularistic benefits in 
return for attendance at political rallies and other political services. As such, to the 
extent that these welfare benefits are open to discretionary allocation procedures, 
populist modes of social governance run counter to technocratic modes of social 
governance, but in ways that preserve the essentially elitist character of the socio-
political order. 
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Hence, as a political outcome of pluralist reform, also populist modes of social 
governance differ markedly from the rhetoric that connects the pluralist approach with 
participatory governance and poor peoples’ empowerment. Populist governance does 
include some sort of participation; indeed, political parties and civil society 
organizations become heavily involved in allocating social funds and performing 
welfare tasks. However, these participatory mechanisms are essentially structured 
from above. Politicians hold tight control over discretionary funds and decisions 
regarding allocation are heavily influenced by political considerations. Social programs 
are manipulated by personalist leaders seeking political support. Such forms of 
selective incorporation help these leaders, both national and sub-national, maintain a 
popular constituency despite macroeconomic reforms that sharpen inequalities and 
drive up unemployment. Yet, populist governance is inherently unstable and prone to 
sudden outbursts of counter-mobilization. As populism tends to cause chronic 
overspending, it often leads to fiscal crisis. “While such crisis can be postponed for a 
while by cumulating public debt, it finally has to be faced” (Piattoni, 2001b: 28). The 
very logic of populism (and clientelism) is bound to drive up expectations and “trigger 
a backlash if it leads to large public deficits, widespread corruption, and the 
disintegration of public institutions” (Ibid.: 26). In sum, populist modes of social 
governance provide for clientelistic access to social benefits. But while these clientelist 
exchanges may intensify patterns of social inequality as certain groups gain 
“privileges” others do not, political control over the distribution of benefits serves to 
politicize social policymaking whereby opportunities may open up for subaltern sectors 
to articulate more encompassing social change. 
Between these two extremes (technocratic versus populist) we may find 
intermediate outcomes, such as participatory modes of social governance that provide 
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for “associative” inclusion of subaltern sectors and in which social funds are allocated 
on the basis of cognitive processes that involve both technical and political 
considerations. At least, this is what a growing literature on participatory governance 
and “associative networks” claim to have found. “Associationalism” refers to the 
networks that link society with the state on the social policy arena. Associative 
networks are “non-hierarchical structures formed through decisions by multiple actors 
who come together to shape public policy” (Chalmers, Martin, and Piester, 1997: 567). 
As  such,  these  networks  allow  societal  actors  to  place  demands  on  the  state  and  
promote state responsiveness through inter-organizational ties that “process and 
reshape contending political claims through relatively open-ended and problem-
focused interactions” (Ibid.: 545). By breaking down the hierarchical relations of 
dependence and connecting segments of civil society with the state, these networks 
expand opportunities to organized collective coordination structures for the pursuit of 
group interests. While associative networks may provide arenas for tri-partite 
negotiations and neo-corporatist participation, in contrast to traditional corporatist 
modes of social governance, these networks do not privilege corporatist structures 
over other associative forms and potential participatory organizations such as NGOs. 
Instead, participatory modes of social governance provide for more flexible state-
society interactions that grow out of the need to solve relatively specific problems of 
social coordination between multiple actors. As a consequence, mass participation is 
seldom the result, “but rather more diffuse participation focused on relatively specific 
purposes” (Ibid.: 562). 
As discussed above, pluralist reforms are often assumed to give way for such 
participatory modes of social governance. The mechanisms for targeting and 
decentralizing inherent in the pluralist social policy approach have been designed to 
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promote participation and collaborative solutions in the management of social policy. 
Yet in this study, as we shall see, participatory outcomes do not figure prominently. 
Rather, the study shows how the pluralist approach may give way to contrasting 
outcomes, most prominently a technocratic mode of social governance (Chile), on the 
one hand, and a populist mode of social governance (Argentina), on the other hand. 
To explain these contrasting outcomes, this study argues that regime institutions 
play a major role. In regimes where decentralized federalism is connected to a 
delegative type of democracy the political outcome of pluralist reform will be a 
populist mode of social governance. As a consequence of decentralized federalism, 
topocrats are influential actors in social policymaking. This will circumscribe the ability 
of central-state technocrats to control policy implementation. Also, as a result of 
delegative democracy, politicians (both at the national as well as the sub-national 
level) have an incentive to foster clientelist linkages with the subaltern sectors. Weak 
institutions of horizontal accountability offer plenty of opportunities to depredate 
public resources for clientelist ends. Clientelist arrangements presuppose a state which 
leaves substantial room for political discretion. It is also in such political systems where 
populism as a political strategy is most viable. Strong institutions of vertical 
accountability put pressure on political leaders to cater to the large mass of poor 
people expecting social improvements. However, providing programmatic public goods 
for lower-class constituencies may be costly for political leaders and their parties in 
economic and organizational terms, as they face constraints in pursuing social policies; 
and parties may wish to simultaneously court wealthier constituents who can finance 
campaigns and who oppose social spending. Hence, politicians in delegative 
democracies with many poor voters have an incentive to replace programmatic 
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appeals with clientelist hand-outs.19 As such, by providing opportunities for political 
manipulation of social funds (weak horizontal accountability) as well as strong 
incentives for a populist strategy to gain voter support (strong vertical accountability), 
politicians in delegative democracies are prone to use the pluralist approach for 
clientelist ends. The result is a populist mode of social governance. 
Alternatively, in regimes where centralized unitarism is connected to a protected 
type of democracy, the political outcome of pluralist reform politics is a technocratic 
mode of social governance. Because of centralized-unitarian institutions, topocrats 
have few means to influence the policy process. Instead, technocrats retain control 
over the process of policy implementation preventing local capture of pluralist 
reforms. Importantly, as a result of protected democracy, politicians are constrained in 
using populist and clientelist means as a way of fostering political support. Strong 
institutions of horizontal accountability provide few opportunities for discretionary use 
of social funds. Agencies of horizontal control such as controllers general are 
authorized with effective powers to audit officials and governmental agencies and 
exercise oversight in the formulation and execution of social spending. As such, they 
have a series of tools available for ensuring compliance with nonpartisan principles 
and preventing abuse of social funds. At the same time, “reserved domains” and other 
constitutional prerogatives ensure responsiveness of political leaders to elite interests, 
which effectively deter political leaders from crafting populist strategies. Instead, 
under circumstances of protected democracy political leaders have an incentive to 
craft neo-pluralist links to subaltern sectors through which popular organizations can 
be co-opted into funding relationships controlled by the techno-bureaucracy and at 
                                                             
19 For a discussion of why political parties in poor democracies use clientelism as an electoral strategy, 
see Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes (2002). Also, Levitsky (2003).  
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the same time stave off social unrest that could trigger an authoritarian backlash. 
Hence, by putting severe constraints on the use of social funds (strong horizontal 
accountability) as well as providing disincentives for politicians to take populist 
measures (weak vertical accountability), politicians in protected democracy find it 
convenient to let technocrats control the process of implementing the pluralist 
approach. The result is a technocratic mode of social governance.   
 
 
RESEARCHDESIGN
The following chapters apply the politics of transforming social governance framework 
to the cases of Argentina and Chile. Thus, the present study is more case-oriented than 
variable-oriented (see Ragin, 1987). It deploys an analytical strategy known as “paired 
comparison” – the structured analysis of two cases.20 According to Tarrow (2010: 243), 
paired comparison is a “distinct analytical strategy for working through complex 
empirical and historical materials using the leverage afforded by the differences and 
similarities of comparable cases”. By combining controlled case comparison with a 
close sensitivity to case material it is well suited to delineate important empirical 
processes and causal mechanisms that furthers our understanding of social 
governance transformations and help build middle-range theory.  
                                                             
20 One may argue that, in fact, the analysis conducted in my study involves more than two cases as it not 
only compares the shift to a pluralist social policy approach in Argentina and Chile during the 1990s, but 
also conducts a comparative-historical analysis of the earlier shift to a corporatist social policy approach 
in these countries. This analysis finds the framework developed in this chapter useful for explaining the 
adoption of the corporatist social policy approach and its political outcome in Argentina and Chile. As 
such, it helps increase the inferential leverage of my causal model in which socioeconomic structure, 
policy ideas and experts, and regime institutions interplay to produce specific modes of social 
governance. Hence, one could perhaps speak about a double-paired comparison conducted in this 
study, in which, nevertheless, the bulk of the analysis is focused on comparing the shift to the pluralist 
social policy approach during the 1990s in Argentina and Chile.     
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While small-N comparison lacks the degrees of freedom of large-N comparisons 
that furthers inferential leverage and lets the researcher make precise probabilistic 
statements, it compensates for this problem by directly observing the mechanisms and 
processes that connect the independent and dependent variables of interest. As such, 
it facilitates what Collier, Brady and Seawright (2004) calls “process-oriented” causal 
inference as against “correlation-based” causal inference. Herein, “process tracing” 
provides a common method that enables the investigator to focus on processes of 
change within cases and “how various initial conditions are translated into outcomes” 
(George and McKeown, 1985: 35). Thus, such in-depth qualitative research is especially 
appropriate for the political perspective adopted in this study that puts policymakers’ 
strategic calculations at the center of analysis and infers the way they are being 
shaped by structural, ideational and institutional variables.  
Importantly, paired comparison permits what Tarrow (2010) calls “dual-process 
tracing”, which sensitize the investigator to the possibility of multiple conjunctural 
causation and the possibility that a supposed determining variable may not be as 
critical as it seems from the perspective of a single-case study. For instance, tracing 
through the process of social policy reform in Argentina during the Menem era may 
lead the investigator to conclude that World Bank leverage is a critically important 
variable in explaining the shift to a pluralist social policy approach. Indeed, the World 
Bank took an active role in formulating and financing pluralist social policy projects in 
Argentina. Yet, when tracing through the process of social policy reform in Chile during 
the Concertación era one finds hardly any sign of the World Bank, save for references 
by some policy experts to the pluralist practices and ideas promoted by the World 
Bank that point towards a process of international diffusion rather than leverage. Thus, 
by resorting to dual-process tracing, the risk of overstating the effect of a supposed 
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determining variable can be reduced. The leverage afforded by the differences and 
commonalities revealed in the analysis of comparable cases permits a scientifically 
more rigorous, yet nuanced, understanding of the politics of transforming social 
governance.   
Based on extensive field research that included in-depth interviews and archival 
research,  as  well  as  a  thorough  review  of  scholarly  work  on  the  history  of  the  
Argentine and Chilean welfare state, the present study provides a longitudinal analysis 
of the unfolding of social reform efforts in Argentina and Chile. The field research was 
carried out in Argentina by the author in 2004-2005 and 2006, and in Chile in 2006. In 
both countries, in-depth interviews were conducted with experts and key participants 
in the policymaking process as well as delivery personnel and NGOs involved with the 
new social programs. The interviewees were selected with a view to their positions 
and the specific knowledge I believed they had about the issues under investigation. 
The interviews were conducted as conversations and all questions were open-ended in 
order to let the informants offer their own nuanced responses.21 To complement 
interview evidence, various documentary sources – newspapers, institutional reports 
and publications, speeches, internal analyses and investigations of governmental and 
non-governmental agencies, statements presenting their positions, etc. - were 
reviewed by investigating the archives of key ministries, foundations and research 
centers. Together the interviews and archival research served several purposes. First of 
all, they provided an understanding of the interests and influence of key actors in the 
policymaking process. Secondly, they helped situate the strategic interactions of 
policymakers and participatory organizations in the context of structural, ideological 
                                                             
21 Most interviews were confidential so I will not generally cite them in the text or they will be referred 
to in very general terms. 
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and institutional constraints. Finally, by providing tentative evidence for an assessment 
of the political outcome of the new social policy approach, they helped detect the 
causal mechanisms that connected initial reform impulses with the particular mode of 
social governance that resulted from the process of implementation.  
Why were Argentina and Chile selected for this study? Argentina and Chile have 
many commonalities that make it easier to assess the impact of remaining differences. 
They share a number of historical and cultural background characteristics, many of 
which have to do with Spanish colonial legacy, have followed similar developmental 
stages, and gone through similar ideological periods from national populism to state-
led industrialization to neoliberalism. Hence, by comparing Argentina and Chile, a 
number of factors can be held fairly constant. But they also differ in important 
respects. In terms of factors that are often seen as crucial for explaining the initiation 
of social policy reform, namely exposure to external influence, Argentina under 
Menem was much more dependent on IFIs than Chile under the Concertación. With 
regard to policy implementation and the political outcome of pluralist social reform, 
different types of regime structures permit an assessment of the impact of regime 
institutions on the mode of social governance. It is precisely this combination of 
commonalities and differences that make Argentina and Chile excellent cases for the 
paired comparison conducted in this study. Subsequent chapters will explore these 
commonalities and differences in more detail, thus providing for a “structured, focused 
comparison” (George and Bennett, 2005) with the aim of producing theoretically 
suggestive findings concerning the politics of transforming social governance.  
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ORGANIZATIONOFTHESTUDY 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a comparative overview of the 
politics of transforming social governance in Argentina and Chile by summarizing the 
main findings from the rest of the study. This cross-perspective highlights important 
commonalities and differences between the two cases. The chapter shows how 
changes in the policy environment prompted both the Argentine and the Chilean 
governments to initiate pluralist social policy reform. It also shows how differences in 
regime institutions account for the contrasting political outcomes of the reform 
attempts. As such, the chapter demonstrates the usefulness of the politics of 
transforming social governance framework developed above. 
The study then turns to an in-depth longitudinal analysis of the transformation of 
social governance in the two countries. Part II conducts a historical analysis of the 
evolution of social governance in Argentina and Chile. The analysis adopts a cross-
sectoral  perspective,  focusing on key social  policies  with a view to the formation and 
retrenchment of the old corporatist mode of social governance. Chapter 3 examines 
the origin, evolution, and erosion of the corporatist mode of social governance in 
Chile. Chapter 4 extends this analysis of welfare corporatism and its demise to 
Argentina. Together these two chapters show how the framework developed above 
stands the scrutiny of such a historical perspective. By focusing on the attempts by the 
political elite to manage the tension between accumulation and legitimation in 
response to changing socioeconomic, ideational and politico-institutional conditions, 
the rise and fall of corporatism can be accounted for. 
Part  III  then  turns  to  analyzing  the  new  politics  of  poverty  alleviation  from  the  
beginning of the 1990s onwards. Discarding the broad focus on traditional sectoral 
social  policies  of  Part  II,  the  focus  is  now  delimited  to  the  specific  policies  and  
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programs initiated to confront the issue of poverty. Having played only a minor role in 
the old corporatist social policy approach, anti-poverty policy became a central tenet 
of social governance in the 1990s. Chapter 5 analyzes the case of Chile during the 
Aylwin, Frei and Lagos administrations. It finds that pluralistic anti-poverty policy has 
been conducted in a highly technocratic fashion leaving little room for subaltern 
sectors to demand encompassing social change. It shows that such technocratic 
governance has been contingent on Chile’s regime institutions, which constrains 
political discretion and paves the way for strong technocratic control over policy 
execution. While helping ensure long-term governability, this technocratic mode of 
social governance fails to enhance citizen participation. The opposite scenario is seen 
in Chapter 6, an analysis of anti-poverty policy in Argentina during Menem, where 
after having initiated pluralist anti-poverty reform, technocratic reformers were unable 
to shield it from political capture. It shows how Argentina’s regime institutions 
provided politicians, both at the national and sub-national level, with wide discretion 
to divert social funds for clientelist machinations. At the same time, such politicization 
of anti-poverty policy helped undermine long-term governability and contributed to 
the counter-mobilization that culminated with the 2001 crisis.    
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CHAPTERTWO

THETRANSFORMATIONOFSOCIALGOVERNANCE
INARGENTINAANDCHILE
 
In the early 1990s, the Argentine and Chilean governments initiated a reformulation of 
social policy toward an emphasis on poverty alleviation and civil society participation. 
In both countries new social policy institutions were inaugurated to coordinate this 
new anti-poverty effort. In Argentina, the government led by President Carlos Menem 
created the National Secretariat of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
de la Nación, SDS) that was made responsible for the design of new anti-poverty 
programs and for the integration of civil society participation. A number of targeted 
programs  were  created  that  were  based  on  the  active  involvement  of  NGOs  and  
community organizations. New programs were also set up inside the traditional social 
ministries. Programs such as the Mother and Infant Nutrition Program (Programa 
Materno Infantil y Nutrición, PROMIN) and Plan Trabajar were set up with autonomous 
organizational bases and given responsibilities for many functions that previously had 
been handled by more traditional administrative units within these ministries. Older 
social programs, such as the National Housing Fund (FONAVI), were decentralized and 
reforms were initiated to shift to a more pro-poor and participatory approach. In Chile, 
the first government of the Concertación, under the lead of President Patricio Aylwin, 
similarly created the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (Ministerio de Planificación 
y Cooperación, MIDEPLAN) that was put in charge of coordinating the new anti-
poverty strategy and for managing new targeted programs, most notably the Solidarity 
and Social-Investment Fund (FOSIS). FOSIS, like other social funds created to target 
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poor and vulnerable sectors in Chile as well as in Argentina, was set up to finance anti-
poverty projects based on a participatory manner of demand generated by local 
groups and screened against a set of eligibility criteria. Across the social sectors new 
instruments were adopted to install a more pluralistic institutional framework in the 
provision of social welfare. A common instrument used is the organization of public 
biddings in which local actors present project proposals and compete for funding. 
Proposals are technically evaluated by professionals and funding granted according to 
a  set  of  selection  criteria.  The  ministry  in  charge  only  defines  programs  and  lays  the  
rules for project competition that are then implemented by various agents at the local 
level – decentralized state bodies, municipalities, NGOs, community organizations, or 
private enterprises. What factors explain this new approach in Argentina and Chile? 
The first part of this chapter provides an account for this shift towards a new social 
policy  approach.  The  new  anti-poverty  projects  were  initiated  by  executives  in  an  
effort  to overcome the acute political  challenges that  faced them in the wake of  the 
dual transition to neoliberalism and democracy. The dual transition presented a 
fundamental dilemma for the governing elite – how would they reconcile the tension 
between political and economic liberalization? This dilemma is well described by Kurtz 
(2004a:  7):  “The  crux  of  the  problem  is  that  the  economic  reforms  essential  to  
economic liberalization – inter alia privatization, deregulation, trade opening, fiscal 
austerity, and tax reform – produce harmful material consequences for the vast 
majority of citizens. In the context of democratic politics, this provides fertile ground 
for the emergence of ‘nationalist’ or ‘populist’ politicians seeking office based on 
promises to reverse the reforms”. The recent backlash against free market democracy 
in countries such as Bolivia, Venezuela and Russia reminds us of the inherent difficulty 
in rendering free markets and democratic politics compatible. According to Kurtz 
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(Ibid.), “the key to reconciling democracy and the market thus involves the 
construction of a political coalition capable of sustaining reforms in a politically open 
context”.  
For the governments of Argentina and Chile, the pluralist social policy approach 
formed part of the new governing strategy whereby they sought to construct such as 
socio-political coalition and respond to the dilemma of the dual transition. The 
transition  to  free  market  democracy  had  made  the  old  corporatist  mode  of  social  
governance obsolete. Stripped from old corporatist and clientelist channels for 
managing social demands, governing elites in Argentina and Chile began to seek new 
instruments for social governance congruent with the new socioeconomic structures.  
The shift from import substitution policies to a neoliberal model put severe constraints 
on social policy options and produced strong incentives for politicians to target new 
constituencies among the growing popular strata outside the formal labor market.22 
The pluralist social policy approach provided a means to rebuild the support base by 
incorporating informal sector constituencies and territorially-based popular 
organizations at relatively low cost. In addition, by adopting this new social policy 
approach promoted by multilateral development banks and donors, the Argentine and 
Chilean governments could tap international aid resources and also receive additional 
resources for social governance. 
In this process, technocratic experts played an important role.23 Through their links 
to international policy networks and their experience with NGO activities, social 
technocrats were the first to embrace the new pluralist social policy approach. In both 
Argentina and Chile, the design of pluralist reform initiatives was to a large extent the 
                                                             
22 For a related argument, see Roberts (1995). Also Dresser (1994), and Weyland (2002).  
23 On the role of technocratic experts in Latin American reform politics, see, for instance, Teichman 
(2001).  
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work of such technocratic social reform teams. By delegating authority to policy 
experts within the executive, the Argentine and Chilean presidents were able to bypass 
opposition from vested interests and build a “wall of contagion” against bureaucratic 
or corporatist meddling. In both countries, social technocrats were thus endowed with 
considerable policymaking capacities to drive pluralist reform.  
Yet, this new social policy approach in Argentina and Chile has not led to a more 
participatory mode of social governance, as anticipated by many advocates of pluralist 
reform. The second part of this chapter deals with this issue. The argument is 
consistent with survey evidence and research on popular participation in Argentina 
and Chile (e.g. World Bank, 2002; PNUD, 2004).  Despite much rhetoric about 
empowerment and inclusive governance through new partnerships between the state 
and societal actors, in neither country have “associational networks” become the 
dominant mode of social governance. In both countries, horizontal linkages between 
civil society actors are found missing and “social capital” wanted. Instead, social 
governance remains a highly top-down process in which state actors dominate 
decision-making and in which societal actors, particularly the most vulnerable sectors, 
remain disempowered and riveted by internal conflicts. Indeed, a striking consequence 
of  the  new  social  policy  approach  seems  to  be  the  disaggregation  of  societal  
organization and the confinement of political articulation, foremost, to the local level. 
In Argentina the politics of pluralist reform resulted in a populist mode  of  social  
governance. As it was conceived in Chapter 1, in a populist mode of social governance 
social benefits are allocated according to partisan and political criteria enabling the 
establishment of neo-clientelist relationships. In Argentina, pluralist social policy 
reforms, such as targeting and decentralization, were politically manipulated to 
facilitate clientelistic incorporation of the poor. At the same time, such clientelistic ties 
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have served to politicize the linkages between the political elites and subaltern sectors. 
These linkages constitute mechanisms through which the multiple categories of 
subaltern sectors make demands upon the state and which the political elites compete 
to command. In Chile, by contrast, the politics of pluralist reform resulted in a 
technocratic mode  of  social  governance.  As  it  was  conceived  in  Chapter  1,  in  
technocratic modes of social governance social benefits are allocated according to 
non-partisan and technical criteria, which provide for the establishment of neo-
pluralist relationships. Through these relationships the Chilean state is able to control 
social demand-making and set the terms for civil society participation in social 
policymaking. As such, these structures serve to depoliticize the linkages between 
state and society, and help deflect popular mobilization away from encompassing 
political activity towards grass-roots social efforts. What explains these diverging 
outcomes? 
This study argues that a major variable in explaining diverging modes of social 
governance is regime institutions. As the second part of this chapter shows, these 
regime institutions in Argentina and Chile are very different. In accordance with the 
expectations laid out in the politics of transforming social governance framework 
developed in Chapter 1, a centralist-unitary regime structure in Chile gives technocrats 
within the central state welfare bureaucracy strong control over the policymaking 
process. In contrast, a decentralized-federal regime structure in Argentina provides 
provincial governors with strong control over the policymaking process. Also, strong 
institutions of horizontal accountability in Chile prevent politicians from capturing 
social funds. In Argentina, weak institutions of horizontal accountability coupled with 
strong institutions of vertical accountability give politicians compelling incentives to 
divert social funds for populist and clientelist purposes. The result has been the sharply 
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diverging modes of social governance in Argentina and Chile. The comparative analysis 
that follows summarizes the main findings from the core chapters of this study.  


THECHALLENGEOFTHEDUALTRANSITION:MANAGINGTHENEW SOCIAL
QUESTION
The dual transition to political democracy and economic liberalism provides a critical 
backdrop for understanding the shift to the new pluralist social policy approach in 
Argentina and Chile. Despite different sequences, by the beginning of the 1990s both 
Argentina and Chile had undertaken significant political and economic liberalization. 
For the new political elites, the dilemma of the dual transition was how to reconcile 
the tension between the political imperative of inclusive, democratic governance with 
the economic imperative of fiscal discipline and market-oriented growth. At the heart 
of this dilemma lay the “new social question”. The debt crisis, structural adjustment 
policies and neoliberal reforms had produced regressive distributional outcomes. 
Income inequality increased, poverty became more extensive and the basic social 
infrastructure deteriorated.24 This raised the specter of uncontrolled mass mobilization 
and radical redistributive demands, not least in the absence of effective political 
controls. Democratization had unleashed a host of social expectations and demands, 
particularly  among  the  popular  sectors  who  had  borne  the  burden  of  economic  
restructuring under neoconservative authoritarianism. At the same time, in the 
context of free market democracy, traditional corporatist mechanisms were no longer 
able to channel demands, secure control and mobilize support for incumbent 
governments. Spearheaded by such concerns over the consolidation of free market 
                                                             
24 For a discussion of these trends, see Grindle (2000).  
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democracy, social reform emerged as a major issue in Argentina and Chile. In both 
countries the pluralist policy approach was adopted in order to craft a new socio-
political coalition capable of sustaining the neoliberal model under political 
democracy. As such, the pluralist approach formed part of a new governing strategy 
that was decisively molded by the structural and ideological transformations in 
conjunction with the process of globalization and the dual transition to free market 
democracy.   
 
StructuralTransformations
A major consequence of the dual transition has been the dismantling of the patronage 
networks  that  served  as  a  primary  mechanism  of  state-society  linkage  in  the  pre-
neoliberal era. During the period of national-populism in Argentina and Chile, these 
networks, organized around corporatist and clientelist principles, were instrumental in 
incorporating and processing the demands of social groups (Collier and Collier, 1991; 
see also Chalmers, Martin and Piester, 1997). State-sponsored corporatism and 
clientelism provided a tool for governments to limit the autonomous expression of 
social forces by establishing a set of structural linkages between the state and social 
groups. Governments manipulated these structural linkages to ensure political 
support, while social groups demanded services and benefits in exchange. This system 
of state-society mediation was sustained by the socioeconomic structures associated 
with the import-substitution model (ISI). ISI was characterized by a large public sector, 
the promotion of national industry, and a Fordist process of production and regulation. 
These productive structures created conditions for the organization of a relatively 
homogeneous working class. Indeed, under ISI, corporatist labor unions emerged as 
the most important representatives of popular sector interests (Collier and Collier, 
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1991).  As  a  result,  welfare  policies  became  geared  toward  unionized  workers  in  an  
attempt to defuse their disruptive potential and make inroads to labor constituencies. 
The corporatist social policy approach helped to foment broad political coalitions 
through which the governing elite could mediate social struggles and generate political 
power  (Malloy,  1991).  At  the  same  time,  the  expansion  of  social  programs  served  to  
subsidize the reproduction of the labor force and expand domestic markets.  
Until the mid-1960s, favorable global economic conditions helped finance this 
expansion of social protection in Argentina and Chile. The expansion, however, was 
accompanied by systemic biases in the distribution of benefits, reflecting the varying 
strength of social groups at different points in time to effectively pressure the state for 
concessions.  The outcome was a highly  stratified system in terms of  access,  range of  
coverage, and quality of benefits (Mesa-Lago, 1994; also Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002). 
Reforming this system proved difficult as “insiders” were reluctant to give up their 
privileged welfare schemes and patronage bases. Efforts to streamline the social policy 
system and extend it to groups outside the urban-industrial complex led to increasing 
public spending that fed budget imbalances and intensified inflationary pressures 
within the ISI model. This model ran into deep trouble with the worldwide slowing of 
economic growth from the mid-1960s onwards. In the end, the exhaustion of the ISI 
model fed increasing political struggle that culminated with the breakdown of 
democracy.  
Under neoconservative authoritarianism, Argentina and Chile abandoned ISI and 
began a new project of deep socioeconomic transformation. The military believed it 
necessary to forcefully transform the socioeconomic structure to build a new basis for 
governability and prevent the kind of deep ideological polarization that had 
culminated in Argentina and Chile in the beginning of the 1970s. To this end, the 
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repression of political and social organizations, as well as the imposition of a neoliberal 
developmental model became instrumental (Schamis, 1991). Neoconservative 
authoritarianism thus allowed for a set of structural transformations that undermined 
the socioeconomic bases of corporatism.  
The new socioeconomic structure put constraints on social spending and provided 
incentives for governing elites to reshape their links to the popular sectors. Under the 
new  economic  model,  labor  costs  and  taxes  needed  to  be  kept  relatively  low  in  an  
effort to sustain competitiveness and attract private investment. This reduced space 
for social spending was exacerbated by the debt crisis, which imposed severe fiscal 
constraints just as rising unemployment and poverty sharply raised demands for public 
social assistance. The ability to respond to these rising needs was further constrained 
by the narrowing contributory base for social protection systems and, particularly in 
Argentina, by the spending limits stipulated by austerity programs and structural 
adjustment policies agreed with the IMF and other financial institutions as a condition 
for debt refinancing (Brooks, 2007: 33). Such transformations sharply reduced the 
economic viability of traditional corporatist welfare arrangements. 
Concomitantly, class-structural changes also reduced the political viability of these 
corporatist welfare arrangements. The collapse of the state-centric matrix and the 
attack launched by the military regimes on organized labor contributed to dramatically 
weaken industrial labor organizations, limiting their capacity to deliver the votes, 
resources and social peace that had been an important foundation of the corporatist 
mode of social governance.25 This  process  of  corporatist  decay  was  accelerated  by  
neoliberal reformers seeking to liberalize the economy and reduce the scope of state 
                                                             
25 For a discussion of the decay of corporatism, see Hagopian (1998).  Also, Collier and Handlin (2005); 
Oxhorn (1998); and Roberts (2007). 
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patronage. Neoliberal restructuring provoked a series of dramatic changes in the 
socioeconomic structure, particularly as a result of large layoffs of the formally 
employed. Jobs disappeared in the public sector and in traditional industries that had 
formed the most militant and best organized sectors of the working class.26 The result 
of these changes was a sharp drop in union membership and the weakening of the 
labor movement (see Table 2.1). As a direct result, the corporatist institutions that had 
been put in place to control the incipient mobilization of industrial workers became 
increasingly obsolete as a device for organizing state-popular sector relations. 
 
Table2.1  ChangeinUnionDensity,1970s-1990s
 1970s 
Union Density 
1980s 
Union Density 
1990s 
Union Density 
Net Change in 
Union Density 
Argentina 58.81 36.33 25.75 -33.1 
Chile 32.02 10.04 11.36 -20.7 
Source: Cardoso (2004); Dirección del Trabajo (2006) 
Notes: 11975; 21973; 31985; 41986; 51998; 61998 
 
 
At the same time, rising poverty and the growth of the urban informal sector 
provided a structural basis for alternative forms of popular organization around 
neighborhoods and voluntary associations (see Appendix 2). Indeed, a major 
consequence of neoliberal restructuring was the proliferation of popular sector 
organization around “subsistence” issues (Oxhorn, 1995; Lehmann and Bebbington, 
1998). The initial emergence of such alternative popular-sector associations was a 
result of the repression of party and union activity during neoconservative 
dictatorship. In fact, popular movements came to play an important part in the process 
                                                             
26 For a discussion of these trends, see Portes and Hoffman (2003). Also Gilbert (1997). 
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of democratization. The debt crisis of the 1980s and the onset of austerity policies 
further accelerated this reconstruction of social organization. An array of new 
voluntary organizations sprang up from the grassroots efforts to cope with daily 
subsistence  as  well  as  in  connection  to  the  new  NGOs  that  emerged  to  support  this  
activity. As such, the new economic model dramatically changed the social structural 
base of politics. With the onset of democracy, political parties faced compelling 
incentives to reorient their programs, remold their relationships with the popular 
sectors, and reach out for new constituents among the self-employed poor (Roberts, 
1998; Levitsky, 2003).      
Comparing these structural transformations and their consequences for socio-
political strategy in Argentina and Chile, a major difference relates to the sequence of 
the dual transition to free market democracy. In Chile, neoliberal restructuring had 
been taken much further than in Argentina by the time of the return to democracy. 
During the Pinochet era in Chile, the group of neoliberal technocrats popularly known 
as the “Chicago Boys” were able to penetrate key policymaking institutions and gain 
considerable leeway to implement the neoliberal model. Important was the 
concentration of power achieved by Pinochet that neutralized opposition to neoliberal 
policy (see Remmer, 1989; also Castiglione, 2001; and Teichman 2001, 2004). With the 
backing of Pinochet, the Chicago Boys were thus able to implement encompassing 
neoliberal change that in a more dispersed power structure would have faced 
problems against more conservative interests. As a direct result, corporatist 
institutions had largely been dismantled by the return to democracy in 1990. Besides 
extensive economic liberalization, important measures had been taken to remold the 
social role of the state. These measures involved the privatization and decentralization 
of social service provision as well as breaking the control of corporatist organizations 
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over social security and other welfare funds (see Castiglione, 2001; also Taylor, 2003). 
At the time of democratization, neoliberalism was thus firmly enmeshed within the 
socioeconomic structure and organized labor in a weak position to influence 
policymaking and serve as the social base for the new democratic government. In this 
context, the corporatist approach was no longer a viable strategy of social governance.  
By contrast, in Argentina, neoliberal restructuring during the military regime did 
not fully accomplish the dismantling of corporatism. The economic team under the 
lead of Martínez de Hoz encountered considerable resistance against neoliberalism 
from within the military. Crucially, his team of neoliberal economists did not enjoy 
policymaking  autonomy  nearly  to  the  same  extent  as  the  Chicago  Boys  in  Chile  
(Remmer, 1989; Teichman 2004). In Chile the personalist structure of the authoritarian 
regime that centered around Pinochet had provided the Chicago Boys with 
considerable decision-making power, but the Argentine technocrats had no such 
powerful caudillo to provide leeway for the implementation of reform. Instead, 
conservative interests within the military retained powerful levers to block neoliberal 
policies. These conservative interests benefited from the junta structure of the 
Argentine military regime that dispersed decision making power among the top 
leadership. Martínez de Hoz and his team of neoliberal technocrats therefore had to 
spend considerable time trying to convince different military elements of the 
advantages with their reform program, which contributed to slow down (and often 
water down) the process of neoliberal restructuring. As well as this, the duration of 
neoconservative authoritarianism was shorter in Argentina, which helps to explain the 
less encompassing neoliberal transformation in comparison with Chile. As a result, by 
the time of the transition to democracy, corporatist institutions had not been fully 
broken.  
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Hence, in Argentina, corporatist and clientelist interests resurfaced with the return 
to democracy, which contributed to complicate efforts to manage the debt crisis and 
the new economic conditions under the Alfonsín government. These interests were 
still able to mount considerable opposition to Alfonsín’s program of socioeconomic 
adjustment. As such, major social reforms were watered down or failed to be brought 
into effect (see Chapter 4). Through energetic strike activity, labor unions were able to 
obstruct reform efforts. Patronage-based politicians (mainly peronists) were also 
important, having extensive links to corporatist networks who opposed any anti-union 
policies. The impasse culminated in the hyperinflationary crisis that provided a 
powerful lesson for reformist policymakers of the costs of breaking with neoliberal 
policies and the need to dismantle corporatist networks. Clearly, this helped foment 
the decisive turn to neoliberalism under the Menem era. In addition, the crisis proved 
instrumental in dismantling the remnants of labor movement power, as it led to 
considerable stress for organized labor through higher levels of unemployment and 
informality (see Appendix 2).  
In response to the hyperinflationary crisis in the late 1980s, the government of 
Carlos Menem initiated a radical neoliberal project in order to restore governability.27 
This economic restructuring succeeded in stabilizing the economy and put Argentina 
on  a  path  of  market-led  economic  growth  from  the  beginning  of  the  1990s  (see  
Appendix 2, Table A.2). At the same time, these economic reforms fed severe social 
dislocations as a result of large layoffs of public workers, higher levels of inequality and 
sharply reduced public social spending (see Appendix 2, also Chapter 4, Table 4.1). 
Successively, the Menem government came under pressure to enact social reform so 
as to be able to manage this rising social question. In this, the need to consolidate 
                                                             
27 For a discussion, see Teichman (2001). 
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economic reform constrained his options by largely ruling out corporatist social 
policies. Instead, by instituting targeted social assistance programs, social policy could 
be used to make inroads into the growing informal sector at relatively low cost, 
shoring up popular support and fend off opposition against the economic program.28 
In Chile, the government of Patricio Aylwin was also under pressure to address the 
new social question. However, in contrast with Argentina, for the Chilean government 
the most pressing concern was not economic restructuring, but securing the 
consolidation of political democracy. As explained above, the Chilean military regime 
had managed to dismantle corporatism and institute an export-oriented economic 
model that had started to generate stable economic growth by the time of 
democratization (see Appendix 2, Table A.1). Yet, the return to democracy raised the 
specter of an explosion of social demands that could come to destabilize the newly 
inaugurated democratic government. Indeed, the enormous social problems caused by 
authoritarian neoliberalism had given rise to pent-up expectations for “compensation” 
under democracy. President Aylwin was thus under intense pressure to take social 
action, but given that Chile’s democracy was far from consolidated, it was imperative 
for the democratic government to avoid stimulating social demands and forms of 
popular mobilization that could endanger the Right’s tacit acceptance of 
democratization.  
The Aylwin government thus faced a delicate dilemma. To preserve popular 
support and in order to pre-empt mass mobilization against economic policies, the 
government was under intense pressure to enact social reform. At the same time, 
Chile’s “protected” type of democratic regime and the neoliberal economic model 
                                                             
28 See arguments about the uses of anti-poverty policy under Menem by Gibson (1997), Roberts (1995) 
and Weyland (1996b, 2002).  
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severely constrained the government’s social reform options. Radical redistributive 
reform was out of the question. Instead, the Aylwin government envisaged a careful 
strategy of piecemeal social reform that would increase social welfare, but within the 
confines  of  the  free  market  model.  To  this  end,  targeted  social  assistance  programs  
provided a means through which the government could help mitigate the effects of 
market-based development and cultivate political support at relatively low cost. An 
important part of this anti-poverty effort was also the emphasis on social participation. 
This emphasis was not only designed to relieve the state from some of the burden of 
social action and thus help preserve fiscal austerity. Participatory social programs were 
also considered an efficient device for managing state-society relations. By transferring 
program implementation to intermediary institutions, such as NGOs and community 
organizations, the government could build new pluralist links to the popular sectors. 
Stripped from traditional corporatist channels for managing social demands, the 
government sought new mechanisms that could ensure social governability. As such, 
the new social policy approach was not only adopted to strengthen opportunities for 
social integration, but also to function as a means for social control.  
To summarize, structural transformations provided important impulses for the 
Argentine and Chilean leaders to enact social welfare reform. The new socioeconomic 
structure put constraints on social spending and provided incentives for governing 
elites to reshape their links to the subaltern sectors. The transition to free market 
democracy had rendered the corporatist mode of social governance obsolete in 
Argentina and Chile. For both governments it thus became imperative to find new 
means by which to ensure social governability. In this context, new pluralist social 
policy ideas and practices gained attraction. Thus, while socioeconomic 
transformations associated with the transition to free market democracy put pressure 
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on Argentine and Chilean decision-makers to enact social welfare reform, the specific 
approach adopted was also shaped by prevailing policy ideas and norms prescribing 
the appropriate response to these changes in socioeconomic structure. 
 
PolicyIdeasandExperts
Towards the end of the 1980s, prominent international actors, including the World 
Bank, the IDB, the United Nations and international donors and development 
specialists, began to push for the reformulation of the social policy approach in Latin 
America. These international actors were critical of the traditional role of corporatist 
organizations in the distribution of social welfare benefits and services. Instead they 
advocated bypassing corporatist organizations in favor of NGOs and community 
organizations, and to improve the cost-effectiveness of social policy by redirecting 
social spending towards targeted social programs. The new pluralist social policy 
paradigm rested on claims of the inherent failure of the corporatist approach and 
associated pluralist reform with more democratic and socially equitable ends, such as 
more efficient poverty alleviation, increased popular participation, and better 
orientation to demand. 
However, this study contrasts with arguments that emphasize the pressures of the 
World Bank and other international actors in explaining social policy reform in 
developing countries, including Latin America.29 These arguments usually emphasize 
the financial leverage borne by international financial institutions. But the World Bank 
and  the  IDB  had  weak  financial  leverage  in  Chile.  Clearly,  IFI  pressures  were  not  a  
major concern for Chilean policymakers. In Argentina, the Menem administration 
                                                             
29 For a discussion, see Weyland (2003).  Also Bräutigam and Segarra (2007),  and Kaufman and Nelson 
(2004). 
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established a close relationship with the IFIs that often attached conditions to project 
loans demanding pluralist social reforms. Yet, as we have seen, this international 
concern with policy change coincided with domestic political priorities. Economic crisis, 
austerity policies and neoliberal reforms had made the traditional corporatist social 
policy approach increasingly obsolete as a strategy of governance. The new social 
policy measures formed part of President Menem and his political allies’ political 
strategy to remake peronismo and rebuild the party base toward the urban underclass 
in the informal sector and the rural poor. Top level social technocrats in the Menem 
administration also widely shared the new social policy norms and priorities promoted 
by the international development community. They needed no convincing of the 
importance of reorienting social policy toward targeted interventions and civil society 
incorporation. Referents interviewed for this study emphasize how IFI officials were 
considered as “partners” and how no hard bargaining occurred in negotiations over 
project loans. The World Bank and the IDB clearly did not have to “impose” reform on 
Argentina. In fact, evidence from these interviews suggests that loan conditions were 
of no decisive importance in these negotiations and that they were not even seriously 
monitored, at least with regard to questions about participation and pluralistic access 
to project funds. Rapid disbursement of funds took precedence over norms of 
implementation.  
Also, when political conditions started to change towards the end of the 1990s in 
conjunction with deteriorating social conditions and hardened protest against 
neoliberalism, Argentine politicians effectively resisted efforts by international officials 
and technocratic reformers to push for more pluralistic social policies. President 
Menem himself increasingly started using anti-poverty programs for clientelist 
purposes, discarding the pluralist norms attached to project loans. Under the 
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subsequent Alianza government, IFI officials testify about their frustration over the 
reluctance of the Argentine government to co-operate and consult with regard to 
social welfare reform. All in all, it shows how the Argentine government retained levers 
to block pressure from these international organizations.  
But while international financial leverage was only a weak factor in shaping social 
reform politics in Argentina and Chile, the role of IFIs in diffusing the new social policy 
ideas among policy-makers in Argentina and Chile was more important. In this process, 
domestic  technocrats  played  a  pivotal  role.  As  we  shall  see  in  Chapters  5  and  6,  the  
policy experts recruited to take charge of welfare reform in Argentina and Chile often 
shared a common background through education abroad (most commonly in the 
United States) as well as through professional experience within the NGO universe and 
work for international organizations. As such, these social technocrats had developed 
extensive links to international policy networks. Through intense professional contacts 
and “social learning”30 they had come to share a strong commitment to the new policy 
norms and practices, and they were the first to embrace the pluralist approach to 
social policymaking. In their capacity as policy experts they were also able to wield 
considerable influence over the social agenda. 
In Chile, progressive elites, who after the military coup had taken refuge in 
international agencies, such as the IDB and various UN organizations, as well a variety 
of NGOs and research institutes, formed the base for the “policy commissions” that in 
1989 gathered to elaborate on a program for the Concertación (Loveman, 1995; see 
also Teichman 2009). Referents interviewed for this study explain how a broad 
consensus emerged on the new social policy approach during this process of 
deliberation. Technical training and professional experience within the auspices of 
                                                             
30 For a discussion, see Bräutigam and Segarra (2007). 
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these NGOs and international agencies had helped produce an ideological conversion 
to the new pluralist policy ideas and norms. Indeed, many of these policy experts were 
soon recruited to MIDEPLAN, which in the immediate aftermath of the transition to 
democracy started to implement the new social policy approach. Others helped 
initiate pluralist reforms within the more traditional welfare bureaucracy where 
programs were instituted and molded to better reflect the new pluralist principles. 
Similarly, in Argentina during the 1980s, both main parties saw the growing 
influence of party activists with professional experience in NGOs and international 
agencies. These technocratic activists helped disseminate the new social policy ideas 
and norms that rose to prominence during the Menem era. Within the PJ, technocratic 
activists got involved with the party’s “renewalist” movement that gained 
predominance over the traditional trade union wing by 1987 (Levitsky, 2003). During 
the Cafiero governorship (1987-1991) in the Buenos Aires province, such technocratic 
activists played an important role in social policymaking. Under their influence, new 
targeted social programs were set up and measures taken to incorporate the self-
employed poor and their organizations in policy implementation. These policy experts 
were later recruited by president Menem to take over responsibility for anti-poverty 
policy. They usually shared a strong hostility toward corporatist institutions that they 
considered corrupt and anachronistic. Many of these top level social technocrats had 
earlier professional experience with the World Bank, IDB or other international 
agencies through which they had become familiar with the new social policy ideas and 
models. Under the lead of Eduardo Amadeo, a tightly knit team of social technocrats 
that shared a commitment to new principles in social policymaking was installed in the 
SDS from where it started to implement the new pluralist social policy approach.  
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Yet, the new pluralist approach was not chosen by Argentine and Chilean 
policymakers out of purely ideological conviction, but for highly instrumental reasons 
as well. As explained above, the combination of increasing pressures from the new 
social question and the severe constraints on social spending provided by the 
neoliberal model precipitated a search among Argentine and Chilean policymakers for 
ways “to do more with less”. Both presidents Menem and Aylwin thus had compelling 
incentives to adopt the pluralist approach.  
In Argentina, Menem faced hardened political and societal opposition to his 
structural reform program from 1993 onwards. By adopting the new social policy 
approach, with its emphasis on targeted assistance and social participation, he was 
able to build political support among the urban poor.31 Also,  the  decentralization  of  
the FONAVI to the provinces was a carefully calculated device in building support 
among the provincial governors and securing their adherence to the economic 
program.  
In Chile, the transition to democracy unfolded within the framework determined 
by the military-drafted constitution of 1980 and the accessory organic laws enacted 
after the 1988 plebiscite. These institutional features, by securing a “tutelary” role for 
the military and extensive right-wing influence over policymaking in the new 
democracy, effectively diminished Aylwin’s room of maneuver. In particular, these 
institutional prerogatives made it very important for the Aylwin government to avoid 
reigniting mass mobilization, radical redistributive demands and populist politics that 
could trigger a backlash from conservative forces. Instead, by adopting a pluralist social 
                                                             
31 Compare the arguments presented in discussions of neoliberal populism, e.g. Roberts (1995); 
Weyland (1999a). 
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policy approach the Aylwin government was able to channel demands into local 
projects, secure control over associational activity, and mobilize electoral support.  
Crucially, a central element of chief executives’ strategies to pursue welfare reform 
was the use of technocratic change teams. In both Argentina and Chile, technocratic 
reformers were instrumental in setting up new targeted and participatory programs. 
By deploying technocratic change teams, the presidents of Argentina and Chile tried to 
resist attempts by actors such as workers’ unions, bureaucrats or professional 
associations with vested interests in the status quo to derail reform. The labor 
movement had been severely weakened, but, especially in Argentina, it still controlled 
some important powers within the social welfare system. The pluralist approach was 
designed to bypass such corporatist remnants by delegating authority over 
policymaking to technocratic reformers and by encouraging the participation of NGOs 
and independent popular organizations in the implementation of new targeted social 
programs. Also, by centralizing policymaking authority with these technocrats, 
resistance from within the welfare bureaucracy could more easily be overrun. 
In  Chile,  one of  the first  initiatives of  the Aylwin government was the creation of  
MIDEPLAN. Devoid from more traditional bureaucratic procedures and reward 
systems, and packed with reform-minded social technocrats, the Aylwin government 
was trying to insulate this new ministry from corporatist pressures, as well as from 
routine bureaucratic processes, allowing for the swift implementation of new targeted 
social programs. At the same time, new programs with autonomous organizational 
bases were set up inside traditional line-ministries, such as Chile Barrio in the Ministry 
of Housing. Responsibility for running these new units was delegated to technocratic 
reformers in an effort to help protect them from capture. Unlike more entrenched 
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bureaucrats, these technocratic experts were committed to the restructuring of the 
state’s role in social welfare in accordance with the new pluralist vision. 
Similarly, in Argentina, President Menem instituted the SDS outside traditional line-
ministries (which are often deeply entangled with union and partisan interests) in a 
direct attempt to bypass resistance to social welfare reform. Instead, the SDS was 
directly subordinated to the presidency, giving Menem direct control over anti-poverty 
policy. Eduardo Amadeo, a well-known economist with links to the international 
financial institutions, was brought in to take charge of the new unit. Amadeo explicitly 
demanded  to  bring  with  him  his  own  team  of  policy  experts  so  as  to  be  able  to  
effectively drive the new anti-poverty approach. With the backing from international 
financial institutions, particularly the World Bank and the IDB, a multitude of new 
social programs with autonomous organizational bases were also set up inside 
traditional line-ministries so as to enlarge reformist control over social policymaking. 
Chapter  6  will  look  in  detail  at  some  of  the  most  important  of  these  new  programs  
such as PROMIN and Plan Trabajar.  
In sum, technocratic experts played a pivotal role in initiating pluralist reform. By 
making use of such technocratic teams, the presidents of Argentina and Chile were 
able to bypass attempts by bureaucratic and union interests to resist or overturn 
reform. In the process, government agencies, institutional arrangements and 
policymaking procedures were significantly revised to ensure the insulation of these 
technocratic reformers from countervailing pressures. New agencies such as the SSD 
and MIDEPLAN were set up to centralize decision-making authority and displace 
conflict over welfare reform. Programs such as PROMIN and Plan Trabajar in Argentina 
and Chile Barrio were set up inside line-ministries but with autonomous organizational 
bases. With strong financial and technical backing from IFIs and support from top 
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political authority, these new social programs took over vital tasks and responsibilities 
from more traditional administrative units within the welfare bureaucracy. In 
accordance  with  the  pluralist  approach,  these  new  social  programs  did  not  involve  
labor unions but were instead set up to establish partnerships with NGOs and 
community organizations. In the process, new constituencies with a stake in the 
pluralist social policy approach were created, while simultaneously draining patronage-
oriented politicians and workers’ unions of some of their traditional organizational 
resources. In addition, new mechanisms and rules were instituted so as to assert 
technocratic control over social spending. A good example is the use of the bidding 
mechanism for distributing social funding pioneered by FOSIS in Chile. In this model, 
civil society organizations submit project proposals that compete for funding in terms 
of technical quality and cost-benefit ration. As such, it has directly contributed to 
technifying the procedures for allocating social spending. Weakened by socioeconomic 
transformations and neoliberal policies, central state bureaucrats and labor unions 
have found it difficult to resist such changes. The new approach was thus designed to 
strengthen technocratic control over social policymaking while simultaneously 
establishing new links to the popular sectors outside traditional corporatist 
arrangements. 
Yet, it bears emphasizing that while technocratic reformers played a crucial role in 
initiating these pluralist social reforms, political leaders determine whether and how a 
reform goes forward. In Latin America, including Argentina and Chile, technocrats owe 
their posts and influence to their political superiors. Indeed, the precarious position of 
policy experts is demonstrated by the political machinations of President Menem 
towards the end of the 1990s. Faced with increasing political pressures, Menem 
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started to replace leading experts at the SDS with loyal party cronies willing to forego 
the pluralist approach in favor of populism (see Chapter 6).  
Also, in both countries, as we shall see in Chapters 5 and 6, the influence of reform-
minded officials at MIDEPLAN and the SDS was circumscribed by other agencies. As a 
result, efforts to achieve better planning and coordination of social policymaking 
between key agencies largely failed. On both accounts, attempts to invest 
MIDEPLAN/SDS with authority to coordinate social spending were undermined by the 
other ministries. In particular, ministers of finance and economy were loath to 
strengthen the role of MIDEPLAN/SDS. In Argentina, the Economy Minister Cavallo 
repeatedly clashed with Amadeo over social policy. Similarly, in Chile, Molina was 
constantly overshadowed by Finance Minister Foxley. Informants explain how Foxley 
worried that strengthening the authority of MIDEPLAN to plan and coordinate social 
spending would open up a new target for demand-making, political pressure and rent-
seeking that could come to jeopardize fiscal responsibility. Instead, he argued that in 
order to preserve macroeconomic stability it was essential to protect the authority of 
the finance ministry over all budgetary matters. In this, he got important backing from 
Aylwin’s advisors at the powerful Ministry General-Secretariat of the Presidency who 
agreed with the importance of centralizing authority with the finance ministry so as to 
protect policymaking from pressure group politics. Neither did the other social 
ministries support MIDEPLAN in its quest for a larger coordinating role as they did not 
want to give up any of their own control over policymaking and spending matters. 
Crucially, Aylwin himself sided with his finance minister against Molina, which decided 
the matter. An important consequence, according to informants, was that finance 
minister Foxley was given the chairmanship of the inter-ministerial social cabinet that 
was  set  up  to  coordinate  social  policies.  Given  Foxley’s  lack  of  time  and  interest  in  
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social policies, the committee only came to function on an irregular basis and with very 
little impact on the anti-poverty effort. Informants emphasize how subsequent 
presidents have acted similarly, opting for shielding the power of the Ministry of 
Finance at the expense of MIDEPLAN’s efforts to lead a more coordinated effort in the 
fight against poverty. All in all, it shows how the position of political leaders is crucial 
for how reform moves forward. 
 
 
FROMPOLICYTOREALITY:THEROLEOFREGIMEINSTITUTIONS
So far, it has been argued that structural transformations provided important impulses 
for policymakers in Argentina and Chile to launch pluralist social reforms including new 
anti-poverty programmes, and that the specific design of these reforms was shaped by 
the new pluralist policy ideas and the technocratic experts who advocated the pluralist 
social policy approach. Yet, implementation is in many ways the most problematic 
phase of the reform process. Chapter 1 argued that regime institutions play a decisive 
role in the process of implementing reform. By creating constraints and opportunities 
for different actors in social policymaking, and structuring their relations with one 
another, regime institutions shape the process of implementing reform, and by 
extension the political outcome of welfare reform.  
Crucially, regime institutions differ markedly in Argentina and Chile. To begin with, 
Argentina and Chile have diametrically opposite types of democratic regime, as 
illustrated by Figure 2.1.  



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Figure2.1   TypesofDemocraticRegimeinArgentinaandChile
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Chile is characterized by a “protected” democracy in which weak mechanisms of 
vertical accountability (VA) are combined with strong mechanisms of horizontal 
accountability (HA). The political system is based on the constitution drafted in 1980 
by the military authorities and reformed in 1989 and 1991 at the time of the transition 
to democracy. The 1980 Constitution establishes some important characteristics of 
Chilean political regime institutions. To begin with, a number of prerogatives designed 
to protect the interests of the old elite, some of which were already discussed above, 
contribute to weaken mechanisms of VA (see Valenzuela, 1992). These include 
unelected senators in the upper chamber of Congress and a grossly biased electoral 
system that favors conservative political forces by over-representing them. A number 
of features of the 1980 Constitution also grant the armed forces tutelary power over 
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civilian political forces.32 At the same time, these undemocratic features serve as 
checks on executive power. Together with the more conventional liberal-constitutional 
checks and balances enshrined in the 1980 Constitution, the system provides for 
exceptionally strong mechanisms of HA. The more conventional horizontal controls 
include a bicameral Congress that plays an important role in the policymaking process, 
an independent judiciary and a powerful comptroller general (see IDB, 2005). 
Protected democracy has had important effects on social governance in Chile. 
Above, it was argued that the constitutional prerogatives designed to protect 
conservative interests had a decisive influence on the strategy adopted by the Aylwin 
government  to  deal  with  the  social  question.  Given  the  tutelary  role  of  the  armed  
forces it became imperative for the government to avoid stimulating social demands 
and forms of popular mobilization that could trigger a military response. Hence, 
pluralist welfare reform was undertaken not only as a means to strengthen 
opportunities for social integration, but also as a way to channel social demands 
towards less disruptive social projects at the local level and pre-empt the emergence 
of popular organizations that might carry its political activation beyond the limits 
acceptable to the old conservative elite. Also, deprived of its electoral majority the 
Concertación was forced to negotiate with the conservative opposition in order to be 
able to enact policy changes. Important social legislation envisaged by the 
Concertación government such as labor and tax reform was thus passed only after 
extensive negotiations with conservative forces who were able to extract important 
concessions from the executive moderating the original intent of these reform projects 
(see Chapter 3). 
                                                             
32 For a more detailed discussion of this ”perverse institutionalization”, see Chapter 3.  
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Importantly, the congressional powers of the conservative opposition have also 
provided for strong checks on social spending, eliminating room for discretionary 
allocation of social funds for partisan interests. Siavelis (2002: 97-98), in discussing the 
1997  budget  negotiations,  stresses  how  the  opposition  “was  able  to  extract  
agreements setting a limit on discretionary spending from the public treasury and 
measures to enhance transparency and efficiency in spending”. He also mentions that 
the government in negotiations with a congressional conference committee (comisión 
mixta)  “agreed  to  select  20  social  subsidy  programs  for  evaluation  during  1997  to  
determine whether they should be continued”, and how in the 1998 budget 
negotiations the government agreed to “redouble its oversight of social subsidy 
programs and to consider an additional 40 programs for systematic evaluation and 
potential elimination”. 
These budget negotiations demonstrate how the Chilean Congress acts as an 
important check on the executive and in reining in discretionary spending. Interviews 
with key policymakers confirm this view. Referents talk about how congressional 
oversight and other mechanisms of institutional checks and balances leave little room 
for discretion and the manipulation of social spending. In this, it also seems that legal 
provisions play an important role and the fact that the Chilean judiciary is genuinely 
independent from other branches of government and therefore in a position to 
sanction any misconduct in the allocation of social funds. What is more, the 
Comptroller General possesses strong powers to supervise social expenditures. The 
1980 Constitution establishes its absolute independence from other powers of the 
state and according to most analysts its institutional design also accomplishes that goal 
in  practice  (e.g.  Aninat  et  al.,  2006).  The  CG  has  authority  to  rule  on  the  
constitutionality of government expenditures and is charged with monitoring the 
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actions of the president, as well as overseeing local government ordinances and 
spending. Referents maintain that any misuse of funds is quickly detected by the CG. 
Even representatives of the opposition agree that the CG provides an effective check 
on the manipulation of social funds and that funding has generally been distributed 
according to strict technical rules. Indeed, evidence of manipulation and clientelism in 
the distribution of the new social programs set up by the Concertación are scarce and 
the consensus view suggests that the implementation of these programs have 
followed a highly technocratic trajectory in which politicians have not found room for 
political capture. Chile’s strong mechanisms of horizontal control effectively prevent 
the political manipulation of social spending. The inclination of the Concertación 
government to avoid the “populist temptation” given the neoliberal growth model and 
the tutelary role of the armed forces in Chile’s protected democracy has reinforced the 
tendency towards technocratic governance. The Concertación leaders have willingly 
surrendered authority over social policymaking to technocrats in order to pre-empt 
social pressures that could come to threaten the agreement with conservative forces 
over social policy. 
Argentina, by contrast, is characterized by a “delegative” democracy in which strong 
mechanisms of  VA are combined with weak mechanisms of  HA.  Argentina’s  mode of  
transition to democracy was almost the opposite of Chile’s, with the Argentine military 
regime virtually collapsing following the defeat in the war over the Falkland/Malvinas 
islands and the armed forces unable to dictate the terms of the transition. As a result, 
the Argentine presidents from Alfonsín to Menem and De la Rua have not been 
constrained by the interests of the old elite as in Chile, but instead faced strong 
incentives to cater to popular demands. No reserved domains or positions outside 
democratic control are found in Argentina. Neither has the armed forces been in a 
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position to exercise any tutelage over the Argentine elected government, at least not 
on a comparable measure with Chile. The electoral system also provides for strong 
majoritarianism with no comparable over-representation of conservative candidates. 
At the same time, weak mechanisms of HA gives the Argentine executive wide 
discretionary powers. The Argentine president enjoys strong decree authority leaving 
the legislature in a  weak position to act  as  a  check on executive power (see Ferreira,  
Rubio and Goretti, 1996; Mustapic, 2000; see also Morgenstern and Manzetti, 2003). 
Indeed, many analysts refer to Argentina as a “hyper-presidentialist” regime in which 
Congress has only limited capacity to exercise oversight (e.g. Nino, 1992). For instance, 
by resorting to the so-called decretos de necesidad y urgencia (decrees of necessity 
and urgency), the president can impose his/her will and avoid the legislature’s 
participation in policymaking. Also, Argentina lacks an autonomous auditing office or 
comptroller general with sufficient powers to constrain discretion in allocating public 
funds. The National Tribunal of Accounts (Tribunal de Cuentas de la Nación) was 
dismantled by President Menem when it became too much of an irritant. The new 
National Audit Office (Auditoría General de la Nación, AG) established in 1992 has 
been subject to wide political interference and failed to act as an independent agency 
of oversight (Santiso, 2008). Also, the judiciary in Argentina is deeply politicized (e.g. 
Prillaman, 2000). Under the Menem administration the courts were brought under 
executive sway rendering them largely subservient to the whims of the executive will. 
A major effect of delegative democracy in Argentina is the widespread manipulation 
of social funds for political ends. Weak mechanisms of institutional checks and 
balances provide politicians with ample opportunities to use discretion in allocating 
resources from social programs. Indeed, studies of social programs provide ample 
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evidence of politically motivated spending and clientelism.33 The analysis of anti-
poverty policy in Chapter 6 shows how technocratic reformers, while playing a decisive 
role in initiating pluralist reform in Argentina, were unable to shield the new anti-
poverty programs from political interference and manipulation. Targeted programs 
such as Plan Trabajar were rapidly captured by partisan interests and manipulated to 
mobilize popular support. Referents point toward the lack of oversight and sanctioning 
mechanisms that would ensure compliance with nonpartisan criteria and prevent the 
misuse of funds. President Menem, when coming under political pressure towards the 
end of the 1990s, faced no constraints in pursuing a populist strategy that included 
allocating resources to his favored constituencies rather than the needy sectors of 
society and manipulating social programs to feed clientelist networks. Menem’s 
control over the court system coupled with weak congressional oversight and a 
general auditing office that was highly politicized ensured that he had ample room to 
exploit resources from social programs for his private political gain. Such misconduct 
was replicated in sub-national governments where institutional constraints on the 
exploitation of state resources are even weaker. Using funds from the Fondo 
Conurbano,  Governor Duhalde was able to set up a vast clientelist network to secure 
domination not only of his province but also major influence over national 
parliamentary affairs. This also brings us to the importance of territorial regime 
institutions in explaining social governance. 
Argentina and Chile have diametrically opposite types of territorial regime, as 
illustrated by Figure 2.2.  
 

                                                             
33 For an overview, see Dinatale (2004). See also Vinocur and Halperin (2004). 
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Figure2.2   TypesofTerritorialRegimeinArgentinaandChile 
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Argentina has a federal system of government with extensive decentralization of 
political and administrative powers. As emphasized by many scholars, this makes the 
province the locus of partisan politics and the base of political support for politicians 
and  parties  (e.g.  Gibson  and  Calvo,  2000;  Levitsky,  2003;  Jones  and  Hwang,  2005;  
Eaton, 2005; Spiller and Tommasi, 2007). Indeed, according to some analysts, 
federalism permeates partisan politics in Argentina to the extent that national parties 
resemble federations of parties run by provincial leaders (Brusco, Nazareno and 
Stokes, 2002). Political careers are usually province-based and even positions in the 
national government are often a result of provincial factors. The Argentine constitution 
gives  a  great  deal  of  authority  over  expenditure  and  tax  decisions  to  the  provinces.  
With regard to expenditures, the only areas in which the national government has 
exclusive control are those associated with defense and foreign affairs. In the areas of 
economic and social infrastructure, responsibilities are shared between the national 
government and the provinces, while the latter have exclusive control in primary 
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education and local organizations and services (Tommasi, Saiegh and Sanguinetti, 
2001). In terms of public spending, Argentina is the most decentralized country in Latin 
America. In 1995, sub-national government spending accounted for approximately 50 
percent of total public sector expenditures (IDB, 1997). 
As  a  consequence,  topocrats  are  crucial  actors  in  social  governance  as  they  hold  
authority over vital institutional and political resources. This is especially true of 
provincial governors and party bosses (frequently the same person). Given the 
decentralized federal structure, governors in Argentina exercise considerable influence 
over the execution of public policy and spending. The federal revenue sharing system 
automatically transfers funds to the provinces, which are then mostly used at the 
province’s discretion. This usually provides the governors with considerable patronage 
resources whereby they are able to control provincial-level party organization. 
Crucially, national legislators are elected on provincial party lists and control over local 
patronage resources allows governors to control the list-making process. National 
legislators thus come to depend heavily on provincial leaders for career progression, 
which means that the provincial elite exert considerable influence over the national 
legislative process. Indeed, according to some analyses, Argentine legislators are the 
pawns of their provincial party bosses (Jones and Hwong, 2005; Spiller and Tommasi, 
2007).  This  means  that  Argentine  executives  have  to  negotiate  the  support  of  
provincial leaders in order to get things done.  
Such powers in the hands of topocrats have had important consequences for social 
reform efforts in Argentina. Clearly, as we shall see in Chapter 6, technocratic 
reformers at the SDS and other federal welfare agencies have found their control over 
the process of implementing the pluralist social policy approach circumscribed by local 
interests. Governors (and to a lesser extent, mayors) exercise considerable influence 
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over the execution of social policy in their jurisdictions. This influence not only stems 
from their direct control over the provincial budget but also from their discretionary 
control of many national government-funded programs (De Luca, Jones and Tula, 
2002). Given that much of their ability to launch successful campaigns, both in primary 
and general elections, is based principally on patronage, pork-barrel politics, and 
clientelism,34 the  manner  in  which  they  choose  to  execute  social  policies  may  differ  
significantly from the pluralist norms and practices advocated by technocratic 
reformers in the national government. Indeed, officials at the SDS testify about their 
deep frustration over provincial politics. In implementing national government-funded 
social programs, sub-national governments lacked commitment to the programs’ 
pluralist principles and objectives. Mechanisms designed to invoke civil society 
participation and pluralistic access to social funds were ignored and efforts by program 
officials to institute a more pluralist approach were frequently undermined by 
topocrats. In many instances, topocrats were thus able to capture pluralist policies for 
their local political ends. Also, provincial governments have set up a host of their own 
social programs that frequently overlap with national programs but seldom invoke 
pluralist principles of administration. To coordinate the actions of the various 
jurisdictions, the national government on the initiative of Eduardo Amadeo at the SDS 
created the Federal Council for Social Development, composed of the social ministers 
of the twenty-four provinces. However, lack of political support caused the failure of 
the council to generate coordinated actions. Efforts were also made during the Alianza 
government, particularly by the minister of social development Graciela Fernández 
Mejide, to increase federal control over the implementation of social programs in the 
                                                             
34 Several scholars emphasize how sub-national politicians in Argentina depend on such activities for 
electoral success and political influence (e.g. De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; 
Jones and Hwang, 2005; Spiller and Tommasi, 2007).   
98 
 
provinces. Designed as a measure to reduce clientelism, these efforts provoked intense 
resistance from topocrats who managed to block the initiative.  
The reluctance of topocrats to adhere to the pluralist principles of social policy and 
succumb to federal coordination is related to the incentives they face in serving their 
political goals, which may be very different from those of the national government. 
Since topocrats’ hold on power is based primarily on patronage, pork and clientelist 
activities, their goals are best served by distributive policy. This directly reflects on 
their relations with the national government. In exchange for political and legislative 
support (i.e. the votes of their legislators), they want transfers, subsidies, government 
posts, and pork to dole out with discretion (Jones and Hwang, 2005). Indeed, 
Argentina’s deeply federalized structure provides ample opportunities to hold the 
national government to “ransom” in this manner. A good example is the 1992 “Federal 
Pact” that formed part of President Menem’s economic adjustment efforts (see Spiller 
and Tommasi 2007). To reach this pact, Menem agreed to a number of discretionary 
financial transfers to the provinces in order to secure their support for the economic 
program. Annual transfers of $400-700 million helped secure the support of Governor 
Eduardo Duhalde of Buenos Aires province and “his” legislators in the National 
Congress. Duhalde used these transfers from the national government to set up a vast 
infrastructure and social program that became notorious for its clientelism.35 The 
devolution of  FONAVI to the provinces also formed part  of  this  pact.  In  practice,  this  
gave the provinces almost  complete discretion in the use of  resources from FONAVI.  
All former pretensions to institute a more participatory and demand-driven approach 
                                                             
35 The arrangement diverted 10 percent of federal tax revenues to a new Fondo de Reparación Histórica 
del Conurbano Bonaerense directly controlled by Governor Duhalde. The Fund permitted Duhalde to 
build a powerful party machine that in the 1995 presidential election “was credited with orchestrating 
President Menem’s electoral victories in the greater Buenos Aires region, bucking a general trend of 
urban electoral losses” (Gibson 1997: fn. 53). 
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were dropped. Instead, according to my informants, these funds have been used in a 
clientelistic manner by the provincial governors in order to attract local political 
support. Subsequent negotiations between the president and the provinces over 
economic adjustment followed a similar pattern (see Spiller and Tommasi 2007). In 
order to pass his economic reform projects, Menem needed to gain provincial support. 
In exchange for this support, provincial governors were given wide discretion over the 
use of fiscal transfers and the execution of social policy and programs. Such clientelistic 
tactics not only helped topocrats secure domination in their respective localities, but 
also made a major contribution to Menem’s political support base by delivering votes 
for his Peronist party.         
In stark contrast to Argentina, Chile has a highly centralized unitary system of 
government. As a consequence, national officials dominate politics and policymaking 
to a much greater extent than in Argentina. Sub-national authorities hold very few 
exclusive functional responsibilities. Almost all functions of sub-national government 
are shared with other levels of government and subjected to central control. Regional 
government is headed by an Intendente, appointed by the President as his 
representative in the region.36 The central government ministries maintain regional 
offices (SEREMIs) that are coordinated by the Indendente as a regional cabinet. 
Intendentes are advised in relation to planning and the distribution of funds by the 
regional  agents  (SERPLACs)  of  MIDEPLAN.   The  Intendente also presides over the 
Regional Council that consists of indirectly elected members who are chosen by 
municipal councillors for a four year term. But as emphasized by Angell, Lowden, and 
Thorp (2001), the councilors have no real power to control the Intendente and remain 
                                                             
36 For a discussion of regional government composition and functions, see Angell, Lowden and Thorp 
(2001).   
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marginal actors in regional politics. The allocation of funds for regional development is 
also basically determined by the criteria of the central ministries, “and there is very 
little room for maneuver by the regional authorities” (Angell et al., 2001: 95). All in all, 
regional government plays only a minor political role. Their function is that of co-
ordinating central government policy.  
The political weakness of sub-national officials is repeated at lower levels of 
administration. The regions are divided into fifty one provinces, which are headed by 
an appointed governor. Their function is exclusively administrative and can be used by 
central government authorities in order to bypass the regional level in the 
implementation of policies. Below the provincial level, the country is divided into 
communes with municipal status. As of 1992, the municipal government is chosen in 
direct elections. Municipal government consists of a mayor and a municipal council. 
Yet, the role of municipalities is again more to function as service agencies for central 
government policy than to be autonomous political entities in their own right.37 
Municipal governments have exclusive responsibility for a limited number of functions 
mostly related to community development. Other responsibilities are shared with 
central and regional government. Even over matters such as staff levels and structure 
municipalities have relatively little control. This greatly reduces the ability of mayors to 
distribute patronage in the form of municipal jobs. Opportunities to use clientelistic 
tactics to gain political support are further reduced by the SERPLACs which control 
access to local investment projects. The SEREMIs also have a supervisory and guiding 
role over municipalities in their sector, whereas the redistribution of municipal funds is 
controlled by the Ministry of Interior. Finally, the regional Intendente and the 
                                                             
37 For a discussion of their role, see Raczynski and Serrano (2001).  
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provincial governor, as the President’s agents at the local level, serve as powerful 
checks on municipal decision making.   
Hence, in Chile, topocrats lack real institutional and political resources to perform a 
major role in social governance. In terms of financial structure, sub-national spending 
amounts to only 13.6 percent of total government spending (IDB, 1997). In direct 
contrast to Argentina, the central government does not automatically share any 
portion of tax revenues with sub-national governments. Instead, as emphasized by 
Eaton (2004: 42), “national politicians determine on an annual basis, in the course of 
budget negotiations, the amount of funds transferred to sub-national governments”. 
Importantly, sub-national governments may not borrow in their own right and cannot 
create new taxes without central government approval. As a result, topocrats cannot 
hold central government to ransom as in Argentina. Indeed, Chile’s deeply centralized-
unitary structure is reflected in partisan politics, where the locus is clearly at the 
national level. Unlike Argentina, Chilean sub-national politicians wield only minor 
influence over candidate selection and the conduct of national legislators. Instead, as 
emphasized by many scholars (e.g. Eaton, 2004), the control of national party leaders 
in Chile at all levels of partisan politics far exceeds what their peers in Argentina can 
hope to achieve. 
The limited role of sub-national government in Chile’s political system has 
important consequences for social policymaking. In stark contrast to Argentina, the 
Chilean executive has no need to engage in “territorial politics”, fighting over local 
political turf or seeking the loyalty of sub-national heads of government in order to get 
things done. As the heads of regional government are appointed by the president and 
directly elected mayors command few political or institutional resources, the executive 
need not worry about commanding the loyalty of sub-national politicians. As a direct 
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result, there is no need to use social programs as bargaining chips in negotiations with 
the heads of regional government or doling them out to mayors in order for these to 
be able to build a political base independently from and against the regional caudillo.  
The weakness of sub-national government has been directly reflected in social 
reform efforts in Chile. The design and management of new social programs have 
remained heavily centralized. A typical example is FOSIS, a social investment fund that 
was established to channel targeted resources for productive development projects 
among the poorest strata. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the various programs set up by 
FOSIS have been formulated in a top-down manner by FOSIS officials, without much 
input from local government or lower administrative units. According to Raczynski 
(2000: 139), “programmes are designed by the central government, are top-down, and 
arrive at the local level in search of predefined beneficiaries. The local level is a mere 
recipient for programmes”. Not only are programs designed in a top-down manner, 
but the role of sub-national government has also been limited with regard to their 
implementation. The same goes for Chile Solidario, a more recent anti-poverty 
program. It reflects the deep suspicion held at the apex of central government as to 
the technical capabilities of municipalities to administer targeted social programs. 
Informants stress how FOSIS officials have been reluctant to cede responsibility for 
programs to local government, preferring instead to work directly through NGOs or by 
subcontracting technical personnel to administer collaboration with community 
organizations. In general, collaboration between municipalities and FOSIS has been 
rare. As a result, “associative networks” (Chalmers, Martin and Piester, 1997) at the 
local level have rarely been formed or performing well.     
Hence, the Chilean regime provides few opportunities for topocrats to capture 
social programs for their own political purposes. The executive can easily bypass 
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topocrats that do not share the program principles and commitments by making use of 
intendentes or governors that have been appointed by the president. Indeed, 
according to MIDEPLAN sources, in implementing FOSIS and similar programs, 
MIDEPLAN often deliberately circumvent local mayors who showed a reluctance to 
adhere to the pluralist criteria of operation. Lack of local discretion over the 
administration of social programs thus reduces “implementation gap” at the local 
level.  In  this,  the  strong  role  of  the  Office  of  the  Comptroller  and  other  agencies  of  
“horizontal accountability” further help to ensure adherence to the pluralist principles 
and objectives. Such agencies have been apt at defending social policy and programs 
from political manipulation and preventing clientelism. Thus, whereas in Argentina 
social technocrats have often been frustrated in their efforts to invoke more technical 
criteria into the administration of social programs by politicians bent on “capturing” 
these programs for their own political purposes, in Chile social technocrats have 
remained in control of the process of implementing the pluralist social policy approach 
and political criteria has not been allowed to steer the administration of social 
programs. In fact, in Chile even the opposition admits that clientelism has not been a 
problem in the administration of FOSIS or Chile Solidario. 
Yet, most analysts maintain the view that while clientelism is not a major problem, 
lack of decentralization has hampered community participation and the formation of 
associative networks at the local level. Ultimately, this has made it difficult to respond 
to various situations of poverty and social exclusion. Or as the analysis of eight social 
programs  carried  out  by  Concha  et  al.  (2001:  187)  affirms:  “los  programas  son  
estandarizados, rígidos, definen soluciones homogéneas y muestran poca flexibilidad 
para responder a la diversidad de situaciones de pobreza específicas”. As local 
government has not discretion in selecting projects or beneficiaries, the social policy 
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approach has remained inflexible and bureaucratic. That is the other side of the coin – 
rigid rules formulated by central level technocrats, which are rigorously monitored for 
adherence by a strong and fiercely independent Comptroller General as well as 
carefully designed internal mechanisms for control. 
The Chilean government has not been totally deaf to this critique. In the mid-1990s 
the regional level was politically strengthened somewhat through the introduction of 
the regional councils and by transferring some functions of social policy to the 
regions.38 However,  the  regional  extension  offices  of  the  ministries  and  central  state  
agencies (such as FOSIS) continue to play a dominant role in regional policymaking. For 
instance, as some responsibilities for the selection of project proposals were devolved 
to the regional level, SERPLAC (e.g. the technical secretariat of MIDEPLAN at the 
regional level) was put in charge of the technical evaluation and, guaranteeing that the 
projects selected apply with the technical standards formulated by MIDEPLAN (or 
some of its dependent agencies such as FOSIS). In fact, in 1998 it was proposed that 
SERPLAC would cease to be part of MIDEPLAN, and instead become dependent on the 
regional government. However, the initiative was blocked by the Office of the 
Comptroller who was worried about potential politicization of SERPLAC. It 
demonstrates the strong authority that the Office of the Comptroller commands in 
enforcing horizontal accountability in Chile. The downside has been a 
technocratization of social policy.  
In short, at no stage in the process do politicians have much opportunity to use 
social project funds for patronage, as funds are either distributed directly from 
agencies  such  as  FOSIS  to  NGOs  or  the  private  sector,  or  are  devolved  through  the  
                                                             
38 For a discussion of the functions of regional government and how they have been strengthened, see 
Serrano (2001).  
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technical secretariats at the sub-national level where SERPLAC is in charge of 
coordinating project execution.  
 
PoliticalOutcome:DivergentModesofSocialGovernance
It is the argument of this study that because of different regime institutions pluralist 
reform has lead to divergent modes of social governance in Argentina and Chile. In 
Chile, the outcome has been a technocratic mode of social governance. Chile’s 
protected democracy effectively prevents politicians from capturing social funds. Its 
centralist-unitary system of government also contributes to give technocrats within 
the central state welfare bureaucracy strong control over the policymaking process. 
Hence, the institutional configuration in Chile allows for strong technocratic control 
over the allocation and distribution of social funds. In comparison with Argentina, the 
technocratization of social governance in Chile contributes to less particularistic 
procedures with less clientelism and stronger likelihood of social rights being upheld. 
In Chile, responses to social problems are relatively efficient and in tune with people’s 
real needs. Targeting of social programs is generally thought to have been effective 
and guided by technical criteria emphasising efficiency in the allocation of funds rather 
than political expediency (Clert and Wodon, 2002). Indeed, vulnerability has been 
reduced substantially since the transition to democracy, in no small measure due to 
the new social policies and programs designed by the Concertación government (see 
Meller, 1999).   
At the same time, this technocratic mode of social governance provides little room 
for articulating bottom-up pressure on the decision-making process. Thus, the pluralist 
social policy approach implemented by the Concertación government differs markedly 
from the discourse that connects it with participatory governance and empowering the 
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poor. Participation mainly revolves around the devolution of community development 
projects to non-governmental agencies to aid the implementation of anti-poverty 
policies  and  programs  designed  from  above  (e.g.  Concha  et  al.,  2001).  This  type  of  
structured participation is inherently conservative. Indeed, civil society activists have 
voiced heavy criticism of the Concertación for being treated only in their role as 
project executors (Consejo Ciudadano, 2000). In the process, many NGOs have been 
forced to adjust their agendas in order to compete in the aid market created through 
pluralist reform. Technocrats maintain overall control of the allocation of funds to 
NGOs who have to compete with each other on the highly technical terms defined by 
MIDEPLAN. NGOs and community organizations that lack adequate resources to 
compete and submit viable project proposals, often those most in need of aid, become 
excluded. Programs such as FOSIS designed to have its base in community participation 
have therefore in reality acquired a highly techno-bureaucratic structure that serve to 
ensure social control and the marginalization of more radical demands. Indeed, local 
activists complain about how their demands are ignored by a system that favors 
technical proficiency over popular participation. The impact of such technocratic 
governance on the quality of Chilean democracy warrants more specific research, but 
it does not seem too farfetched to suggest that it has contributed to the rising political 
apathy and disillusionment found in surveys and studies of the popular sectors in Chile 
(see Delamaza, 2005; Oxhorn, 1994; PNUD, 1998; Posner, 1997, 2004). Indeed, in her 
study of political activity, Olavarría finds that the technocratization of politics in Chile 
“has  led  to  widespread  disengagement  from  formal  politics  at  the  grassroots  (2003:  
14). The perception is that political parties and elected officials have been rendered 
largely impotent by this technocratization and that politics is unable to realize the 
tasks that the people propose. While such disengagement from formal politics may 
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have contributed to the success with consolidating Chilean democracy, it 
simultaneously feeds a “participation deficit” that hampers democratic deepening.39  
By contrast, in Argentina the outcome has been a populist mode of social 
governance. Argentina’s decentralized-federal system of government gives topocrats, 
particularly provincial governors, strong control over the policymaking process while 
simultaneously reducing the leverage of technocrats within the central state welfare 
bureaucracy. Its delegative democracy also provides room for politicians to manipulate 
social funds for personal and partisan ends. Hence, the institutional configuration in 
Argentina paves the way for wide political discretion over the allocation and 
distribution of social funds. In comparison with Chile, this politicization of social 
governance in Argentina contributes to particularistic procedures; clientelism and less 
likelihood of social rights being upheld. In Argentina, responses to social problems 
have been inefficient, reflecting political expediency rather than people’s real needs. 
Targeting of social benefits is generally perceived as having been ineffective and 
guided by partisan interests rather than social criteria. Indeed, studies show how social 
programs set up during the 1990s by technocratic reformers were captured during the 
implementation stage by Peronist topocrats who used the benefits from these 
programs to foster clientelist networks. For instance, various studies have documented 
how the unemployed have received work under the temporary employment program, 
Plan Trabajar, in return for attendance at party rallies and other political services. As 
we shall see in Chapter 6, President Menem himself increasingly deemed it necessary 
to engage in such political manipulation of targeted benefits, using the programs set 
up by the SDS as a lynchpin for mobilizing political support among poor constituencies. 
As the 1990s advanced, Menem was increasingly seen inaugurating community works 
                                                             
39 For an extensive treatment of this argument, focusing on the Chilean countryside, see Kurtz (2004). 
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and handing out benefits from these programs, in what appeared to be an attempt to 
promote a symbolic link between the president and poor communities, by taking 
advantage of the discretion allowed to him by the weak institutional constraints on 
such selective transfers. Thus, even when his macroeconomic policies were anti-
populist, social policy was used to foster a populist strategy at the community level. 
Interestingly, this populist mode of social governance contributed to foster 
popular mobilization. As several studies have shown (Garay, 2007; Franceschelli and 
Ronconi, 2005; Svampa and Pereyra, 2003), clientelist handouts contributed to the rise 
of piquetero organizations. As such, however, the pluralist social policy approach 
implemented under Menem and continued under De la Rua also differs markedly from 
the discourse that connects it with participatory governance and poor peoples’ 
empowerment. Civic participation in “associative networks” remains weak. Instead, 
participation revolves around the clientelistic ties that provide mechanisms through 
which popular organizations such as piqueteros can make claims on the state and 
acquire resources to administer among its members, such as the famous “work plans” 
from Plan Trabajar. As the allocation of benefits are based on political considerations 
popular organizations face strong incentives to engage in political advocacy, in direct 
contrast to Chile.  
This type of “politicised participation” is inherently prone to conflict. Populist 
governance will eventually trigger a backlash if it leads to large public deficits and 
widespread corruption. The politicized nature of public disbursements discredits 
political parties and the political class.  Indeed, the 1990s saw increased public 
disillusionment with the populist mode of social governance. What Teichman (2004: 
36) writes with regard to the market reform experience of Argentina during the 1990s 
applies equally to the experience with pluralist social policy reform. It is worth quoting 
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her at length: “While Carlos Menem was able to contain the growing political unrest of 
the mid 1990s, in 1999 he was defeated at the polls. The depth of public 
disillusionment resurfaced with a vengeance in late December 2001, when the country 
erupted in political protest and no less than four presidents resigned from office. 
Argentina teetered on the brink of financial collapse with a debt of U.S. $132 billion. It 
is clear that the crisis in Argentina is as much political as economic. It is characterized 
by deep public disillusionment and anger with both the political leadership and the 
manner in which policy reforms had been carried out. This political side of the 
Argentine crisis, the delegitimization of political institutions and leaders, has much to 
do with the public’s perception of the nature of Argentina’s reform experience, 
particularly its patrimonial features”.  
 
 
CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis of anti-poverty policymaking in Argentina and Chile shows 
the usefulness of the politics of transforming social governance framework that was 
introduced in Chapter 1. The analysis demonstrates how the major structural, 
ideational and institutional transformations that accompanied Argentina’s and Chile’s 
transition to free market democracy provide a critical backdrop for understanding their 
shift to the new pluralist social policy approach. Pluralist welfare reform was initiated 
by the Argentine and Chilean political leaders in order to maintain governability in the 
new political environment. In this process, they found it useful to delegate wide 
authority over policy reform to technocratic experts so as to be able to bypass vested 
interests and facilitate the implementation of reform. Many of these technocrats came 
from  NGOs  and  were  sympathetic  to  the  new  pluralist  practices  in  social  policy.  Yet,  
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technocrats in Argentina and Chile faced contrasting institutional environments with 
wide-ranging effects on the political outcome of these reform efforts. In line with the 
framework introduced in Chapter 1, the analysis shows how differing regime 
institutions help explain the contrasting outcomes of pluralist reform in Argentina and 
Chile. Both outcomes contrast with the assumptions that expect pluralist reforms to 
give way for more participatory modes of social governance and poor people’s 
empowerment. 
  The  next  two  chapters  take  us  back  to  the  old  corporatist  mode  of  social  
governance. By giving an account for its origins, evolution and erosion in Argentina and 
Chile, this historical analysis provides further support for the arguments with regard to 
causal mechanisms that this study makes. It also provides the necessary context for 
understanding the shift to the new pluralist social policy approach. The subsequent 
two chapters then come back to the particular case of anti-poverty policy, providing an 
in-depth look at the complex process of anti-poverty reform as it unfolded in each of 
the two countries.   
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PartII

THERISEANDDEMISEOFCORPORATISM
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CHAPTERTHREE

CORPORATISMANDITSDEMISEINCHILE
 
This  chapter  looks  at  the  evolution  of  social  governance  in  Chile.  It  shows  how  the  
transformation of social governance has been linked to politicians’ attempts to 
manage state-society relations in response to changing socioeconomic, ideational and 
political-institutional conditions. The chapter thus strengthens our understanding of 
the politics of transforming social governance and provides support for the argument 
presented in Chapter 1. 
The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section discusses the period 
leading up to the military coup in 1973. It shows how early social legislation 
constituted a direct response to rising working class militancy propelled by changes in 
the socioeconomic structure. As Scully (1995: 106-107) has pointed out, “political elites 
sought to mitigate the most conspicuous aspects of working-class exploitation in order 
to remove the conditions for recurrent social protest”. While initially rejected by 
conservative interests in Congress, military rule enabled the initiation of a corporatist 
social policy approach by a new cadre of technocrats who took inspiration from the 
Bismarckian social  security  system of  Germany.  From the 1930s onwards,  as  the new 
social policies and programs were expanded, a corporatist mode of social governance 
emerged supported by the structural and ideational features of the ISI model. More 
than in Argentina, however, the corporatist characteristics of social governance in 
Chile were combined with clientelistic pluralist elements that were nourished by a 
vigorous democratic regime in which reformist political parties fiercely competed for 
popular support. Over time, the corporatist social policy approach led a highly 
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stratified and internally fragmented social policy system that helped deepen structural 
problems and political instability.  
The second section discusses how the military takeover in 1973 ushered in a 
period of neoconservative transformation whereby the corporatist welfare state was 
dismantled. The authoritarian nature of the regime allowed for the massive use of 
repression against the popular sectors paving way for the reversal of the economic and 
social policies that had established the basis of the corporatist welfare state. In 
addition, the institutional structure of the regime that concentrated political power in 
the hands of General Pinochet and his team of neoliberal technocrats proved decisive 
for the implementation of a new social policy approach that revolved around the 
principle of a subsidiary state.  
The third section discusses the return to democracy and its effects on social 
governance. The analysis shows how the combination of structural, ideational and 
institutional conditions impeded a major overhaul of the social policy approach 
instituted by the Pinochet regime. Instead, the new democratic government envisaged 
a cautious approach to transforming social governance. Tax and labor reforms had to 
be negotiated with the conservative opposition reflecting the institutional constraints 
inherent in Chile’s protected democracy. Great importance was placed on preserving 
democratic governability in face of the threat posed by military tutelage. This required 
avoiding the “populist temptation” of inflated social expenditures, while 
simultaneously enacting piecemeal social reform so as to pre-empt popular 
mobilization. The pluralist social policy approach adopted by the new democratic 
government was intended to incorporate the array of autonomous grassroots 
organizations and NGOs that had formed around subsistence issues. It was shaped by 
technocratic reformers that had taken refuge in international organizations and NGOs 
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during military rule. With a view to the need to avoid pent-up social demands from 
influencing governmental policy in Chile’s protected democracy, technocrats were 
given considerable powers to formulate pluralistic social policy. In Chile’s centralized-
unitary system of government these technocratic reformers were able to maintain 
control over the process of implementation.   
 

THERISEOFTHECORPORATISTWELFARESTATE
Prior to the military coup of 1973, Chile saw the emergence of a corporatist mode of 
social governance with important clientelistic features. Its roots were in the major 
structural, ideational and political-institutional changes that spearheaded a process of 
corporatist social state expansion from the 1920s. In this process new interest groups 
emerged that pressured the state in search for ever more privileges and benefits. 
Gradually, the state became the principal referent for social demands to the point 
where “access to the state seemed a necessity for obtaining satisfaction of demands 
and claims” (Garretón, 1989: 7). Around 1970, the level of government social spending 
almost doubled the average in Latin America, even surpassing that of Argentina 
(Arellano 1985). More so than in Argentina, social governance in Chile also developed 
stronger clientelistic pluralist elements as the popular sectors and their organizations 
became tightly linked to political parties. These party-based linkages enabled popular 
organizations  to  retain  a  measure  of  autonomy  from  state  control.  In  Chile,  state  
corporatism was thus less prevalent and the mode of social governance in some ways 
more akin to the societal corporatism of Western Europe.  
The explanation for this has to do with regime institutions. From 1932 until 1973 
Chile maintained a vibrant democracy characterized by a fierce competition among 
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reformist parties for popular support. Through the democratic process popular 
organizations were given substantial leverage as each party protected particular 
segments of the popular sectors through favorable legislation and administrative 
prebends. The trajectory of Chile’s social state expansion was thus slightly different 
from Argentina’s, as we shall see. Nevertheless, in both countries it resulted in an 
internally fragmented and stratified system that over time led to severe economic and 
social inconsistencies that helped undermine governability. In Chile, these problems 
reached unprecedented levels during the government of Salvador Allende (1970-73) 
that ultimately led to the breakdown of democracy and a dramatic restructuring 
process under neoconservative authoritarianism.   
 
TheSocialQuestionandEarlySocialLegislation
During the 19th century and until the 1920s social provision in Chile was largely in the 
hands of philanthropic institutions and, most importantly, the Catholic Church. Most of 
the population lived in the rural sector where patron-client relations helped uphold 
oligarchic control. The regime established with the constitution of 1833 restricted 
political participation through limited suffrage and permitted the president to control 
potential political opposition with constitutional provisions for regimes of exception 
(see Loveman, 2004). In such a system of “authoritarian republicanism”, the ruling elite 
had little need for social policy.  
The nitrate boom beginning in the 1880s helped fuel major changes to the 
socioeconomic structure with wide-ranging repercussions for state-society relations 
that  eventually  put  pressure  on  the  political  elite  to  pay  more  attention  to  social  
welfare. Importantly, this period saw the rise of the working class that began to 
organize in response to the dismal social conditions. From 1890 onward strike and 
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protest activity increased considerably. It was often met with police and sometimes 
military repression leading to outbreaks of extreme violence in which thousands of 
workers lost their lives. Increasingly, the “social question” became a source of concern 
for the political elite. Collier and Collier (1991) emphasize the salience of the social 
question and how the fear of the threat posed by the working class was particularly 
high in Chile. In relation to this they note how “the strike wave that began in 1917 was 
a convincing indication to both the traditional oligarchy and the middle sectors that 
something had to be done” (1991: 189).  
From the late 1880s onwards some bills were introduced in Congress to improve 
the situation, particularly in relation to the housing problem and the expansion of 
primary education (see Arellano, 1985). Yet these were timid measures with little 
effect in relation to the deep social dislocations that characterized the era. Analyzing 
the  political  system  up  to  1925,  Remmer  (1984:  154)  noted  how  it  “impeded  state  
activity on behalf of subordinate groups”. With the end of World War I and the 
recession that immediately followed, manifestations of social discontent reached new 
levels.  The  emergence  of  the  labor  movement  put  considerable  stress  on  a  political  
system that did not accommodate working-class interests. Galvanized by the Russian 
Revolution, workers and students alike became increasingly radical in their actions 
(Collier and Sater, 2004). 
In the campaign for the presidential election of 1920 the “social question” was one 
of the major issues (Arellano, 1985). The election was won by Arturo Alessandri on the 
basis of a reformist program. Similarly to Yrigoyen in Argentina, as we shall see, 
Alessandri pressed for the enactment of social legislation, particularly the creation of 
social security and a labor code. Lacking Yrigoyen’s “delegative” democratic powers, 
however, Alessandri was unable to override conservative resistance in the legislature. 
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As a result of the restructuring of the presidential system to a quasi-parliamentary one 
in the 1890s, the presidency had been severely weakened in relation to Congress, a 
relationship that prevailed until the 1920s. It was against this background of a political 
impasse and the ensuing economic and social disorder that the armed forces stepped 
in to bury the so-called Parliamentary Republic in September 1924 (see Collier and 
Sater, 2004). 
Under military rule, a corporatist social policy approach was adopted to deal with 
the social question. Instrumental in shaping the new approach was the coalition of 
experts, mostly doctors of medicine, which made an alliance with the military. These 
social technocrats came to occupy the new Ministry of Hygiene, Social Assistance and 
Security created in 1924 (Illanes and Riesco, 2007). Under their influence, a process of 
social state expansion was initiated that was modeled after the Bismarckian social 
security system of Germany.40 Between  1924  and  1925,  labor  legislation  was  
established that formed the legal basis of unionization and insurance funds were 
created for blue and white-collar workers, as well as for civil servants, journalists and 
the police. The creation of these new institutions brought an immediate increase in 
personnel and fiscal expenditure, laying the foundation for massive growth of the 
corporatist welfare state in the coming years. 
During the Ibáñez dictatorship from 1927 to 1931 the corporatist approach was 
intensified in order to better be able to control the labor movement. As explained by 
Collier and Collier (1991: 185): “It was primarily a response to the social question 
posed  by  the  challenge  of  a  newly  activated  militant  labor  movement,  in  which  the  
goal  was  to  deradicalize  the  union  movement  by  providing  a  legal  framework  and  
alternative union structures that would ‘harmonize’ class relations, substituting class 
                                                             
40 See also Abel and Lewis (1993). 
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collaboration for class conflict”. The approach had three main components: “first, the 
repression of existing leftist-oriented unions; second, a paternalistic extension of 
certain benefits to workers to eliminate some of the underlying causes of worker 
protest; and third, the promotion of an alternative form of legalized state-controlled 
and state-sponsored unionism” (Ibid.). By making use of dictatorial powers, Ibáñez 
thus laid the groundwork for a corporatist mode of social governance in Chile, 
anticipating what occurred under Perón in Argentina. 
Indeed, there are interesting parallels with Perón. Inspired by the ideas of Primo 
de Rivera and Mussolini, and largely unconstrained in their use of executive powers, 
both Ibáñez and Perón attempted to resolve the social question by way of state 
corporatism. Ibáñez was cut short in his efforts by the Great Depression, which put 
Chile on a democratic path that, while far from circumcising the corporatist social 
policy approach, helped add stronger clientelistic pluralist elements to social 
governance. In Argentina, Perón was in power for more than ten years and was thus 
able to go further in consolidating state corporatism, a point that will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter.        
Hence, we see how the framework proposed in this study is useful for 
understanding Chile’s trajectory of social state expansion. The basis for the creation of 
the first social policies was the attempt by political elites to restore governability in 
face of escalating working class militancy propelled by major changes in the 
socioeconomic structure. These attempts were shaped by the policy ideas in vogue 
during the time and by the experts who took charge of implementing the new social 
policies, such as the social policy advocacy coalition led by Dr. Alejandro del Río during 
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the mid-1920s to which was referred above.41 Important boundaries were put on 
these efforts by the nature of regime institutions, as evidenced by the Alessandri´s 
failure to implement social laws under the constraints of the Parliamentary Republic. 
Only under military dictatorship could conservative opposition to social legislation be 
overridden. The role of regime institutions becomes particularly clear in a comparison 
with Argentina. Comparing Yrigoyen and Alessandri it is evident that regime 
institutions are the main variable in explaining their different fortunes in implementing 
social reform. It was also noted how authoritarian institutions under Ibáñez and Perón 
led to similar efforts to establish a corporatist mode of social governance. As Chile was 
put on a democratic path, however, some differences again appeared in the nature of 
social governance between the two countries, as the next section will more clearly 
show.  
 
DemocraticCompetitionandSocialStateExpansion
Constitutional order was restored in 1932 under the Constitution promulgated in 1925 
but that initially had been rejected. From 1932 until 1973 Chile maintained a stable 
democracy in which parties on the right, center and left competed for elective office. 
This democratic regime allowed for the political incorporation of the popular sectors 
and set  the basis  for  a  mode of  social  governance in which,  in  addition to important 
corporatist features, state-society relations were defined by clientelistic ties in higher 
measure than in Argentina. Borzutzky (1998: 91-92) writes: “Clientelism gave the 
parties political support and clientelistic politics affected legislation more so than 
ideology. By the end of this period the legislative process had become almost entirely 
devoted to the solution of particular problems, the concession of special benefits, or 
                                                             
41 On the role of ideas in informing social policy formation during the period, see Abel and Lewis (1993). 
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exemptions to general obligations. Invariably the process produced the expansion of 
the social and economic functions of the state”. 
From the 1930s, the Chilean state steadily increased its role in the provision of 
social services.42 In  the  social  security  field,  coverage  was  extended  to  new  working  
categories and new benefits were introduced such as family allowances, 
unemployment pay and maternity allowance. With regard to housing, the Popular 
Housing Fund (Caja de la Habitación Popular)  was  set  up  in  1936  to  subsidize  the  
building of houses for workers. In healthcare, legislation was adopted under Pedro 
Aguirre Cerda’s Popular Front government (1938-1941) to provide preventive medical 
care for workers and in the case of blue-collar workers extend curative care to mothers 
and children. In education, the expansion of enrolment continued at all levels.  
Between 1935 and 1955 public social expenditures increased 4.5-fold. Growing 
state provision constituted a response to pressure from organized social groups: the 
middle strata, miners, industrial workers, and the urban proletariat (Raczynski, 2000; 
Castiglioni, 2005). Their organizations and associations pressured the state in search 
for privileges and benefits: jobs, salaries, social security, health care, education, and 
housing. As a source of patronage, social policies helped to mediate social struggles 
and to form broad, “incorporating” populist coalitions between different interests. 
Social policy also served the economic model of import-substituting industrialization 
adopted in the 1930s. By subsidizing the reproduction of the labor force through the 
development of state systems of social protection, social policies reinforced the 
purchasing power of wages thereby expanding domestic markets (Taylor, 2003).  
The expansion of social protection was uneven between different segments of the 
labor force, reflecting the varying strength and ability of class-based social movements 
                                                             
42 For a detailed analysis of social policies during the period, see Arellano (1985).  
121 
 
at different points in time to effectively pressure the state for concessions (Taylor, 
2003;  Raczynski,  2000).  From  the  1950s  onwards,  a  highly  stratified  system  between  
“insiders” and “outsiders” emerged. For “insiders”, workers with stable permanent 
jobs represented by strong centralized union organizations, free access to public health 
programs and guaranteed social security coverage, plus unemployment insurance, 
were part of the social protection package that followed from institutions such as 
centralized wage bargaining, lifelong employment guarantees in the public sector and 
rigid employment contracts in the private sector. The problem with this corporatist 
model was the growing number of “outsiders”, those with temporary, “informal” jobs 
or chronically unemployed. As a consequence, the system became “notoriously 
fragmented as different sections of the middle and working classes variously 
succeeded in pressuring the state to grant or extend coverage to their particular 
occupational group” (Taylor, 2003: 24).  
This is particularly evident in the evolution of social security. By the mid-1950s 
there were more than 35 institutions serving different occupational groups with widely 
differing benefits, contributions and regulations. Another example taken up by 
Arellano (1985) is family allowances. For private white-collar workers family 
allowances were established in 1937, for blue-collar workers in 1953. “The amounts of 
these benefits varied substantially from one security institution to another in common 
with the qualifications required for the benefit. Almost every new benefit introduced 
during the period followed the same course of unequal and irregular application” 
(Arellano, 1985: 409-10).43  
                                                             
43 It should be noted that in the matter of education policies were more universalistic and in any case 
not associated with occupational groups.  
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In response to these contradictions and imbalances of an internally fragmented 
and stratified social policy system, various governments attempted to streamline it by 
integrating the diverse social policy institutions into larger state agencies. The result 
was heavy centralization and bureaucratization that made reform difficult, decision-
making slow and caused problems in responding to the changing needs and demands 
of the population, not least the social groups that fell outside the formal labor market 
(Raczynski, 2000). Raczynski (1996) also notes how the corporate and political interests 
that dominated the arena made the implementation of change proposals extremely 
difficult. Another problem was financial as the expansion of the system had to be 
accompanied by increases in public spending. This led to budget imbalances that 
intensified inflationary pressures within the ISI model. The fluctuation of global copper 
prices, on which the Chilean economy was heavily dependent, and the ever more 
frequent social struggles underscored repeated crises.  
The state responded to these growing problems by further deepening the 
interventionist model and by an extension of social programs. The Cuban revolution 
had opened a new ideological period in Latin America. Social policy also figured 
prominently in the new structuralist paradigm promoted by ECLA during the 1960s. 
Even the US government favored more comprehensive social policies through 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (Illanes  and  Riesco,  2007).  This  embrace  of  
developmentalism facilitated the rise of technocratic reformers entrusted with the 
design of more extensive social programs.44 During the PDC government of Eduardo 
Frei (1964-1970) social policies took center stage in an effort to mobilize and gain the 
loyalty of the peasants and urban marginal sectors that had been neglected by the 
                                                             
44 For an account of the role of policy experts during the period, see Silva (2008). See also Abel and Lewis 
(1993).  
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stratified nature of the social policy system. Policies were adopted to support 
neighbourhood and urban community organization (“promoción social”) as well as 
rural labor unions.45 These  policies  enabled  the  PDC  to  gain  clientelistic  control  over  
the urban and rural poor. The government also stepped up the role of the state in 
financing, managing and directly producing social services and programs. Social public 
expenditure more than doubled during the Frei era rising to around 20 percent of GDP 
in 1970 (Arellano, 1985).  
Between 1970 and 1973, under the Allende administration, social state expansion 
was further extended with a program that concentrated on the redistribution of 
income. In 1971 and 1972, social expenditure rose by more than 30 percent in relation 
to 1970 (Arellano, 1985). The approach helped feed ideological polarization and 
growing political unrest. The worldwide slowing of economic growth in the early 1970s 
exacerbated the crisis and radicalized popular mobilization. Eventually, this 
polarization of Chilean society culminated in the military takeover of September 1973. 
The regime ushered in a period of deep neoconservative transformation and a 
completely new mode of social governance as the new military-technocratic alliance in 
charge sought to rid the Chilean state of its role as the principal referent of the popular 
sectors’ demands.  
  
 
THEPINOCHETERA:DISMANTLINGCORPORATISM
The foundational mission of the military-technocratic alliance that presided over Chile 
from 1973 to 1989 was to carry out a complete neoconservative restructuring of the 
country. Shortly after the violent coup of 1973 the military proclaimed its goal to give 
                                                             
45 For an account, see Sandbrooke et al. (2007) 
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Chile “a new institutional basis…to rebuild the country morally, institutionally and 
materially” (cited in Taylor, 1998: 39). To this end, the military believed it necessary to 
forcefully repress political organization, especially organized labor, and submitting 
“society over a long period of time to the unbridled forces of the market” (Scully 1995: 
122). Society was to be depoliticized so as to prevent the kind of deep social crisis and 
polarization of political forces along social class lines that had culminated under the 
Allende administration. ”The government sought to construct an atomized, 
depoliticized society where there would be no bases for collective action and the state 
would no longer be at the center of redistributional issues. Instead, the market was to 
determine the allocation of resources” (Huber, 1996: 164). Dismantling the corporatist 
welfare state so as to remove the incentives for political mobilization and re-
establishing the basis for sustained capital accumulation in Chile became central. To 
this end, the repression of political and social organizations, as well as the imposition 
of a  neoliberal developmental model became instrumental. By the time of re-
democratization in 1990, the corporatist welfare state had been dismantled and the 
traditional links between state and society broken down. 
The regime structure proved decisive for the success with which the military-
technocratic alliance managed to accomplish this transformation of social governance 
in Chile. Firstly, the authoritarian nature of the regime allowed for the massive use of 
repression whereby the popular sectors were demobilized to give way for the reversal 
of the economic and social policies that had established the basis of the corporatist 
mode of social governance. Secondly, as Remmer (1989) has forcefully argued, the 
concentration of power achieved by Pinochet and his team of technocrats made 
possible the implementation of radical neoliberal reform. Various observers have 
emphasized the importance of neoliberal technocrats for the politics of the military 
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government (for instance, Remmer, 1989; Silva, 1996; Huneeus, 2000; Teichman, 2001, 
Castglioni,  2001;  Silva,  2008).  These  technocrats  were  able  to  penetrate  key  
institutions of the state and achieve the decision-making authority needed to pursue 
the transformation of social governance. In contrast to Argentina, where neoliberal 
technocrats ran up against the resistance of military officers, in Chile they were able to 
ignore or override resistance to neoliberal reform. This capacity hinged on the 
institutional structure of the regime that concentrated political power in the hands of 
Pinochet. “No other Southern Cone military leader has enjoyed comparable authority 
or braked so completely expressions of institutional autonomy on the part of the 
armed forces. It was precisely because of this consolidation of power around a 
personal dictatorship that the process of state change was carried much farther in 
Chile than elsewhere” (Remmer, 1989: 25). 
 
Demobilizationandshocktreatment
Immediately following the coup, the military launched a period of repression aimed at 
demobilizing the popular sectors by forcefully closing the channels of popular influence 
on policymaking such as trade unions and political parties. These early policy choices 
drew inspiration from the National Security Doctrine that had become influential in the 
region as part of the U.S. anticommunist counterinsurgency training of Latin American 
militaries (Castiglioni, 2001; Oppenheim, 1999). In the view of the military, the acute 
socioeconomic crisis and class conflict following the arrival of the Marxist Unidad 
Popular coalition into government, was a result of the politicization of Chilean state 
and society provoked by political demagogy and leftist militants supporting social 
change under Frei and Allende. Restoring social peace and development required the 
depoliticization of social conflict. Duly, the National Congress was dissolved, political 
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party activities were immediately suspended and sympathizers of Allende’s 
government and other political enemies were singled out for repression. In particular, 
the trade union movement came under attack. In its first few months in power, the 
military outlawed the largest national confederation, the Central Única de 
Trabajadores (CUT). It also suspended the processing of all labor petitions, abolished 
the right to strike and to bargain collectively, allowed workers to arbitrarily be laid off, 
closed all mediation boards, prohibited union elections and declared that any union 
meeting would need prior approval by the police. Along with the persecution of the 
old union leadership and the freezing of union funds, these constraints and 
prohibitions on union and partisan activity left the working class effectively without a 
voice in private as well as public decision making processes (see Remmer, 1980; also 
Loveman, 1997). 
          Demobilizing the popular sectors helped facilitate the reversal of the 
fundamental economic and social policies that had established the basis of the 
corporatist welfare state (see Remmer, 1980 and 1989). The immediate worry for the 
military government was runaway inflation, which by official statistics had escalated 
beyond 500 percent, and the enormous fiscal deficit of about 24 percent of GDP 
(Castañeda, 1992). Initially the military favored a gradual approach to stabilization and 
the restoration of market mechanisms. By 1975 it had become apparent that the 
gradualist approach was not working. Chile’s poor macroeconomic performance, 
exacerbated by the oil crisis and the drop in copper prices, laid the basis for the rise to 
prominence of a group of economists popularly known as the “Chicago Boys” who 
advocated strict adherence to a free market model and the rupture with the gradualist 
policies. The “Chicago Boys” were an ideologically cohesive group of neoliberal 
economists that dominated the National Planning Office (ODEPLAN). As the economic 
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situation grew worse, General Pinochet “decided in early 1975 to embrace the 
draconian set of policy remedies advocated by the Chicago Boys and their most 
distinguished mentor, University of Chicago economist Milton Friedman” (Remmer, 
1989: 11-12). In April 1975 an economic recovery program known as “Shock 
Treatment” was announced that consisted of a set of strict monetarist prescriptions 
such as drastic cuts in public spending, prize liberalization of most consumer goods, 
new taxes and tight monetary policy. In addition to these economic shock measures, 
the government also reduced import barriers and accelerated the process of 
privatizing  state  enterprises,  a  process  that  went  far  beyond  a  rollback  to  the  pre-
Allende situation (Oppenheim, 1999; see also French-Davis, 2004).  
The successful application of Shock Treatment allowed a deepening of structural 
reforms. Tariffs were unilaterally reduced to 10 percent and foreign capital was 
offered guarantees and incentives through a new statute on foreign investment 
(Decree Law 1748) adopted in March 1977 (Remmer, 1989). By late 1977 Chile had 
broken with decades of state-supported ISI and adopted a free market monetarist 
economic model. This radical overhauling of the developmental model hinged in no 
small measure on authoritarian repression whereby opposition to structural reform 
could be neutralized. At the same time, the consistency with which orthodox 
monetarist policies were pursued, in comparison with other neoconservative 
experiments  in  the  Southern  Cone,  was  a  direct  result  of  the  personalist  type  of  
authoritarianism that distinguished Chile from these other military dictatorships. The 
concentration of power achieved by Pinochet by the mid-70s, paved the way for the 
autonomy from corporatist interests enjoyed by the reforming technocracy on the 
back of which it could impose its draconian measures.  
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Depoliticizationofsocialpolicy
A complementary aspect of the dramatic economic restructuring process was the 
implementation of changes in social service provision. The removal of the “incentives 
inherent in the old system of social provision that created beneficiary coalitions 
seeking to extract rents through concerted action in the political sphere” (Kurtz, 
1999b: 417) was to be accomplished through a redefinition of the social role of the 
state. In particular, the regime embraced the principle of state subsidiarity (Castiglioni, 
2001). The diagnosis of the Chicago Boys was that previous social policy had benefited 
middle-income groups more than the extremely poor, created market distortions and 
stifled individual initiative. Instead, the state should only support those who cannot 
meet their most basic needs; the rest of society should rely on the private sector (Kast, 
1979; see also Castañeda, 1992).  
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Table3.1PublicPerCapitaSocialExpenditures(1992pesos),SelectedYears(1970-92)
Year Education Health Social 
Security 
Housing Other Total %  of 
Total 
Exp. 
% of 
GDP 
1970 39,503 21,601 81,735 16,578 910 160,328 57.1 21.7 
1974 31,545 18,712 48,684 21,527 1,159 121,626 48.8 17.6 
1975 24,967 14,498 49,543 12,288 357 101,653 55.3 18.3 
1976 26,693 13,543 48,992 9,084 926 99,238 57.0 15.9 
1977 31,171 14,650 56,029 10,181 1,830 113,861 60.6 17.4 
1978 32,797 16,202 67,008 9,517 1,562 127,086 56.7 16.0 
1979 35,886 15,952 74,852 11,881 1,903 140,474 58.4 15.6 
1980 35,033 17,789 77,898 11,809 1,924 144,453 59.8 17.0 
1981 36,384 16,152 90,509 11,684 1,588 156,318 60.7 18.5 
1982 36,753 16,941 104,281 8,193 1,232 167,401 59.0 22.4 
1983 31,125 13,479 96,735 6,785 1,872 149,996 64.2 21.1 
1984 30,088 14,241 96,398 7,925 1,640 150,292 63.5 21.3 
1985 29,858 13,745 88,243 10,876 1,573 144,296 61.6 19.8 
1986 28,087 13,428 85,196 10,186 1,649 138,546 60.0 18.4 
1987 27,601 18,213 60,811 8,493 16,260 131,378 64.1 16.7 
1988 26,956 20,849 61,346 11,120 13,383 133,653 61.3 15.2 
1989 26,275 20,614 61,983 10,418 10,747 130,037 63.1 14.0 
1990 24,717 19,361 62,095 10,237 10,391 126,802 66.7 14.0 
1991 27,220 22,440 63,532 11,971 11,268 136,430 66.7 14.5 
1992 31,602 26,535 68,181 13,310 13,010 152,638 65.4 14.7 
Source: Reproduced from Raczynski and Romaguera (1995) 
 
In accordance with the concept of the “subsidiary state”, public social spending (PSS) 
decreased as a percentage of GDP as well as in absolute terms (Table 3.1). Per capita 
PSS was below its 1970 level in every year from 1974 to 1989, except during the severe 
economic crisis in 1982. Nevertheless, major qualitative changes to social policy did 
not take place until 1979, as prominent military figures, most importantly General 
Leigh, persisted in opposing the concentration of power advanced by Pinochet and the 
radical reform agenda advocated by his economic team (Castiglioni, 2001). By the late 
1970s, however, Pinochet had outmaneuvered his rivals in the junta and concentrated 
the process of economic and social policymaking with the Chicago Boys (Castiglioni, 
2001; see also Remmer, 1989; Huneeus, 2000). This proved decisive for the direction 
of social reform. It shows how the success with which Chile under Pinochet managed 
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to implement radical social policy reform was contingent on the capacity of these 
technocrats to penetrate key institutions within the state bureaucracy and override 
resistance to neoliberalism. This capacity was a direct result of the regime structure 
that emerged under Pinochet. 
          Beginning in 1979, neoliberal ideology was extended to virtually all areas of 
policy. In a speech by Pinochet on September 11, 1979 an extensive package of state 
reforms known as the “Seven Modernizations” was unveiled (Oppenheim, 1999). The 
reforms began with the implementation of a new labor code in response to growing 
labor unrest and international pressure (Remmer, 1989). It was intended to normalize 
labor relations after having banned both labor unions and strikes since the coup. The 
labor code established a new legal framework for labor organizations and collective 
bargaining, but on highly disadvantageous terms for organized labor. The new 
legislation restricted collective bargaining and union organization to the plant level, 
made no provision for federation or confederations linking workers across enterprises 
and allowed for bargaining groups in competition with unions within individual firms. It 
abolished the need to state a cause for dismissal and increased facilities for short-term 
contracting. The right to strike was also strictly regulated – strikes were limited to sixty 
days only, after which workers would automatically be fired if not returning to work. In 
addition, the new labor code provided for employer lockouts as firms were allowed to 
hire temporary workers during such strikes. Finally, trade union activity was to be 
apolitical; union members could not simultaneously hold party membership and trade 
union leaders that had participated in partisan activities were banned from holding 
leadership positions. The new labor rules were intended to fragment workers into 
distinct strata, weaken the bargaining power of unions and their association with 
political parties, as well as to remove the state as an interlocutor of labor disputes. 
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(Oppenheim,  1999;  also  Remmer,  1980  and  1989).  In  sum,  it  was  an  attempt  to  
deprive the trade-union movement of its bargaining strength and ensure the flexible 
functioning of the labor market.             
          From 1980 onwards further ‘modernizations’ took place through privatization 
and decentralization in a variety of social sectors, such as health, education, and social 
security.46 Following the guiding principle of subsidiarity, the Pinochet government 
encouraged private enterprises to replace the public sector as the major provider of 
social services. This was presented as a method for increasing the efficiency of social 
service provision for the benefit of all welfare “consumers” (Taylor, 2003). Apart from 
the expectation of higher efficiency through competition and better allocation of 
resources, the policy would also serve the political function of removing the state 
apparatus as the locus of collective struggles. Instead, social service provision would 
become a matter between individuals and private service enterprises. The creation of 
an individual-capitalization pension system administered by the private sector and a 
private health care system alongside the public health care system was consistent with 
the principle of subsidiarity. With respect to housing, the system of subsidies was 
changed to give a more important role to real estate enterprises.  
          In accordance with neoliberal doctrine, social policy was primarily to function as 
targeted anti-poverty relief, ensuring certain basic needs in order to guarantee 
“equality of opportunity” in the market place. Ideally, these basic needs should be met 
by the market, but when this was not possible, the state would intervene in a technical 
and efficient manner to ensure their provision - chiefly through the use of demand-
driven subsidies so as to minimize market distortions and encourage competition. 
                                                             
46 For a detailed description of these reforms, see Castañeda (1992). See also Raczynski and Romaguera 
(1995), and Castiglioni (2001).  
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Where the state was still involved in providing social services “decentralization would 
segment collective articulation into the localized realm of municipal governments” 
(Taylor, 2003: 27).  Indeed, as a high official at the Ministry of Health during the 
military government testifies, a central objective with the decentralization of social 
services from the central government to the municipalities “was to break unions, 
because prior to these reforms teachers would go on national strike and would deal 
with the [education] minister (the same was true with doctors). But when you 
distribute this among municipal governments, the employer is the mayor, so instead of 
having a national union you have 350 small unions” (quoted in Castiglioni, 2001: 55). 
Concrete measures taken towards this aim were the transferral of the administration 
of primary and secondary schools, primary health care, and components of the safety 
net to the municipalities. 
          Hence, as well as serving the new productive structures, the retrenchment of the 
corporatist welfare state was part and parcel of the regime’s “political project of 
breaking the bases of  collective action and withdrawing the state as  a  target  of  such 
action” (Huber, 1997: 2). Targeting, privatization and decentralization would pave the 
way for new social governance centered on an individualized, targeted and market-
mediated form of state-society interaction and social provision. This process of 
creating a new institutional framework culminated with the Constitution of 1980. 
“...the constitution coupled strong guarantees of property rights with extensive 
limitations on political rights, sanctifying the union of national security doctrine and 
Chicago  economics”  (Remmer,  1989:  16).  In  essence,  the  constitution  sought  to  
institutionalize a restricted form of political democracy that would protect the 
neoliberal model and replace class conflict with a depoliticized or “technified” society 
in which social relationships would be redefined in a highly individualized manner.  
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          Nevertheless, the repercussions of the economic crisis that hit Chile at the end of 
1981 demonstrated that despite Pinochet’s efforts to atomize society, Chilean society 
had not completely rid itself of its custom of collective action (Oppenheim, 1999). 
Beginning in 1983 a period of furious popular protest against the regime surfaced 
leading to widespread mobilization that continued through 1986. However, popular 
mobilization had changed form. No longer did organized labor and the trade-union 
movement play the leading role in mobilizing popular dissent. Instead, it was 
grassroots groups, especially shantytown dwellers (pobladores) that became 
instrumental in organizing popular mobilization (Oxhorn, 1995). Cut off from 
patronage and prohibited from joining trade-unions, the popular sectors had begun to 
form community organizations and cooperatives. Initially, grassroots groups took the 
role of self-help networks in response to the 1975 Shock Treatment from which the 
popular sectors suffered disproportionately as unemployment soared and real wages 
plummeted. The economic downturn of 1981-1983 exacerbated this trend, helping to 
create a strong grassroots network and the rebirth of political activity as political 
parties and trade-unions reappeared. As the GDP fell by 14.5 percent in 1982, 
continuing its fall in 1983, and unemployment reached 30 percent of the work force, 
including those employed in emergency public programs47, the protest movement 
evolved into a massive social movement that united different sectors of society. 
Indeed, according to Oppenheim (1999: 163) the protest movement “demonstrated 
that the military had not been successful in atomizing Chilean society”.  
                                                             
47 The military government introduced several make-work programs intended to alleviate the impact of 
massive unemployment, most notably the Minimum Employment Program (PEM), which expanded from 
19,000 participants to over 200,000 in 1982. In the same year, the Program for Head of Household 
(POHJ)  was  instituted.  According  to  Loveman (1997),  in  1982 almost  8  percent  of  the  labor  force  was  
‘organized’ into government make-work programs.  
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          In addition to the protest movement, Pinochet came under intense pressure 
from industrialists and business leaders suffering from the financial collapse to reverse 
the neoliberal model (Remmer, 1989). In 1983 the government finally took some 
measures to smooth the effects from the economic crisis, such as devaluing the peso 
and raising tariffs. In addition, the government took over the failing banking system by 
assuming the debt of financial institutions that had gone bankrupt and nationalizing 
others (Oppenheim, 1999). Nevertheless, these were only temporary retreats from 
orthodoxy. As Remmer (1989) has explained the government had limited freedom of 
maneuver. Chile had contracted an enormous debt under military rule and was under 
intense pressure from the international banking community to meets its international 
obligations. The debt burden pushed the government to implement policies in 
accordance  with  IMF  orthodoxy,  a  process  that  was  helped  by  the  power  and  
autonomy achieved by the neoliberal technocrats (Remmer, 1989).  
The military-technocratic alliance presided over by Pinochet not only managed to 
stay in power despite strong opposition, but also deepened the neoliberal model 
through renewed privatization and denationalization via debt-for-equity swaps from 
1985 onwards. It was not until 1990 that Pinochet succumbed to a change of regime. 
By then the democratic opposition had changed strategy gradually abandoning social 
mobilization, having witnessed the protest movement fail, in favor of an electoral 
strategy that gave greater priority to accommodate conservative interests and 
preserving the neoliberal model.  
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DEMOCRACYRESTORED:MANAGINGTHENEWSOCIALQUESTION
When the new democratic government of Patricio Aylwin finally took over in March 
1990,  its  greatest  challenge was how to manage the “new social  question”.  The new 
regime  inherited  an  enormous  social  debt  accumulated  over  almost  17  years  of  
neoconservative authoritarianism. Poverty levels were substantially higher than they 
had been twenty years earlier – more than 40 percent of the population was classified 
as either poor or indigent. In 1989 real wages were still  below what they had been in 
1970. Income distribution was highly concentrated as the gap between the highest- 
and lowest income brackets had steadily widened during the Pinochet era. Public 
services were severely underfunded and lacking infrastructure. Hospitals suffered from 
a shortage of medicine, personnel and supplies, as investments had severely lagged 
behind the increase in population and the deterioration in infrastructure. Social 
workers were in distress over the labor reforms. In education, teachers’ minimum 
salaries had dropped and were more than 50 percent lower than in 1980. Pensions and 
family allowance values had also dropped, and the housing deficit had increased 
markedly (see, for instance, Queisser, Larrañaga and Panadeiros, 1993; Raczynski and 
Romaguera, 1995).                                                               
This dismal social record had been relentlessly criticized by the Concertación during 
the campaign to restore democracy and had a decisive effect in undermining the 
legitimacy of the military regime. According to prominent Concertación politicians, the 
defining  moment  of  the  electoral  campaign  was  when  Alejandro  Foxley,  who  later  
became Minister of Finance in the Aylwin government, announced that there were 5 
million people living in poverty in Chile (author interviews, 2006). In the campaign the 
Concertación promised to deal with this “social cost” of neoliberalism and it played a 
decisive role in the victory of the Concertación alliance in the 1989 elections. Hence, 
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expectations were high that the new democratic government would deal with these 
social problems and introduce rapid social “compensation”.  
At  the  same  time,  this  new  social  question  raised  the  specter  of  a  return  to  
“populist” public spending and corporatist welfarism. Many observers feared that the 
democratic government would succumb to social pressures and fall prey to the 
“populist temptation”.  Developments in Argentina where the Alfonsín government in 
face of trade union pressures essentially reintroduced the corporatist social policy 
approach in combination with a heterodox strategy of stabilization served to foment 
worries that the restoration of democracy in Chile would precipitate a return to the old 
ways.  
These worries proved unfounded. The major structural, ideational and institutional 
changes Chile had undergone since 1973 impeded a return to the old ways. Indeed, 
the new democratic government opted for a cautious approach to transforming social 
governance that involved negotiating tax and labor reforms with the conservative 
opposition and a new pluralist social policy approach that put great emphasis on the 
design of flexible, targeted and participatory welfare schemes through mechanisms 
such as vouchers, microcredit and competitive tendering. 
  
LegacyofPinochet  
Thus, in contrast to Argentina, as we shall see, corporatism did not resurface with re-
democratization in Chile. The explanation has to do with the very different legacy from 
neoconservative authoritarianism inherited by the incoming democratic government. 
First of all, the transformation of the socioeconomic structure under 
neoconservative authoritarianism was much deeper in Chile than in Argentina. In Chile, 
the success of the Chicago Boys in implementing the neoliberal model had 
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repercussions for the social policy options of the incoming democratic government. In 
stark contrast to Argentina, where the military left behind economic chaos, in Chile the 
economic model of the Pinochet regime was considered a success. Accordingly, the 
Concertación pledged not to overhaul the model and, thus, continue with the export-
oriented economic policies that made any radical social reform difficult. 
Crucially, in Chile, the labor movement never recovered from military rule. By the 
time of re-democratization in 1990, corporatist social institutions (labor unions and 
peasant confederations) had become notably weak. Authoritarian repression and 
neoliberal restructuring had weakened the organizational bases of the labor 
movement. The national unionization rate was low and most union members belonged 
to small firm-level unions illustrating the growing atomization of the labor movement 
(Table 3.2). In addition, workers covered by collective contracts were under 10 
percent.  
 
Table3.2  UnionizationinChile,1973-1998
Year Union 
Members 
(Thousands) 
Avg. Size 
Union 
Unionization 
Rate 
Employed 
Workers 
Covered 
1973 934.3 144 32.0 - 
1986 387.0 72 10.0 6.6 
1987 422.3 72 10.6 7.1 
1988 446.2 69 10.4 7.0 
1989 507.6 71 11.4 7.7 
1990 606.8 69 13.4 8.9 
1991 701.4 71 15.1 9.5 
1992 724.1 67 14.8 9.9 
1993 684.4 60 13.4 9.5 
1994 662.0 54 12.9 9.6 
1995 637.6 50 12.3 8.7 
1996 627.7 48 11.8 8.2 
1997 617.8 45 11.5 7.7 
1998 611.5 43 11.3 7.4 
Source: Dirección del Trabajo (2006); Durán-Palma, Wilkinson and Korczynski (2005); Haagh 
(2002).  
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Authoritarian repression alone cannot account for this weakness of organized 
labor.48 Indeed, repression of organized labor was harsh in Argentina as well and 
nevertheless trade-union power rebounded under Alfonsín. Moreover, the Chilean 
labor movement has remained weak and fragmented despite democratization. 
Although unionization briefly increased during the 1989-1991 period, the rate of 
unionization began to decline sharply after 1992 (also in absolute terms). A plausible 
explanation for this erosion of the organizational bases of the labor movement is the 
debilitating effects of the neoliberal model implemented by the military regime and to 
a large extent maintained under democracy. Economic austerity and the shift from 
import-substitution industrialization to an open free-market model under the military 
regime led to a process of rapid deindustrialization in Chile (French-Davis, 2004). As a 
result, the relative size of the industrial working class declined markedly as 
employment in the formal industrial sector was replaced by informal employment, or 
unemployment. Privatisations of public sector activities and the deregulation of labor 
transformed Chile’s social and occupational structure. An important new element in 
Chilean society became the large number of informal workers with little or no social 
protection (see Annex 2,  Table A.2).  At  the same time as these structural  changes in 
the Chilean economy, the corporatist social protection apparatus was dismantled, 
eroding previous incentives to organization. Coupled with the decentralization of social 
services, these neoliberal reforms ended up producing a marked pattern of interest 
disarticulation and the reduction in the ability of workers to mobilize and bargain 
collectively. As a consequence, the ability of labor unions to defend corporatist welfare 
arrangements had become notably weak. 
                                                             
48 See the discussion in Barrett (2001). 
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Secondly, the nature of Chile’s democratic regime has had a decisive impact on its 
current mode of social governance. Chile’s transition from authoritarianism occurred 
within the institutional framework determined by the 1980 Constitution. The new 
constitution was deliberately designed to protect the neoliberal economic model 
imposed by the military regime by defining the parameters of Chilean democracy. The 
effect has been to diminish not only the new civilian government’s capacity but also its 
inclination to reverse the economic and social policy reforms enacted by the military 
regime. Chile’s transition to democracy is a paradigmatic case of a negotiated pact that 
was designed to narrow the range of potential democratic outcomes. The logic of pact-
making requires the democratic opposition (especially the Left) “to postpone or 
moderate objectives for political and socioeconomic transformation” (Roberts, 1998: 
37). Indeed, this particular mode of transition and the type of democratic regime it led 
to helps to explain the continuity of the neoliberal development model after 
democratization. 49     
A brief analysis of the process of regime transition should help explain why the 
Concertación opted for largely accepting the economic and social policy reforms of the 
military regime.  First of all, during the long struggle to reassume democracy in Chile, 
prominent figures belonging to the democratic opposition became increasingly aware 
of the need to reach an accommodation with the conservative forces.50 A decisive 
factor was the military’s “overwhelming strength and determination to defend the 
Constitution and its transition procedures” (Barrett, 2000: 5). Social mobilization and 
economic crisis had proved insufficient to force the military-technocratic alliance from 
power. In 1986, when the economy had re-entered an expansive phase and the mass 
                                                             
49 For a discussion of modes of transition and their impact, see Karl (1990). For the specific case of Chile, 
see, for instance, Barrett (1999).  
50 For an inside account, see Boeninger (1997).  
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protests against the military regime began to ebb out, it became clear that the strategy 
of social mobilization had failed to bring down the dictatorship. From this Christian 
Democrats and renovated Socialists concluded that the plebiscite - on Pinochet’s 
continuation as president promised by the 1980 Constitution – was the best means to 
defeat the regime (Boeninger, 1997; Roberts, 1998; Barrett, 2000). The democratic 
opposition’s victory in the plebiscite opened the way to eventual elections and a 
process of negotiation between the regime and the opposition. The military, however, 
retained the upper hand throughout the process of negotiation and the democratic 
opposition was only able to negotiate modest changes to the 1980 Constitution. This 
had longstanding consequences for the post-transition process. “By obtaining only 
limited reforms, the CPPD helped to consolidate the core features of the 1980 
Constitution and thereby restricted its own strategic options significantly” (Barrett, 
2000: 6). 
As several scholars have pointed out, the Chilean military was exceptionally 
successful in controlling the regime transition and imposing institutional constraints on 
the incoming civilian government (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Munck and Leff, 1997). In 
sharp contrast to Argentina, where the armed forces were seriously discredited by 
military defeat and economic chaos, the Chilean military “remained remarkably 
cohesive, and it retained staunch support among economic elites who had become 
ardent defenders of the neoliberal model implemented by Pinochet’s Chicago-school 
technocrats” (Roberts, 1998: 142). The trauma of the Allende experience had also left 
large parts of the middle class extremely wary of “populism” (Boeninger, 1997). These 
factors contributed to the strength of the military regime and its ability to dictate the 
terms of the transition. The Concertación could perhaps have put pressure on the 
conservative forces to accept democratic reforms by trying to mobilize the popular 
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sectors,  but  as  Roberts  (1998:  144)  has  pointed  out,  “such  a  strategy  entailed  an  
inherent risk that the Right would abandon the democratic arena”. In the face of this 
threat of an authoritarian backlash, and having experienced the failure to topple the 
dictatorship through social mobilization in the mid-80s, the Concertación opted to 
avoid mass mobilization in favor of an elite-negotiated pact with the conservative 
forces. 
This shift in strategy from social mobilization to negotiation and electoral politics 
served to preclude a radical break with the authoritarian regime. The negotiated 
accord left in place a set of constitutional “protections” designed to limit majority rule 
and protect conservative power. In particular, the 1980 Constitution provided for the 
designation of nine Senators from conservative institutions. As a direct result, the 
Concertación was deprived of a working majority in the Senate after re-
democratization  despite  winning  a  solid  majority  of  the  popular  vote.  This  gave  
conservatives strong veto power over legislation. To pass any legislation the 
Concertación thus needed to gain the support of some segment of the conservative 
opposition. In addition, a binomial electoral system was designed to disproportionately 
favor the Right. Its impact for the post-transition process was that it “ingeniously 
overrepresented the political Right in Congress while excluding the Communist Party 
and other leftist forces outside the Concertación” (Roberts, 1998: 143). As such, it 
helped to marginalize postures that called for a more radical break with the neoliberal 
developmental model/economic and social policies of the military regime. 
The  military  also  took  measures  to  institute  a  set  of  “reserved  domains”  that  
removed specific areas of policymaking from the purview of the incoming 
democratically elected government. Apart from depriving the government from 
controlling the armed forces as well as barring the Congress from initiating 
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investigations into malfeasance and human rights abuses by previous governmental 
officials, the departing military-technocratic government passed a series of laws, leyes 
de amarre, that were meant to tie the hands of the incoming government and cement 
into place the neoliberal economic system (Oppenheim, 1999). Among other things, 
the new democratic government was prohibited from replacing most of the 
bureaucracy that was staffed by Pinochet appointees, and decree-laws were speedily 
approved to privatize industries and convert the Central Bank, the national television 
company and the national copper company into virtually autonomous units free from 
governmental control. The outgoing Pinochet government also to a large extent set 
the budget for the incoming government’s first year. Coupled with other fiscal 
decisions Pinochet had made, it left the incoming democratic government with few 
resources for expansionary economic and social policy. 
Finally, the 1980 Constitution also retained a strong “tutelary” role for the military 
by stipulating that the armed forces “guarantee the institutional order of the Republic” 
(quoted in Valenzuela, 1992: 64). The military was guaranteed formal representation in 
the  Senate,  control  of  the  National  Police,  as  well  as  a  majority  at  the  powerful  
National Security Council. These “tutelary powers” guaranteed the military a strong 
political role as “guardians” of the institutional order and considerable autonomy from 
civilian rule, which further limited the maneuvering space of the Concertación. As the 
military considered the economic model to be its primary legacy and any drastic 
change of economic policy as a threat to national security and a possible cause for 
military intervention, radical redistributive policies were simply not feasible 
(Oppenheim, 1999). The strong tutelary role retained by the military served to frighten 
the Concertación from using social mobilization to put pressure on the conservative 
opposition (Boeninger, 1997). Concertación leaders recognized that this institutional 
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compromise was fragile and were careful to avoid stimulating social demands and 
forms of popular mobilization that could endanger the Right’s tacit acceptance of 
democratization (author interviews, 2006, see also Boeninger, 1997; Roberts, 1998). 
As such, the particular mode of regime change in Chile precluded a radical 
transformation of the developmental model and reflected the inherent elitism of 
Chile’s transition to democracy that helped to marginalize the popular sectors. By 
accepting a pact that constituted a transition to a “protected democracy” with a broad 
range of institutional prerogatives that maintained military tutelage and conservative 
influence over the political process, the parties of the Concertación reverted from their 
earlier “maximalist” position that had demanded the immediate restoration of full 
democracy and the dismantling of the neoliberal economic model. Instead, they opted 
for giving priority to democratic consolidation and macroeconomic stability.  
This strategic choice was helped by the process of ideological redefinition that the 
parties of the Concertación went through towards the end of the Pinochet era 
(Boeninger, 1997; Roberts, 1998). The economic chaos of the Allende years coupled 
with the worldwide crisis of socialism wreaked havoc with traditional conceptions of 
state-led development. Years of repression under authoritarian rule and exile 
experiences on either side of the Iron Curtain had a powerful impact as well. State 
socialism  was  in  demise  and  Western  European  social  democracy  had  started  to  
embrace market governance. Even the Socialist Party engaged in a self-critical process 
of ideological renovation with a newfound appreciation of democratic institutions and 
reformism (Roberts, 1998; author interview, 2006). This process of renovation 
facilitated the alliance with the Christian Democrats that provided the basis for 
forming the Concertación.  
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The  commitment  to  a  market-oriented  approach  was  clearly  reflected  in  the  
electoral platform that was negotiated between the parties of the Concertación with a 
view to contend the “inaugurating” elections in 1989. Such an electoral posture was 
designed to convince the conservative forces that the democratic alliance did not pose 
a threat to capitalism (Boeninger, 1997). Roberts (1998: 146) explains that “In part, this 
represented a political concession to economic elites and other supporters of 
Pinochet; the Concertación recognized that business sectors saw the military regime as 
the guarantor of the economic model, and it knew they would fervently oppose any 
regime transition that threatened to reverse Pinochet’s free market revolution. 
Continuity in the economic model was the most viable way to alleviate the concerns of 
the business community and induce its political and economic cooperation with the 
new democratic government”. The goal of democratic consolidation took precedence 
over any other goal. As a result, the Concertación threaded a careful strategy of non-
confrontation and piecemeal reform, designed to send clear signals to the economic 
elites of the Concertación’s commitment to the market-oriented economic model. 
Prominent figures of the alliance believed that democratic consolidation hinged on the 
Concertación’s ability to manage macroeconomic stability (Foxley, 1993; Boeninger, 
1997; author interview, 2006). Challenging business interests by attempting to 
radically change economic policy “would not only provoke intense political opposition 
but could also precipitate a capital strike that would destabilize the economy and 
undermine the new democratic regime” (Roberts, 1998: 146). 
By  the  time  the  first  democratic  government  of  the  Concertación  took  office  in  
March 1990, neoliberalism was in ascendancy everywhere in the world and Chile was 
being touted as a model for the developing world by the “Washington Consensus”. 
Indeed, the Concertación inherited an economy that had recuperated from the 
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adjustment period and started on a solid track of market-oriented, export-led growth. 
Concertación economists, having watched the debacle of heterodox economic 
experiments in post-authoritarian Argentina and Peru, argued forcefully that there was 
no alternative for a small country like Chile to pursue a development strategy of 
economic orthodoxy and be oriented towards international economic integration 
(Foxley, 1993; Boeninger, 1997; author interviews, 2005; 2006). Overhauling the 
developmental model would thus not only meet with domestic opposition, but also 
with international disapproval and reduced access to international financial resources.  
These domestic and international constraints helped to shape the Concertación’s 
development strategy. It accepted the structural changes associated with the 
neoliberal model as irreversible (author interviews, 2006). “The need to gain the 
confidence of investors, who saw the advent of the center-left with trepidation, 
reinforced this determination to pursue cautious economic policies. Indeed, the 
artificial senate majority of business-connected right-wing forces gave established 
socioeconomic interests considerable veto power over government policies making it 
difficult and politically risky to deviate from economic orthodoxy” (Weyland, 1999b: 
70).  This  had  a  decisive  impact  for  social  governance  as  well.  The  new  government  
largely accepted the dismantling of the corporatist welfare state, and did not attempt 
to reverse the decentralization and privatization of social services, such as health care, 
education and social security. Social policy reform would need to be conducted within 
the parameters of the neoliberal developmental model.   
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(Re)FormulatingtheSocialAgenda51
Having accepted the market-oriented socio-economic model inherited from the 
military regime, the Aylwin administration faced a difficult dilemma that was directly 
related to the question of governability and the tension between accumulation and 
legitimation. On the one hand, the Concertación had promised to introduce reforms in 
order to alleviate the “social cost” of neoliberalism. The Aylwin administration was 
under intense pressure to enact equity-enhancing reform. Indeed, equity-enhancing 
policy proposals had formed an integral part of Aylwin’s presidential campaign. The 
popular sectors had high expectations that democratization would precipitate rapid 
social compensation. On the other hand, the institutional and structural constraints 
associated with protected democracy and the market-oriented model put limits on the 
kind of social reform that could feasibly be pursued. Social reform would need to be 
subjected to the basic requirements of the market-oriented model, especially by 
precluding redistributive conflict that could trigger capital flight, and contingent to 
negotiation with the conservative opposition that commanded an unelected majority 
in the Senate and thus veto power over any impending social legislation. To this was 
added other elements of protected democracy such as the tutelary powers wielded by 
the military that made it imperative for the new government to show restraint. Radical 
redistributive policies were simply not feasible.  
Aylwin  and  his  advisors  were  well  aware  of  this  dilemma.  To  deal  with  it  they  
envisaged a cautious strategy of piecemeal social reform designed to limit social 
demands so as not to endanger governability. Social spending would need to be 
increased, to pre-empt social unrest, but this would need to be done in a fiscally 
responsible, non-inflationary way. Leading ministers in the Aylwin administration, 
                                                             
51 This section builds on interviews with policymakers conducted in Chile in 2006. 
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particularly Minister Secretary-General of the Presidency Edgardo Boeninger and 
Minister of Finance Alejandro Foxley, put a high premium on maintaining 
macroeconomic stability (Foxley, 1993; Boeninger, 1997). They feared a “populist 
cycle” with expansionary social policies leading to galloping inflation and, ultimately, 
instability and social disruption. Having watched the devastating impact of “economic 
populism” during the Allende years, as well as in neighboring Argentina under Alfonsín 
and Peru under García, leading figures in the administration were convinced of the 
importance to resist the “populist temptation” to increase social spending without 
concern for inflationary pressures. Instead, it was imperative to build a “wall of 
contagion” against populist pressures so as not to endanger economic and political 
stability.  
According to one argument, such a process of political learning produced the 
Concertación’s commitment to pursue a prudent course.52 Some referents interviewed 
for this study also stressed this point. However, as has been pointed out by Weyland 
(1997) political learning alone cannot explain how the Concertación was in practice 
able to resist the “populist temptation”, especially in a situation of pent-up 
expectations and pressures to rapidly increase social spending. Learning does not 
automatically translate into action and result. 
To guard macroeconomic stability and enact prudent social reform, Aylwin relied 
on a cohesive team of moderate figures of technocratic character whose ties and 
loyalty to each other had been formed in research institutes such as CIEPLAN and CEN. 
Many of them were Christian Democrats, others belonged to the PPD or the PS, but 
their loyalty lay foremost with the administration. In fact, it earned them the nickname 
“partido transversal”. Analysts have stressed how this supra-party structure helped to 
                                                             
52 For a closer look at this argument, see Weyland (1997).  
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limit the influence that corporatist and political interests could attain by lobbying 
sectoral state agencies (Silva, 1991; Barrett, 1999; Weyland, 1999b). At the same time, 
the ability of the Aylwin administration (as well as subsequent Concertación 
administrations under Frei and Lagos) to make policy in technocratic, anti-populist 
fashion was contingent on Chile’s regime institutions, a centralist-unitary system of 
territorial government and a protected democracy, which impedes popular access to 
state-decision making. As was explained in Chapter 2, the institutional configuration in 
Chile provides the executive with strong incentives to avert populism and paves the 
way for strong technocratic control over the policymaking process. This had important 
consequences for social governance. 
In view of the need to expand social programs and reduce poverty while averting a 
populist cycle, the government adopted a pluralist social policy approach. Measures 
were adopted to improve targeting of social spending. Under the influence of policy 
experts, new and innovative social programs were designed that emphasized the 
participation of the beneficiaries and the promotion of local self-help efforts. The 
system of housing subsidies was revamped to better meet the needs of poor families 
building their own housing solutions and promote cooperative solutions as a means to 
reduce costs and encourage community participation. Primary healthcare was 
expanded in rural and poor urban areas. The school nutrition program was also 
expanded and a program launched to improve the quality of primary education. 
Overall, priority was given to social spending that represented investments in human 
and social capital, which would promote integration as opposed to aid dependency. 
The top-down manner in which the military regime had conducted social 
governance was replaced by an emphasis on state-NGO cooperation. As such, the new 
social policy approach also discarded old corporatist linkages in favor of more local and 
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less political organizations. To facilitate these partnerships and promote local self-help 
efforts, new mechanisms were created such as microcredit programs and competitive 
tendering. A deliberate aim with these new pluralist structures was to relieve the state 
of some of the burden of social action, helping in avoiding unnecessary market 
distortions and pressures on state finances. Another important aim, at least within the 
upper echelons of the Aylwin administration, was the incorporation of social 
organizations to create stable state-society relations. As one high-ranking PDC member 
put it, “nobody wanted to see a continuation of popular mobilization” (author 
interview, 2006). Indeed, the structural and institutional constraints inherited from 
Pinochet made it imperative to pre-empt mobilization that could antagonize the old 
economic and political elites. Together with the new policy ideas promoted by the 
technical cadres linked to the Concertación these institutional and structural 
conditions provided decisive impulses for the adoption of the pluralist social policy 
approach. 
Importantly, to finance the new social programs the government initiated a tax 
reform. This had to be negotiated with the center-right, which used its majority in the 
Senate  to  extract  a  compromise  that  was  comfortable  for  business.  The  result  was  a  
small increase in income taxes for business and high-income groups, and an across-
the-board increase in the value added tax (VAT) from 16 to 18 percent. In any event, 
the reform boosted tax revenues allowing for the increase in fiscal spending on social 
programs (see Foxley, 1996). Further negotiations with the center-right enabled the 
administration to extend tax increases beyond 1993. 
The Aylwin administration was also under pressure to enact labor reform. The 
labor movement, a major constituency of the Concertación, demanded improvements 
to job security and the strengthening of mechanisms for collective negotiation. In its 
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1989 program, the Concertación had proposed a series of changes in the labor code 
aimed at restoring the “fundamental rights of workers” (Concertación de Partidos por 
la Democracia, 1989). But again, the constraints imposed by protected democracy 
meant that the resulting reform was a far cry from those proposed in the 
Concertación’s program, let alone from the aspirations of organized labor. Haagh 
(2002) has shown how the Aylwin administration, mindful of the conservative veto in 
the senate, scaled down important areas of the reform project to facilitate 
negotiations with Renovación Nacional (RN), the more moderate of the two right-wing 
opposition parties. She also argues that “the entrepreneurial sector was able to use 
implicit threats of destabilizing the democratic regime to extract a tacit commitment 
from the Concertación to change its  position on key legislative issues” (Haagh,  2002:  
94). The tutelary powers enjoyed by conservative forces added credibility to such 
threats. At the same time, the structural constraints inherent in the market-oriented 
economic model worried many key figures within the administration and probably had 
them thanking protected democracy for providing an excuse to go ahead with a more 
limited project that would not upset the market economy. In any event, the 
administration submitted a severely restricted reform proposal to Congress, where 
conservative  forces  used  its  majority  in  the  senate  to  wrest  further  concessions  for  
business (Weyland, 1997).  
Hence, as Silva (2002: 468) has explained: “In a united front, business organizations 
and right wing political parties used the institutions of Chile’s protected democracy to 
reject the central propositions of the government and labor movement...”. The result 
was  a  mild  reform  that  left  much  of  the  Pinochet  labor  code  of  1979  intact.53 In 
essence, the new 1994 labor code amounted to a pluralist reform that re-established 
                                                             
53 On labor reform, see also the discussion in Sandbrooke et al. (2007). 
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basic labor rights that had been denied to workers under the Pinochet regime - such as 
the right to organize, bargain collectively and strike - but that failed to provide labor 
organizations with stronger institutional mechanisms through which to increase their 
bargaining power. Collective negotiation by sector was rejected as was a proposal to 
make non-union members pay fees for union-negotiated benefits. Crucially, it allowed 
for “the existence of competing types of collective bargaining (regulated and non-
regulated), collective agreements (contracts and conventions) and representatives 
(unions and bargaining groups)” (Durán-Palma, Wilkinson and Korczynski, 2005: 76). 
This is the opposite of mechanisms found in corporatist systems designed to guarantee 
a monopoly of representation for labor unions.  
Organized labor did not fare any better under the second Concertación 
administration of Eduardo Frei Jr. Under pressure from the labor movement, his 
government sent a labor reform proposal to Congress in January 1995, which sought to 
change certain aspects of the 1994 labor code. In this instance, conservatives exercised 
their veto power in the Senate to reject the bill outright. For fear of upsetting the 
climate of consensus and cooperation between the government and the opposition 
that leading figures in the Concertación considered vital for preserving governability, 
and ultimately democratic stability, the administration refrained from turning the 
matter into a major political issue. A new project was again launched under the third 
Concertación administration of Ricardo Lagos, which succeeded in getting approval in 
Congress as the Concertación by now had achieved a small majority in the Senate for 
the  first  time  since  the  restoration  of  democracy.  Yet,  the  approved  bill  was  also  a  
substantially watered down version of the original project (see Durán-Palma, Wilkinson 
and  Korczynski,  2005).  Parts  of  the  PDC  united  with  the  opposition  to  block  
comprehensive reform of the 1994 labor code, arguing that the viability of the Chilean 
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economy depended on maintaining the flexibility of labor legislation. The continuing 
decline in organizational strength and bargaining power suffered by the labor 
movement during the 1990s meant that it was unable to articulate strong pressure on 
the governing alliance for a more protective reform bill.  
Indeed, the continuous decline of organized labor, its inability to protest against 
limited reforms or even get a seat at the table where changes to the labor code were 
being negotiated, shows just how comprehensive the dismantling of corporatism in 
Chile has been. The CUT strongly denounced the government’s failure to fulfil its 
program and made a host of threats directed at the government and business. None 
were carried out, however, “in large part because of the CUT’s organizational 
weakness and its fear of undermining the still fragile process of transition” (Barrett, 
1999: 18). While unionized labor initially increased in the early re-democratization 
process, peaking at 15 percent of the employed force in 1991, by 1998 only 11 percent 
of the employed labor force was unionized. Meanwhile, the average size of unions fell 
from  71  members  in  1991  to  43  in  1998,  contrasting  sharply  with  the  144  members  
they  had  in  1973  (see  Table  4.1).  At  the  same  time,  only  half  of  Chilean  unions  are  
active in practice. According to Durán-Palma (2005), this helps to explain the low level 
of conflict during the 1990s. Moreover, collective bargaining coverage fell from 8.9 
percent  of  the  employed  labor  force  in  1990,  to  a  meager  7.4  percent  in  1998.  The  
change from the pre-1973 era is, indeed, striking. In marked contrast to the era before 
the  military  coup,  the  ability  of  the  labor  movement  to  affect  policy  decisions  is  
notably weak.      



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CONCLUSION
Instead of vitalizing corporatist relations, the Concertación thus opted for building new 
links to the “masses” of urban poor and informal workers through intermediaries such 
as NGOs. The structural, ideational and institutional conditions inhibited a return to 
corporatism. Instead, a pluralist social policy approach was adopted to deal with the 
“new social question” and ensure governability. This new pluralist approach reflected 
the re-composition of social organization around networks of NGOs and community 
organizations that had occurred during military rule. For the Concertación leaders it 
was important to incorporate these new autonomous civil groups to pave the way for 
stable state-society relations. As such, the emphasis on targeting, privatization and 
decentralization in social policy initiated by the military regime was essentially 
preserved, but had to be complemented by a stronger focus on facilitating social 
participation and pluralism. Yet, as we shall see in Chapter 5, the new pluralist 
approach did not lead to a participatory mode of social governance but instead to a 
technocratic mode of social governance in which popular participation is contained 
within the conceptual space envisioned by the techno-bureaucracy, stunting the 
transformative potential of truly participatory governance. 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis of welfare corporatism and its demise to Argentina. 
It shows how similarly to Chile, changes in the socioeconomic, ideational and political-
institutional environment led to the emergence of a corporatist mode of social 
governance. In both countries corporatism generated powerful vested interests that 
made reform difficult. Yet, as the analysis in these chapters shows, differences in 
regime institutions help explain important variations in social governance trajectories 
that nevertheless exist between the two countries. 
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CHAPTERFOUR

THERISEANDFALLOFSTATECORPORATISMIN
ARGENTINA
 
This chapter provides a historical analysis of the transformation of social governance in 
Argentina. In line with the framework developed in Chapter 1, the analysis 
demonstrates how politicians’ policy choices and the resulting mode of social 
governance have been constrained by socioeconomic structure and regime institutions 
and the importance of this. Furthermore, it shows how policy ideas and experts have 
played an important role in prescribing the particular course of policy choice and 
implementation. As such, the analysis shows how the evolution of social governance 
during the course of Argentine history has been conditioned by politicians’ attempts to 
manage state-society relations in response to changing socioeconomic, ideational and 
political-institutional conditions. 
The first section analyses social state formation from the time of independence to 
the end of the Peronist regime in 1955. It shows how social policy became based on a 
notion of work-based social insurance designed to manage social pressures at a time of 
accelerating industrialization, urbanization and migration. This process of social state 
formation culminated with the corporatist social policy approach under the Peronist 
regime. The second section shows how these corporatist welfare arrangements helped 
to foster powerful interest groups that opposed substantial reforms. Even when the 
corporatist social policy approach led to severe economic and social inconsistencies, it 
was politically hard to change. Neoconservative restructuring under the Proceso (1976-
1983) helped to weaken the labor movement, and thus initiated the dismantling of the 
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corporatist system, but it failed to conclude this process. The third section explains 
how trade-union power, as a consequence, was re-established with the transition to 
democracy and how that power was sufficient to prevent any major reforms to the 
social policy model during the Alfonsín era. It took a major socioeconomic crisis in the 
end of the 1980s to generate sufficient space for the dismantling of the corporatist 
mode of social governance. The socioeconomic, ideological and political changes that 
took place in conjunction with that crisis spearheaded the change toward a new mode 
of social governance during the Menem era.    
 

FROMPHILANTHROPYTOCORPORATISM
Argentina has a long history of social policymaking, and together with Chile and 
Uruguay is among the “pioneers” in Latin America to develop social welfare programs 
and systems (Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002). Just like in Chile, any account of early social 
state development must begin with the major structural transformations that rocked 
the foundations of oligarchic rule and led to the emergence of new social groups that 
could no longer be held in check by traditional patron-client relations. Under the new 
democratic regime, established by the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912, the political elite came 
under increasing pressure to deal with the social question. Accompanying these 
structural and political-institutional changes were new policy ideas that emphasized 
the development of social protection policies (Lewis 1993). From its beginnings in 
Bismarckian Germany, social policy became based on a notion of work-based social 
insurance. According to Malloy (1991), World War I and the Russian Revolution were 
critical in pushing the diffusion of the social insurance concept, which was taken up by 
a  new  cadre  of  technocrats  operating  out  of  the  International  Labor  Office  (ILO).  In  
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Argentina, this process of early social state formation culminated under Peronism and 
led to a corporatist mode of social governance that predominated until 1976 and the 
new neoliberal era.  
 
OligarchicRuleandPhilanthropy
During the 19th century in Argentina, patron-client relations served as the principal 
means to ensure that lower class social forces were kept at bay. These relations burst 
into full flowering with the collapse of the imperial authority following independence 
in the 1810s. As Rock (1987) has showed, the collapse of the Crown prompted neither 
social revolution nor egalitarian social movements. Instead, it paved the way for the 
country’s landholding and commercial elite – later referred to as the “oligarchy” – to 
assert its domination by taking control of the state in a framework of agrarian society 
and limited political and civil freedoms.54 The excluded lower classes found their 
representation in caudillo rule and patron-client networks that functioned as an 
effective check on social mobilization along the lines of class or caste. Caudillismo and 
patron-client relations became a means to revive elitism and patriarchalism following 
the collapse of colonial rule, “allowing the elites to adapt rather than disappear, while 
society  at  large  upheld  its  hierarchical  form”  (Rock,  1987:  117).  While  the  1853  
Constitution instituted the conventional liberal freedoms, electoral fraud and political 
repression was used to ensure the continuation of oligarchic control.  
In such a political and socioeconomic context, the strategic utility of social policy 
for the ruling elite was relatively minor.55 For the most part of the 19th century, social 
protection was largely in the hands of philanthropic and charitable organizations, if not 
directly an extension of patron-client relations. The state focused its actions on making 
                                                             
54 See also Monsma (1988). 
55 For a discussion of social welfare during the 19th century, see Moreno (2000) and Passanante (1987).  
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basic education universal and constructing the necessary infrastructure for 
development of the agro-export model (Barbeito and Goldberg, 2007). The creation of 
a “National Education System” towards the end of the nineteenth century promoted a 
model of basic education that was obligatory, secular and free. An important aim of 
this system was to promote social integration, particularly with a view to the large 
inflow of immigrants. As the country’s agro-export model demanded no special labor 
qualifications or skills, the expansion of secondary and tertiary education remained 
limited.  
An important role was played by the Catholic Church that had a religious mandate 
to assist the needy as well as the ability to raise private funds for social purposes (see 
Thompson, 1995a). The influence of the Catholic Church had important consequences 
for the approach through which social assistance was given. The focus was on 
“individual reformation and charity as the framework for social assistance, and a 
rejection of movements that reframed private needs as social problems requiring a 
political response” (Beard, 2002: 4). On a general level, this emphasis of the Catholic 
Church on shaping the “moral character” of the lower classes and combat lower class 
mobilization served the conservative goals of the ruling elite.  
Nonetheless, while temporarily expedient to let the Catholic Church take care of 
social assistance, some state leaders considered it to be contrary to the larger goal of 
nation-building in Argentina (Beard, 2002). To this end, during the course of the 1800s, 
the Argentine state became more involved, albeit slowly, in the creation and 
sponsoring of social services. Hence, an approach was advanced that was based on 
secular philanthropy and gradually increasing the influence of the state in the social 
sphere. This secular philanthropic approach achieved its clearest expression with the 
creation of the Sociedad de Beneficencia (SB), a charitable organization created in 1823 
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to provide assistance to the poor and indigent population in the city of Buenos Aires 
and to administer charitable health organizations. During the course of the 19th 
century, it took charge of the administration of numerous philanthropic organizations. 
Although  it  was  set  up  as  a  private  charity  and  retained  an  important  degree  of  
autonomy in the administration of its institutions, the state was heavily involved in 
defining its responsibilities and setting priorities for its activities as well as being a key 
source of funding. As such, the SD clearly formed part of the broader initiative to 
expand state control of social aid and exercise social control. Indeed, towards the end 
of the 19th century,  the  SD  gradually  moved  into  the  orbit  of  the  state.  In  1908,  
legislation was passed making the SB an unambiguous part of the state apparatus 
(Passanante, 1987).  
 
Table4.1ImmigrationRatesbyDecade(Per1,000MeanPopulation)
 1871-1880 1881-1890 1891-1900 1901-1910 
Argentina 117.0 221.7 163.9 291.8 
US 54.6 85.8 53.0 102.0 
Source: Adapted from Galiani and Gerchunoff (2003) 
 
 
Yet such a philanthropic approach was clearly inadequate to deal with the 
tremendous social dislocations caused by accelerating industrialization, urbanization 
and immigration from the late 19th century onwards. Spearheaded by these major 
structural transformations, traditional patron-client relations began to lose their 
importance as a means for organizing relations among classes and as a mechanism for 
social control, paving the way for growing social conflict. Indeed, the successes of the 
liberal export-led development model between the 1860s and 1920s had generated a 
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process of immigration and internal migration around trade, finance and industry that 
accompanied the commercialization of agriculture and industrialization (Lewis, 2002). 
With this, the socio-political foundations of oligarchic hegemony had begun to 
disappear.  
A central outcome of the processes of immigration, urbanization and 
industrialization was the rapid expansion of new social groups such as the urban 
middle and working classes whose interests and demands were not being satisfied by 
the existing system, creating pressures for their socio-political incorporation. Indeed, 
the growth of the new proletariat soon led to the emergence of an increasingly 
aggressive labor movement that put considerable stress on a political system that did 
not accommodate working-class interests. As a result, the beginning of the twentieth 
century saw heightened social unrest as the new sectors began to mobilize in response 
to the dismal political and social conditions. The situation provided fertile ground for 
socialist and anarchist ideas about workers’ organization and struggle. Labor and 
factory protests proliferated and political conflict was increasingly being acted out on 
the streets  and plazas of  major  cities  such as Buenos Aires and Rosario (Lewis  2002).  
The central political issue of the period was how to respond to this “social question” in 
order to restore social peace and political stability (Romero, 2004).  
Initial solutions to the social question concentrated on repressing dissent.56 At the 
same time, reformist factions within the political elite began looking for solutions to 
contain and co-opt this rising tide of “agitation” by more modulated means. Legislation 
was introduced to improve working conditions. In 1904 social insurance was granted to 
                                                             
56 See Rock (1987). 
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some categories of central state workers.57 Some initiatives were also taken to deal 
with the growing housing problems and a number of laws were adopted to enable the 
building of cheap housing. But despite such legislation, state action remained limited 
and directed towards moralizing purposes. The main aim was to contain the spread of 
subversive ideas.58  All in all, these measures were clearly inadequate to cope with the 
enormous problems generated by mass immigration and rapid urbanization. Hence, 
they failed to contain the rising tide of anarchism among the new popular sectors that 
culminated in the great strikes of 1910.  
Amidst such instability, pressure for political reform grew within the ruling elite. 
The situation also persuaded the most important newspapers of the time (i.e. La 
Prensa and La Nación) to urge the ruling elite to carry out reform in order to maintain 
control (Rock 2002). Some influential politicians within the ruling party also regarded 
democracy as the best way to avoid insurrection. Leaders such as Pellegrini and Sáenz 
Peña believed that electoral reform “would protect the interests of the upper classes 
by offering representation to their opponents” (Ibid.: 183). It was thought that by 
inviting  the  new  sectors  to  join  the  system  they  would  be  less  inclined  to  try  to  
overthrow it from without. Accordingly, in 1912, the reformist wing of the ruling 
conservative party (Partido Autonomista Nacional) under the lead of President Sáenz 
Peña finally implemented electoral reform that instituted mass democracy in 
Argentina. 
 
  
                                                             
57 Yet, more ambitious social projects such as the National Labor Law met with stiff conservative 
resistance in Congress and were ultimately defeated (Lewis, 2002; Romero, 2004). 
58 These purposes were clearly evident in how housing policies prescribed the elimination of common 
areas in low cost housing blocks that could facilitate the spread of subversive ideas as well as in the way 
houses were awarded to workers with “good records” (Rigotti, 2000). 
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TheTurntoMassPoliticsandtheExpansionofSocialWelfare
The Sáenz Peña Law of 1912, which established secret, compulsory and universal male 
suffrage, allowed the Radical Party, against conservative expectations, to become the 
dominating force in national politics and wrest power from the traditional oligarchic 
elite. Under this new regime, the masses were brought into the electoral arena, 
creating considerable pressure on the political elite to deal with the social question. 
Such pressures were further exacerbated with the exhausting of the primary-product, 
export-oriented growth model in conjunction with the outbreak of World War I. The 
standstill in overseas trade, coupled with a credit crunch, produced an economic crisis 
that revealed the external vulnerability of the economic model (Lewis, 2002). Crucially, 
it led to a new breed of professional politicians and technocrats who favored greater 
government intervention and social policies as a means to manage the problem of 
governance.  
          As  a  result,  the  Radical  years  (1916-1930)  not  only  led  to  the  increasing  
organization of the middle and working classes, but also to important attempts to 
expand the social state by favoring the creation of a social security system, expanding 
public education and healthcare, and institutionalizing structures of collective 
bargaining.59 The period saw the first clear-cut pro-labor bills with the implementation 
of minimum wage laws and collective contracts. In addition, the Labor Code 
established the right to strike in 1921. Together with the expansion of social security 
and  other  incipient  steps  taken  to  establish  a  social  state  by  way  of  central  state  
                                                             
59 This reformist impulse was not exclusive to Argentina. As we saw in Chapter 3, the process of social 
state expansion in Chile began with the new era of mass politics in the 1920s. Similarly, the Battlista 
years in Uruguay saw the early expansion of mass democracy followed by important social legislation 
(Filgueira, 1995). In all these cases, the growing disposition of the political elite to enact social reform 
was linked to changes in the socioeconomic structure and the new ideological environment that 
received its full expression with the transition to a democratic regime.   
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mediation, the Radical years thus prefigured the corporatist social policy approach 
later adopted by Juán Peron.  
During the first years of his government, President Yrigoyen established a selective 
relationship with workers, privileging particular organizations – “syndicalists as 
opposed to socialists and big unions from key sectors of the economy” (Miorelli, 2004: 
11). Such an incipient corporatist approach was reinforced by attempts to co-opt and 
control other popular organizations such as neighborhood associations.60 The main aim 
of neighborhood associations was to improve community life through the installation 
of basic services and urban infrastructure such as drainage, water and lightening, the 
paving of roads, or the building of a primary healthcare unit and a school. This required 
the development of links with state actors through which pressure could be exerted 
and improvements negotiated. At the same time, state actors recognized the politically 
strategic relevance of these organizations. Mechanisms were established to control 
and regulate them through a combination of legislative constraints and selective 
inducements (see Miorelli, 2004).61  
Importantly, the democratic regime installed with the Sáenz Peña Reform in 1912 
provided ample opportunities for the discretionary use (and abuse) of public resources 
and for the limitation of pluralism. Making use of a “delegative mandate” Yrigoyen 
repeatedly overrode parliamentary efforts to veto executive initiatives and 
circumscribe its use of patronage. Indeed, it has been argued that Yrigoyen 
represented a political practice in accordance with O’Donnell’s concept of “delegative 
                                                             
60 This became especially apparent after the so called Tragic Week in 1919, when the Radical Party’s 
relations with workers’ unions turned for the worse after Yrigoyen had authorized police repression of 
workers’ protests. As a result, the party expanded its strategy by creating committees in poor 
communities and reaching out for popular support among neighbourhood associations (Falcon and 
Montserrat, 2000).  
61 Note how this approach coincides with the characterization of the corporatist approach as a 
combination of “inducements and constraints”. See Collier and Collier (1979).  
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democracy” (Spektorowski, 2000). Scholars have emphasized how the government, by 
making use of exceptionally strong powers invested in the executive branch, was able 
to sidestep the parliamentary and judicial branches, and thus take considerable 
liberties with respect to the means by which it went about attracting a popular 
following and co-opt different political actors (see Mustapic, 1984; Spektorowski, 
2000; Romero, 2004). Reflecting the weakness of institutional controls on executive 
power was the easiness by which the government routinely refused to answer 
parliamentary interpellations. Yrigoyen also frequently made use of his powers to issue 
decrees in order to sidestep the other branches of the state.62 Of major importance 
was also the device of federal intervention, whereby the federal government took 
control of the provinces’ political resources, not least its sources of patronage and the 
administrative apparatus. Mustapic (1984) has showed how this provided the 
Argentine executive with great powers of discretion and opened for the arbitrary use 
of executive power. All in all, it shows how the type of democracy instituted with the 
Sáenz Peña Reform provided the executive with considerable discretion in 
implementing policy change.  
In summary, the analysis shows the importance of regime institutions for early 
social state formation. An early experiment with democracy paved the way for a 
reformist alliance of urban elites and middle class professionals that sought to end the 
traditional oligarchic order and restore social peace by co-opting the increasingly vocal 
trade unions and emerging social groups. Rapid industrialization, urbanization and 
immigration had resulted in the expansion of new social groups that could no longer 
be held in check by patron-client relations. The new social policy approach directly 
                                                             
62 For instance, political appointments considered unconstitutional by the Senate were made permanent 
through decretismo. See Mustapic (1984).  
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emerged out of the need to reorganize state-society relations in response to the onset 
of mass politics and democracy. It also played into growing predilections for more 
state intervention. According to Malloy, the articulation of the corporatist social policy 
approach in countries such as Argentina represented a reformist response to the social 
question by a rising cadre of technocrats in alliance with populist politicians. These 
new elites pushed social protection as “a non-revolutionary approach to the problem 
of integrating society” (Malloy, 1991: 14). Importantly, the type of democracy 
established in Argentina gave the executive wide discretion in implementing such a 
corporatist social policy approach in face of opposition from conservative interests.   
Nevertheless, working class protest did not fall during the Radical years. To the 
contrary, accelerating urbanization coupled with inflation and labor market instability 
fuelled an upsurge in workers protest. While state intervention in the economy had 
been increasing since the transition to democracy and Radical rule, the economic 
structure did not yet support the kind of broad social state action that was to develop 
under the ISI model. The Radical administrations could simply not afford such 
encompassing social welfare policies. Hence, even though the social state had started 
to expand since democratization, this expansion had not gone far enough to cushion 
the negative effects of structural transformation and social dislocation.  
Crucially,  the  democratic  regime  established  by  the  Sáenz  Peña  Reform  was  ill-
equipped to cope with the political effects of mass immigration. As emphasized by 
Lewis  (2002:  196):  “Electoral  reform  in  1912  did  not  change  the  franchise,  which  
remained restricted to native-born, and naturalized, males. Irrespective of the formal 
advances effected by electoral law reform, mass immigration meant that an increasing 
proportion of the population was denied access to politics.” In 1914, almost thirty 
percent of the total population was foreign-born. More importantly, this percentage 
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was even higher among the working class. For instance, in Buenos Aires around 
seventy percent of workers were immigrants (Lewis, 2002). Hence, a very large 
segment of the population was formally left outside the political system, particularly 
the politically most conscious and vocal groups. In this respect, democratic institutions, 
even after the 1912 political opening, did little to help bring social conflict into the 
parliamentary system. Instead, disenfranchised workers continued making their voice 
heard  through  union  and  street  action.  At  the  same  time,  the  Radical  Party’s  statist  
predisposition and failure to come to grips with the social upheaval fuelled a growing 
conservative critique of democratic government. These tensions culminated with the 
economic crisis in 1929/30 and led to the military coup that brought to power a 
heterogeneous coalition of reactionary interests that involved segments of the old 
oligarchy as well as Catholic and nationalist groups inspired by Italian fascism (Romero, 
2004). 
The military coup of 1930 marked the beginning of a period (1930-43) known as la 
década infame (“the infamous decade”) during which “electoral fraud and political 
repression kept opposition political parties out of the political game and social reform 
off the political agenda” (Teichman, 2001: 31). It led to the resurgence of the 
philanthropic approach to social problems that pivoted around moralization and 
repression. Workers movements were initially repressed after the 1930 coup and 
Catholic institutions were revived to provide an alternative to anarchism and 
syndicalism. The social doctrine of the Church coincided with the aims of the ruling 
elite to keep workers far from such subversive influences and consolidate the 
conservative order. But while social reform was off the charts during this period, 
economic developments accelerated the process of structural change that had began 
in the early 1900s and that would culminate under the Perón regime. Crucially, the 
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period saw the move toward a model of import-substitution industrialization with 
major effects on the country’s socioeconomic structure that in its turn helps explain 
the adoption of the corporatist social policy approach under Perón.  
Triggering the move to import-substitution industrialization was the collapse of the 
commodity-export-led growth model in the wake of the Great Depression. The 
worldwide depression hit Argentina’s export-based economy particularly hard, causing 
widespread internal dislocation. Among other things, the sharp contraction in 
commodity exports accelerated the process of rural-urban migration, leading to the 
appearance in Buenos Aires of villas de desocupación (“unemployment cities”) on 
derelict land (Lewis, 2002). As in much of the world, the Great Depression also forced a 
general rethinking of economic policies and “a significant rise in nationalist sentiment 
expressed as a generalized desire for autonomous national development” (Malloy, 
1977:9).  
Under the presidency of General Justo (1932-38), Argentina thus began a new 
phase of vigorous government-assisted industrialization that would continue by 
various means until 1976. Crucially, this process of industrialization and massive 
urbanization accelerated the already rapid growth of the urban industrial working 
class, particularly the “new” proletariat “resulting from the flow of internal migrants 
from the interior of the country” (Lewis, 2002: 201). Hence, from 1935 onwards trade 
union activity increased dramatically. Such socioeconomic change eventually helped to 
undermine conservative rule during the infamous decade, especially as the demands 
of these new social groups for housing, better wages and work conditions went largely 
unmet. Internal disputes also mounted within the ruling classes as to how to deal with 
the question of governance (see Romero, 2004).  
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The outbreak of the Second World War in 1939 added to these tensions. In 1943, 
after years of elite-infighting, another coup brought to power a group of nationalist 
military officers that included Colonel Juán Domingo Perón. Using his position in the 
newly created post of Secretary of Labor and Social Security, Perón cultivated trade 
union leaders and sponsored social legislation that had been long demanded by the 
labor movement. According to Romero (2002), a stay in Europe before the outbreak of 
World  War  II  had  allowed  Perón  to  learn  from  the  accomplishments  of  the  Italian  
fascist regime as well as witness the terrible results of the Spanish Civil War. Wise from 
that experience, he set out to capture the sympathy and support of the worker’s 
movement. “During his tenure as secretary of labor, Perón gave legal and technical 
assistance to unions, consulted union leaders on social and labor legislation, enforced 
existing labor laws in the whole country, and generalized paid holidays and vacations 
to the entire labor force. He also created labor courts to handle worker grievances, 
restricted firing, and improved working conditions and severance payment. 
Additionally, he enforced collective bargaining with government-recognized unions 
and intervened often on workers’ behalves when negotiations broke down” (Murillo, 
2001: 46). From the Secretariat of Labor, Perón thus expanded the machinery of the 
state’s powers of arbitration, first outlined during Yrigoyen’s government, while 
simultaneously promoting union organization. Having suffered from exclusion during la 
década infame, these measures earned Perón “the gratitude (and the votes) of many 
workers  and  the  enduring  loyalty  of  many  union  bosses”  (Lewis,  2002:  211).  In  the  
February  1946  elections,  Perón  won  the  presidency  with  54  percent  of  the  vote.  His  
victory rested on the support of the new urban working-class electorate fostered by 
the internal migrations and industrialization, and sectors of the lower middle class 
grateful for his social initiatives.  
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PeronismandtheCorporatistApproach
After his inauguration, Perón went on to undertake extensive socioeconomic reforms 
to cement a state-dominated populist alliance whose fundamental pillars were 
organized labor, the industrialists producing for the domestic market, and the 
nationalistic military groups favorable to industrialization. The government thus 
continued and extended the economic policies begun in the 1930s: tariff protection, 
exchange controls, and import licenses favoring the importation of capital goods and 
inputs needed by industry. Key economic sectors were nationalized and agricultural 
exports taxed to promote industrialization. At the same time, workers’ incomes were 
expanded with the help of government intervention in collective bargaining structures 
and wide-ranging reforms were implemented that improved working conditions and 
extended a variety of new social benefits to workers. Social insurance became the 
responsibility of the public sector. The pension funds run by mutual aid societies were 
gradually absorbed into the state system (Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997a). Private insurance 
companies were prevented from administering contributory pension schemes. Instead, 
workers were obliged to participate in public insurance schemes and prohibited from 
making additional contributions elsewhere.63  
Indeed, a major component of Perón’s political strategy was the adoption of a 
corporatist social policy approach through which unions could be co-opted and 
controlled. The expansion of union-related social welfare programs (obras sociales), 
financed by automatic deductions of union dues and compulsory employers 
contributions, provided the basis for a wide range of social services from healthcare to 
pensions, and educational and training services. This approach had important effects 
                                                             
63 For a discussion of these public insurance programs, see Lewis (1993). Also Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 
(2009). 
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on state-society relations, as Teichman notes: “With a centralized union structure, 
these funds became a source of patronage and pressure in the hands of union leaders 
and were used to reward loyal followers. At the same time, the requirements for legal 
recognition from the state (without which a union could not negotiate or receive union 
dues) facilitated control of the country’s labor movement through the Ministry of 
Labor. Perón used this structure to consolidate his base of support in the trade union 
movement, intervening and withdrawing legal recognition from uncooperative unions 
and establishing parallel ones to which he extended recognition” (2001: 32). In 
essence, the approach involved a quid pro quo between the state and the popular 
sectors; in exchange for representational privileges and social benefits, labor 
organizations had to sacrifice some autonomy and conform to the system of 
corporatist controls limiting their disruptive potential. 
Fundamentally, the corporatist approach was a deeply practical and opportunistic 
proposition for managing state-society relations amidst rapid industrialization and 
urbanization, allowing for the inclusion of new groups in society through the 
cultivation and cooptation of labor unions. It also helped appease important business 
sectors and bring them into the new populist alliance. Arguing that the best defense 
against leftist workers’ revolution was state-sponsored labor unions, Perón managed 
to overcome the fundamental divide created by the growing impetus for labor 
organizing among the urban working class and the strident opposition of business 
sectors to such organizing. The logic is well illustrated in his address to the stock 
exchange in 1944: “What I want to do is to organize the workers through the state, so 
that the state shows them the way forward. In this way revolutionary currents 
endangering capitalist society in the postwar can be neutralized” (quoted in Rock, 
1987:  257).  Extensive  social  welfare  measures  were  an  important  component  of  the  
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corporatist scheme. He called this approach the “Peaceful Revolution” and presented 
it as the best defense against a leftist workers’ revolution.  
Importantly, this corporatist social policy approach was sustained by the ISI model. 
The demand-side logic of this inward-oriented growth model provided considerable 
leeway for relatively pro-worker policies. Increasing wages and pensions, and 
expanding healthcare and social security programs helped increase aggregate demand 
for national producers. Subsidies for the construction of low-cost housing similarly 
helped expand national production and increase aggregate demand. Under Perón, 
public spending on housing increased almost tenfold from the previous years (Isuani 
and Tenti, 1989).  
Accompanying the ISI model were the new social policy ideas in vogue during the 
time that emphasized the development of social security schemes and the expansion 
of welfare programs in order to reinforce the purchasing power of wages (Malloy, 
1991; Lewis 1993; Silva, 2007). These ideas found ardent supporters among the many 
labor leaders and dependent middle class professionals recruited by Perón to make up 
his administrative team.64 To this were added ideas about social action prevalent 
within the Catholic Church. According to church doctrine, situations of social injustice 
should be mitigated, but without questioning the foundations of capitalist society 
(Romero, 2004). Indeed, the Catholic Church provided important support for the Eva 
Perón Foundation that was set up by “Evita” to carry out social welfare projects in poor 
communities and provide social aid to non-unionized poor. The Foundation proved 
highly effective in organizing clientelistic networks that helped manage state-popular 
sector relations and expand popular support for the Perón regime (Plotkin, 1994). 
                                                             
64 For information on the characteristics of the Peronist administrative team, see De Imaz (1964). See 
also the discussion in Buchanan (1985).   
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However, as the economic situation deteriorated in the beginning of the 1950s, these 
welfare projects started to dwindle and be replaced by various means of repression to 
secure social quiescence.  
Referring from this, we see how an important function of social welfare is to 
control society to minimize the need for overt state repression. Social policy formed 
part  of  the  strategy  to  organize  society  on  a  corporative  basis  so  as  to  ensure  
governability. Indeed, Peron’s concept of the “organized community” was directly 
derived out of concerns to “harmonize” labor-capital relations and ensure social peace 
(Brennan, 2007). A fundamental challenge lay in incorporating the popular sector 
economically and politically, using it to break the domination oligarchy and accumulate 
political power for the Peronist movement, but also controlling it to prevent the 
emergence of autonomous organizational bases, leaders and goals that might carry its 
political activation beyond the limits of governability and the limits acceptable to the 
industrial sectors sustaining the economic growth model. In this, the corporatist social 
policy  approach  provided  a  means  through  which  to  mediate  social  struggles  and  to  
form a broad multi-class coalition, and concomitantly, as noted above, fashion 
centrally controlled organizational structures that could be manipulated to co-opt and 
control the popular sectors.  
There can be little doubt that Peronism implied a major transformation of social 
governance in Argentina. During this period, a welfare state was built up with broad 
coverage compared with most other Latin American countries. Social state formation 
was driven by profound changes in the socioeconomic structure in conjunction with 
corporatist social policy ideas advocating the development of union-administered 
social security schemes. The result was a welfare state organized along the lines of the 
corporatist-conservative model identified by Esping-Andersen (1990). As such, social 
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policy was folded into a mode of social governance with a decidedly corporatist bent 
that played an important role in restructuring the interactions between the state and 
society. Social programs became a corporatist linkage between officially sanctioned 
functional groupings and the state apparatus. The main groups incorporated were the 
new social groups that emerged with the process of socio-economic modernization 
such as industrial workers and the state-dependent middle class. These groups 
benefited from the new welfare arrangements, but at the same time they also became 
heavily dependent on the expansions of the state apparatus for the realization of their 
demands and aspirations. Over time, the formalization of corporatist welfare 
arrangements thus fostered a mode of governance in which legally recognized sectors 
of  society  “became  clients  of  the  state  as  they  permeated  the  state  at  a  variety  of  
points and received such benefits as government contracts, jobs, and urban 
improvements” (Teichman, 2001: 13).  
At the same time, people outside the modern urban-industrial complex of state 
and economy were generally denied these privileges which led to a bifurcation of the 
social structure between “insiders” and “outsiders”. In spite of stated policies of 
universalism, the system operated with particularistic criteria with preferential 
coverage  for  workers  in  the  formal  sector.  Large  segments  of  the  population  were  
excluded from social services, particularly the rural workers and urban poor employed 
in the informal sector. Such “segmentary incorporation”65 helped foment a system of 
vertical relationships through which the most organized groups within the emerging 
social sectors sought further privileges for themselves at the expense of universalistic 
benefits. However, as the previous chapter showed, while in Chile (and in most 
                                                             
65 The term has been used to describe a tactic of “giving state aid to the most organized groups within 
an emerging social sector in a way that causes these groups to me more interested in seeking further 
benefits for themselves rather than in broadening and strengthening the power of the entire social 
sector” (Collier 1976: 11). 
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“corporatist-conservative” systems in Western Europe) civil society retained a 
considerable degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the state that helped establish strong 
union-left party ties and a relatively larger role for grass-roots interests in articulating 
demands, in Argentina, by contrast, trade unions were subordinated to the state. This 
resulted in a drastic loss of organizational autonomy and the weak influence of grass-
roots interests over organizational agendas. Clearly, the corporatist approach 
implemented by Perón went much further than in Chile in fomenting a mode of social 
governance in which social demand-making was controlled by the state and in 
preventing a party-mobilizing system (in which the working classes are organized in the 
first instance by competing political parties rather than state-sponsored unions). 
Indeed, in Argentina, despite (or perhaps because of) Peronism’s hegemonic position 
among the popular sectors, the kind of electoral contestation over union allegiances, 
which Chile witnessed from the 1940s onwards, never materialized.    
In this, political regime structure played a decisive role. An electoral-autocratic 
regime structure66 in Argentina allowed Perón to cement a system of state corporatist 
controls by making use of exceptionally strong executive powers. By enfranchising the 
entire population without instituting horizontal controls on executive power, the 
Argentine regime structure provided for unfettered majoritarianism as well as poorly 
institutionalized civil rights and freedoms. Vacs (2002: 406-407) notes how the 
Peronist government “engaged in a number of semi-authoritarian practices, such as 
restricting the freedoms of expression, assembly, and strike; controlling the judiciary, 
manipulating the mass media and the educational system, imposing political 
constraints on public employees, union leaders, and education workers; and harassing 
                                                             
66 For a discussion, see Wigell (2008). 
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and persecuting adversaries”.67 As  such,  the  return  to  electoral  politics  after  the  
authoritarian interlude between 1930 and 1945 in Argentina did not mark a transition 
to liberal democracy but to an intensely popularizing regime that empowered the 
elected government with wide but poorly constrained executive power while leaving 
oppositional forces with weak possibilities to defend pluralism and organizational 
autonomy.68   
However, while Argentina’s electoral-autocratic regime structure enabled Perón to 
centralize power and virtually absorb all popular sector activity into the Peronist 
movement, it also provoked considerable disquiet among Radicals and conservatives 
that were excluded from the echelons of power. Indeed, the increasingly repressive 
characteristics of his government strengthened the resolve of the opposition to 
remove him by extra-constitutional means. Such anti-Peronist forces were fuelled by 
Perón’s increasing economic difficulties following his second re-election in 1951.69 
Finally,  in  September  1955,  after  a  series  of  failed  revolts,  a  faction  of  the  military  
supported by the opposition parties and the Catholic Church succeeded in ousting 
Perón and forcing him into an eighteen-year exile.  
 



                                                             
67 For a discussion of the characteristics of the Peronist regime, see also Romero (2004).  
68 In Chile, by comparison, the authoritarian interlude was shorter (1927-31) and the return to 
democracy more complete. Crucially, the political regime structure in Chile provided for a competitive 
democratic process in which parties of left and center fiercely fought over popular support, preventing 
any single political actor from monopolizing state power. As a consequence, the Chilean state was not 
able to penetrate organizations in civil society and impose limits on associational activity to the same 
extent as Perón did in Argentina. In Chile, it seems that electoral contestation and the institutions of 
liberal-constitutionalism helped civil society retain relatively more autonomy in relation to the state, and 
organized groups from across the social spectrum were able to put relatively more pressure on the 
political process in search of privileges and benefits. For more details, see the previous chapter. 
69 For a discussion of these economic developments, see Gerchunoff and Llach (1998). 
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STATECORPORATISMANDITSDEMISE
The 1955 coup ushered in a period characterized by various attempts by anti-Peronist 
civilian and military governments to overcome Argentina’s systemic crisis by 
introducing a new development model able to foster economic growth and political 
stability. Yet shifting the country’s development model away from its expansionary 
interventionist course toward a more orthodox approach proved difficult. The 
corporatist arrangements imposed by Perón helped to block the reform efforts. Social 
actors such as state-dependent industrialists and organized labor benefiting from the 
corporatist approach had evolved into powerful interest groups opposing any 
fundamental change to the system. At the same time, pro-industry welfare strategies 
promulgated by ECLA and ILO continued to be supported by influential policymakers 
within the Argentine state. In this respect, the structural and ideological changes that 
had occurred during the 1930s and 1940s were irreversible. State corporatism had 
taken hold. Despite various efforts to “discipline” labor and rid the system of 
corporatist interests, jettisoning the corporatist approach was virtually impossible. 
Indeed, as Malloy (1991: 15-16) has argued, the corporatist welfare arrangements had 
some “unforeseen consequences that subverted the internal coherence of these 
control systems and short-circuited their ability to generate an increased power 
capacity at the center”. As a consequence of the corporatist approach, various 
particularistic interests had been able to capture parts of the welfare bureaucracy, 
which they could manipulate to their own benefit. The massive growth of the state 
provided ample opportunities for the building of patronage networks both within the 
state as well as between state bureaucrats and client groups in society. While such 
networks helped incorporate previously excluded sectors, it simultaneously fed a 
process of state disaggregation whereby the internal coordination and cohesion of the 
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state became a growing problem. This disarticulation of state power was particularly 
evident in social policy. Referring to the development of social security more generally 
in the Southern Cone, Malloy (1977: 15) has contended that “the many funds tended 
to become the fiefdoms of the interests they served and were used in a manner that 
actually reinforced socioeconomic inequality even as social security spending fed 
inflation” (1977: 15). That was certainly true of social security in Argentina. The result 
was a “praetorianization” of Argentine politics.  
 
PraetorianPoliticsandtheIssueofReform
Praetorianism implied, among other things, the loosening of the corporatist controls 
imposed under Perón and paved the way for heightened popular sector militancy and 
autonomous mobilization. Unable to defeat Peronism in free elections, the new 
political elites opted for banning the Peronist party, effectively disenfranchising a large 
sector of the electorate. This measure prompted the labor movement to opt for tactics 
that helped undermine governability and destabilize regimes, such as general strikes, 
factory occupations and mass protests (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005). Amidst hardening 
economic constraints, the corporatist mode of social governance could no longer 
contain this growing activation of popular sector militancy. The ability to maintain a 
politics of controlled inclusion directly depends on the resources available to meet the 
demands of the most vocal and organized sectors of society. This ability begins to 
falter  once  economic  conditions  become  more  volatile.  By  the  1960s,  demands  for  
growing wages, social benefits and rights proved increasingly difficult to accommodate 
amidst declining state resources and chronic inflation. Weakened social governance 
was manifested in serious problems of social control and heightened class conflict, 
while social reform was made all but impossible by the corporate interest in effective 
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control of social funds and institutions. Having appropriated control of vital areas of 
social policy as a basis for power and patronage, corporate interests were able to block 
policy innovations that threatened their group-specific benefits. 
Between 1955 and 1976 Argentina had a succession of authoritarian military and 
semi-democratic civilian governments that attempted to re-concentrate executive 
control by integrating the diverse social policy institutions into single administrative 
structures. But instead of strengthening techno-bureaucratic management capacity, 
centralization and bureaucratization exacerbated problems of immobilization and 
inflation associated with praetorianism. Relying on massive welfare bureaucracies to 
manage social demands did not help to correct problems of inefficiency and waste, 
and made it difficult to respond to changing needs and demands of the population. It 
also  failed  to  break  the  central  role  of  the  unions  in  social  policy.  As  a  result,  the  
corporatist approach could not be overturned during the period 1955-1976.  
Some attempts to privatize and decentralize social services were made. In 1957 the 
Family Allowances Fund for Employees of Trade and Industry was created as a private 
institution. In 1963 the creation of the Fund for Stevedores completed the institutional 
framework of the Family Allowances Program. Until that, family allowances had 
formed part of collective bargaining agreements. The Radical government of 1963-66 
also attempted to regain state authority over the obras sociales and advance 
government regulation over the production and sale of prescription drugs. However, 
like most similar initiatives they fed strong corporative opposition, which helped to 
accelerate the fall of the government (Lo Vuolo, 1991).  
The 1966 coup ended a decade of limited democracy and established a repressive 
authoritarian regime (1966-73). The new regime enjoyed wide support, particularly 
among  business  sectors  who  agreed  with  the  view  that  only  a  strong  dose  of  
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authoritarianism could break the political impasse that prevented socioeconomic 
reform. The military government’s aim was the depoliticization of the powerful trade 
unions and an anti-inflation wage freeze as a prelude to economic growth.70 Part of 
this effort to restore governability was also the attempt to restructure the welfare 
system by unifying and centralizing social policy, and eliminating union presence in the 
administration of the system and its funds. In 1967, the military government created 
the National Social Security System (NSSS). Its goals were to streamline social security 
policy, break union domination of the social security cash desks, and control evasion 
(Barbeito and Goldberg, 2007).  
However, the repressive policies of the military government provoked a radicalized 
popular resistance. In May 1969, students and workers unions in Córdoba joined forces 
to lead the mass insurrection that became known as the Cordobazo.71 From there 
popular mobilization spread to the whole country, soon escalating into an armed 
struggle led by the Peronist Montoneros and other guerrilla groups. The insurrection 
forced the military government to backtrack on a number of reform initiatives and to 
start  accommodate  corporatist  interests  so  as  to  be  able  to  appease  the  powerful  
trade unions. In particular, this meant making a number of concessions in social policy 
to the corporative interests and abandoning all attempts to maintain economic 
orthodoxy.  
In 1970, as a direct consequence of the social pressures and the new strategy of 
corporatist accommodation, the government passed the Obras Sociales Law 18610, 
establishing obligatory contributions by all working citizens to their respective unions, 
regardless of them being members of the union or not, hence strengthening union 
                                                             
70 For a discussion of this ”politics of exclusion”, see the seminal analysis by O’Donnell (1988).  
71 For details, see Brennan and Gordillo (1994). 
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control over these welfare funds (Lo Vuolo, 1991). According to Goldberg (2000), the 
ratification of this law led to increasing stratification of demand in comparison with the 
previous model. It also helped further strengthen the negotiating ability of the unions 
with regard to the financing and payment of health services. “In fact, the large amount 
or resources transferred to the unions by way of this law turned them into active 
protagonists, granting them a strategic role in the decision-making process regarding 
health issues irrespective of the number of their actual members” (Goldberg, 2000: 
231).  
Similarly, in 1971, the National Institute for Retirees and Pensioners was created, 
with the aim to provide health services for the beneficiaries of the National Pension 
System – retirees, pensioners and their primary family members. Up until then, the 
majority of these beneficiaries did not have a right to health services. The following 
year FONAVI was created to finance housing, urban infrastructure, and community 
facilities for low-income sectors.  
All in all, despite the stated goal of the military regime to break union control over 
vital social policy institutions and overhaul the corporatist social policy approach, the 
corporatist welfare arrangements remained largely intact and the government even 
expanded the role of the unions as well as that of the state in financing and producing 
social services. Faced with a serious crisis of legitimacy, the military government had 
retaken the corporatist approach in an effort to stem opposition by the trade unions. 
As such, the government failed to correct the persistent fiscal imbalances and the 
growing stratification between “insiders” and “outsiders” generated by these 
corporatist welfare arrangements. Indeed, in many respects the exchanges between 
the state and the corporative interests intensified and came to be dominated by 
attempts to pressure the state with a view toward maximizing short-term benefits. At 
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the same time, relations between the rank and file members and the union leadership 
deteriorated. As the larger unions became increasingly responsible for the 
administration of a range of welfare services and social facilities, possibilities for graft 
increased and led to the resentment of ordinary members (Lewis, 2002). As Teichman 
notes (2001: 35): “The growing bureaucratization of the labor movement, a function of 
its centralized structure and economic wealth and its collaboration with military 
regimes, had produced a conservative stratum of corrupt labor leaders increasingly 
opposed by their rank and file and by the idealistic youth of the Peronist movement”. 
In short, there was a breakdown of union discipline. Such was the situation in 1972 
when the military government responded to increasing polarization and political 
violence by calling elections, legalizing Peronism, and allowing for the return of Perón 
from exile. 
The civilian Peronist government elected in 1973 initially embarked on another 
expansionary program increasing wages and subsidies. Efforts to rein in the obras 
sociales under a unified national health system failed as a result of opposition from 
Peronist  legislators  and  the  trade  union  movement  (Lo  Vuolo,  1991).  According  to  
Lewis (2002: 212): “Graft, cronyism and the use of violence in defense of their empires 
by  union  bosses  came  to  a  head  between  1973  and  1976”  (2002:  212).  At  the  same  
time, public social spending was markedly increased, in spite of worsening fiscal 
imbalances and rapidly deteriorating economic conditions in conjunction with the 
worldwide energy crisis. The result was a fiscal deficit of hitherto unregistered 
proportions. By 1975, total public expenditure as a percentage of GDP had reached 
nearly 40 percent, while the public deficit as a percentage of GDP stood at 15 percent 
(Teichman, 2001). Inevitably, the Peronist government was forced to begin a tough 
stabilization program in face of galloping inflation. But as usual, such austerity 
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measures were met with widespread opposition. Amidst large-scale labor mobilization 
and increasing political violence, Argentina descended into chaos. The stage was set 
for yet another military takeover.  
Similar to Chile a few years earlier, the 1976 Argentine coup was rooted in 
accelerating class conflict and a growing “threat from below” that prompted the 
armed forces to seize power and unleash an unprecedented wave of repression. The 
Argentine military regime also shared many of the goals of its Chilean counterpart, 
articulating from the beginning a determination to eliminate the political power of 
organized labor and a commitment to a neoliberal development strategy (Remmer, 
1989; Schamis, 1991). According to a growing number of civilian and military 
technocrats, the ISI model was no longer sustainable on account of structural 
obstacles. The new military-technocratic alliance was also a product of the global 
ideological reordering that discredited state interventionism and corporatist welfare 
arrangements. Yet, despite similar objectives, the Argentine leaders would prove far 
less successful than their peers in Chile in dismantling corporatism.    
 
NeoconservativeRestructuringandtheBeginningoftheEnd
The primary goal of the military regime was the restoration of governability. In this, 
the new regime enjoyed the support of elite and middle sectors that called for “order 
and security” in the face of increasing social strife and the risk of “subversion” that it 
seemed to entail. In a context where a weakened state had proved unable to block the 
increased praetorian politicization, only the armed forces seemed to possess the 
“necessary” coercive means to enforce a solution to what has been characterized as a 
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“social impasse”.72 Immediately upon taking power the military junta banned all 
political activity and put labor organizations under military control. It also unleashed a 
brutal campaign of extermination, which the military itself called the “dirty war”, to 
eliminate the armed guerilla groups and, more generally, annihilate all societal 
opposition.    
The program of the military went beyond simply reinstating state domination. It 
consisted of  eliminating the root of  the problem so as to prevent a  repetition of  the 
failure of the 1966-1973 military regime, when corporative interests had been able to 
reassert themselves in the decision-making process. The new leaders were determined 
to change the basic socioeconomic and political variables that led to Argentina’s 
economic decline, social strife, and political instability. “According to their diagnosis, 
the chronic political and social instability was born of the impotence of political power 
when faced with the great corporative groups – labor but also business – which 
continuously fought with one another, generating chaos and disorder, or which, united 
by  a  peculiar  logic,  allied  to  use  to  their  mutual  benefit  the  powerful  tools  of  an  
interventionist and welfare state” (Romero, 2002: 221).73 Hence, in order to provide a 
new basis for governability, corporatism would need to be dismantled.  
As Schamis (1991) has explained, coercion and neoliberal economics were 
complementary dimensions of this process. The unprecedented wave of repression 
served to immediately deactivate the labor movement, preventing it from contesting 
the  program  of  restructuring.   As  in  Chile,  the  ultimate  goal  was  not  only  the  
restoration of class compromise, but a complete neoconservative restructuring of the 
country.  In  this  project,  neoliberal  economics  had  a  vital  function.  Not  only  was  it  
                                                             
72 See O’Donnell (1977).  
73 See also Canitrot (1980). 
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perceived as an economic tool capable of rekindling capital accumulation in the wake 
of  the  exhaustion  of  the  ISI  model,  it  also  served  as  a  political  device  by  which  to  
dismantle the apparatus of state intervention and establish a minimal state, shorn of 
its role in allocating resources and distributing income. This would effectively destroy 
the structural links between state and society that had encouraged unhealthy interest-
group behavior and the corporative tug-of-war that characterized the praetorian 
period. Dismantling these structural links would thus eliminate the main cause of 
Argentina’s high level of social conflict and political mobilization, and restore 
governability.      
The military rulers agreed with a number of influential members of the elite and 
technocratic experts that the great culprit of the crisis was the interventionist and 
welfare state, such as it had been constituted since the birth of mass democracy. 
Based on the monetarist doctrines that had become influential around the Western 
world following the first energy crisis in 1973-74, “these advisers believed that the 
loosening of free market forces would not only create the conditions for renewed 
economic growth but also discipline the social actors’ behavior, destroying the 
socioeconomic and political basis for the emergence of populist regimes” (Vacs, 2002: 
409-10). Instrumental in persuading the armed forces of the need to abandon their 
long-term concern with state-led industrialization was Economy Minister Martínez de 
Hoz, who spent “nearly one-third of his time traveling from barrack to barrack, 
explaining the rationale and objectives behind his stabilization project” (Pion-Berlin, 
1985: 58). Under Martínez de Hoz and his team of neoliberal technocrats, Argentina 
embarked on a radical program of economic liberalization.  
The retrenchment of the welfare state formed part of this program. According to 
Martínez de Hoz, welfare policies encouraged ever increasing demands on state 
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resources (Schamis, 1991). The corporatist social policy approach, in particular, had 
contributed to artificially strengthen unions, radicalizing their demands in the process. 
Overhauling these corporatist welfare arrangements was thus a necessary component 
of the effort to enforce a long-term solution to Argentina’s praetorian crisis. Like the 
Chicago Boys in Chile, Martínez de Hoz and his economic team embraced the principle 
of state subsidiarity (Gardarelli and Rosenfeld, 2005). Yet they were far less successful 
than their counterparts in Chile in restructuring the social policy model.    
Some changes were achieved. By taking advantage of the authoritarian nature of 
the regime that allowed for the forceful repression of union activity, the centralized 
structures for collective bargaining negotiations were rapidly eliminated (Marshall, 
1988). The new labor rules were intended to break the bargaining power of unions and 
remove the state as an interlocutor of labor disputes. The government also initiated a 
process of privatization and decentralization of social services. The administration of 
public hospitals and primary schools was transferred to the provinces. While such 
decentralization was presented as a move to more efficient and rational 
administration of the health and education system, the main goal was fiscal, as public 
resources were withheld from being fully transferred, accentuating problems at the 
local level (Lo Vuolo, 1991). Measures were also adopted to accelerate the expansion 
of the private sector in healthcare. The government forcefully stripped the unions of 
their control of the obras sociales and promoted their contracting with private health 
services. The rules for obligatory contributions by workers to their respective unions 
established in 1970 were also repealed, establishing the freedom of affiliation to these 
funds. In 1980, the government sanctioned Law 22.269 as a way to consolidate state 
control over union welfare programs. It established the Secretariat for Social Security 
as the main administrative unit of social security benefits in place of the trade unions. 
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The government also lowered the employers’ contributions to the pensions system 
and the National Housing Fund. Instead, these contributions were replaced by funds 
obtained from an increase in the Value Added Tax.74 
However, although these measures were intended to break union control over 
social policy and overhaul the social role of the state, they largely failed to alter the 
inherent design of the system. The reform process stalled and ultimately collapsed 
during the economic crisis of the early 1980s. While undoubtedly succeeding in 
weakening organized labor, the military regime clearly failed to dismantle corporatism 
and consolidate neoliberal reform. With the return to democracy, the corporative tug-
of-war reappeared. Faced with high expectations for social compensation, laws 
providing for corporatist influence over welfare funds were reinstated. The central 
legacy of the military regime was not a drastic overhaul of the corporatist welfare 
arrangements as in Chile, but a growing chasm between a corporatist social policy 
model tilted towards labor market insiders and the increasing number of labor market 
outsiders (i.e. unemployed and informal workers). This failure to reform contributed to 
the weakening social infrastructure and severe balance-of-payment difficulties 
experienced by Argentina in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. 
Institutional features of the Argentine military regime that distinguish it from its 
Chilean counterpart help to explain this failure to enact comprehensive and far-
reaching reform. As we saw in the previous chapter, the institutional structure of the 
Pinochet regime, characterized by Remmer (1991) as “sultanistic”, allowed the Chicago 
Boys to push ahead with radical neoliberal reform against the resistance of military 
                                                             
74 The measure was explained by the necessity to attract foreign investment and boost competitiveness 
in international markets. As such, one could understand this as an incipient repercussion of the new 
economic structure that put strict boundaries on redistributive policies. Another way of looking at it 
would be as an ideological move to promote the power of the new hegemonic class as against the 
popular sectors. The fact that employers’ contributions were reintroduced after democratization in 1984 
speaks for the latter. 
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officers whose orientations were more statist and nationalist. Indeed, by concentrating 
decision making authority with General Pinochet military politicization was quelled and 
reforming technocrats provided with the necessary power to implement reforms. 
Moreover, the “sultanistic” features of the Chilean regime helped it to survive the 
economic crisis of the early 1980s, in contrast to Argentina, and withstand intense 
local pressure to reverse the neoliberal model. 
The institutional structure of the Argentine military regime did not provide for such 
concentration of authority. To the contrary, characterized by Remmer (1991) as a 
“feudal” regime, the institutional structure dispersed authority and exacerbated 
disunity within regime.75 Any movement toward a personalization of power along the 
lines of Chile under Pinochet was prohibited by the horizontal dispersion of authority 
along military service lines. According to Romero (2002), the junta structure  in  
Argentina established by the foundational documents76 of  the regime amounted to a 
“feudalized anarchy” rather than a state made cohesive and constituted through 
executive power. The authority of the president was weak and subject to permanent 
scrutiny, with restraints imposed by the commanders of the three services. This 
dispersal of authority was replicated at lower levels of administration. “The problem 
was  that  no  one’s  powers  were  clearly  delineated  but  were  rather  the  result  of  the  
changing balance of forces” (Romero 2002: 233).  
Indeed, as several scholars have shown, the period of the proceso was marked by 
deepening conflicts within the military-technocratic alliance. These rivalries within the 
military and the related fragmentation of political authority impeded efforts to 
implement the neoliberal program. Whereas the Chicago Boys in Chile were able to 
                                                             
75 See also the excellent discussion in Arceneaux (1997) as well as Munck (1998). 
76 The Estatuto Para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional (24 March 1976) and Law 21.256 
(Reglamiento para el Funcionamiento de la Junta Militar, Poder Ejecutivo Nacional y Comisión de 
Asesoramiento Legislativo). 
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run roughshod over the objections of the statist/nationalist faction of the armed forces 
with the help of Pinochet, Martínez de Hoz and his economic team repeatedly ran up 
against resistance from the Ministries of Labor and Social Welfare as well as from 
Fabricaciones Militares, the military’s industrial complex (Remmer, 1989a; see also 
Arceneaux, 1997). This was especially the case after the posts of president and 
commander-in-chief of the army were separated in the late 1970s, which strengthened 
the division of power among the rival services. Officers in charge of the social 
ministries held the view that many of the ideas and proposals of Martínez de Hoz and 
his team ought to be changed so as not to lose all public support (Romero, 2002). The 
maintenance of certain corporatist controls was important for reasons of 
governability. Importantly, the collaborationist wing of the trade union movement 
joined forces with the statist wing of the military to vigorously oppose many of 
Martínez de Hoz’s reform proposals (Teichman, 2001).77 Hence, despite his wide 
powers over economic decision-making, de Hoz could not completely eliminate labor 
influence over economic and social policy. In any case, his efforts to consolidate 
neoliberal reform and dismantle corporatism fell victim to the economic crisis that hit 
Argentina in 1979.  
As the economic situation worsened, internal criticism of the neoliberal program 
grew louder. Martínez de Hoz found it increasingly difficult to apply his plan 
consistently and convince the generals of the necessity to stay course. Crucially, he 
lacked the kind of strong presidential backing enjoyed by the Chicago Boys in Chile. In 
1981,  as  General  Viola assumed the presidency,  de Hoz and his  economic team were 
replaced.  In  an  effort  to  salvage  some  measure  of  legitimacy  for  the  regime  and  the  
armed forces, Viola sought better relations with political parties and organized labor 
                                                             
77 For a discussion, see Munck (1998).  
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(Pion-Berlin, 1985). His plan of “national integration” involved the gradual restoration 
of some of the rights surrendered by political parties and unions. Conceivably the 
regime also abandoned its commitment to the neoliberal plan in the process, which 
derived from an insular style of policymaking.  
Nevertheless, the abandoning of the unpopular neoliberal policies failed to 
improve the economic situation. Amidst growing economic chaos, popular protests 
began to stir. Emboldened by Viola’s apertura, the democratic opposition formed a 
coalition (Multipartidaria) that called for the “prompt initiation of a phased plan for re-
democratization and a nationalist-expansionist oriented economic platform, which was 
to include tariff protection for industry, lower interest rates, liberalized credit, and a 
substantial increase in real wages” (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 65). Crucially, the internal 
disputes and confusion only increased as the regime began to face growing domestic 
discontent.  
In December 1981, only nine months after his inauguration, Viola was removed 
from office by General Galtieri who attempted to restore the neoliberal program by 
appointing Roberto Alemann, a devout neoliberal economist, to be Minister of 
Economy. At the same time, he secretly met with key Peronist leaders in an effort to 
build a military-civilian coalition which could accumulate sufficient support to uphold 
his rule. He also began more openly to popularize his government by appointing 
prominent civilians as governors and state administrators. However, his strategy did 
nothing to restore the unity among the armed forces. Indeed, high-ranking officers 
publicly criticized the economic policies of the regime which in their opinion had 
“gravely” affected the credibility of the armed forces (Pion-Berlin, 1985). His political 
ploys also met with disapproval, helping to weaken his authority and widen the 
divisions within the military establishment. As a result, Galtieri came under increasing 
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pressure to improve his own position and that of the regime. With that in mind, he 
opted for the plan to recover the Falkland/Malvinas islands controlled by Great Britain. 
That appeared to be the perfect ploy “to unify the nation behind the government, 
regain some prestige for the military, and legitimize the regime” (Vacs, 2002: 411). 
However, the war with Great Britain ended infamously in a devastating defeat for 
Argentina, triggering a domestic backlash against the regime that forced the military to 
call for elections and agree to a transfer of power to the civilians (Munck, 1998).  
In  stark contrast  to the regime transition in Chile,  where the military was able to 
impose a number of constraints on the incoming civilian government, the Argentine 
military was in no position to dictate the terms of re-democratization. Seriously 
discredited by the military defeat and the economic chaos, the military government 
virtually collapsed. This had important consequences for social governance, as is 
shown in the next section. Indeed, the very different type of democracy established in 
Argentina, in comparison with Chile, constitutes a major factor in explaining the 
different strategy adopted by the Argentine government in trying to manage the social 
question after re-democratization.  
 
 
FROMCORPORATISMTOTHEPLURALISTAPPROACH
The failure of the military regime to dismantle corporatism left several problematic 
legacies for the new democratic regime. One was the growing economic inconsistency 
between the corporatist welfare arrangements and the process of de-
proletarianization began under the military regime. The narrowing contributory base 
(as more people were pushed into the self-employed and informally employed sectors) 
for the work-based social protection systems generated a growing fiscal problem that 
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further exacerbated the debt crisis. Yet under the Alfonsín administration, these 
corporatist welfare arrangements proved hard to reform. The expectations raised by 
the return to democracy put pressure on the new democratic government to increase 
social spending. Importantly, the type of democracy established in Argentina with the 
transition from authoritarianism did not entail any “tutelary” institutions of the kind 
Chile established a few years later that could have discouraged the Alfonsín 
government from pandering to social pressures. To the contrary, the new democratic 
institutions provided strong incentives for the Alfonsín government to increase social 
spending and delay social reform.  
          With the transition to democracy, trade union power was partly restored. Unlike 
Chile, where the labor movement never recovered from neoconservative 
restructuring, in Argentina the failure of the military regime to dismantle corporatism 
provided trade unions with sufficient powers to block any assault on the corporatist 
welfare arrangements. When Alfonsín finally acknowledged the need for social reform 
around the mid-1980s, he ran into fierce opposition from the trade union movement 
and its allies within the Peronist opposition. It was not until the hyperinflationary crisis 
at the end of the 1980s that a consensus was built around the need to reform and the 
trade union movement had been weakened to generate sufficient space for the 
dismantling of the corporatist mode of social governance.  
          This was accomplished under the Peronist administration of Carlos Menem, who 
in a bid to restore governability initiated the overhaul of the corporatist model of 
social protection. Directly contributing to Menem’s surprising attack on corporatism 
were the structural and ideological changes that accompanied the rise of neoliberalism 
in the late 1980s. Faced with a bankrupt state and social violence that exposed the 
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inadequacy of the corporatist model, Menem acknowledged the need for a radically 
new mode of social governance.  
Facilitating the process of dismantling corporatism was the “delegative” nature 
of the Argentine democracy that provided Menem with wide powers to impose policy 
change. As we shall see, the process of implementation was a difficult process that also 
involved sub-national actors with wide-ranging consequences for the political 
outcome. As such, the political perspective and explanatory model developed in 
Chapter 1 provides a useful framework for understanding the process of social reform 
in Argentina during the 1990s.    
 
AlfonsínandtheSocialQuestion
The new democratic government inherited a massive social debt accumulated over 
previous years. Industrial workers in particular had experienced a major setback during 
the  military  era.  The  share  of  wage  earners  in  GDP  fell  from  51  percent  (1970-1975  
average)  to  36  percent  (1976-1982  average),  reflecting  a  sharp  drop  in  average  real  
wages and a shift from wage to self-employment (World Bank, 1988). In the industrial 
labor market,  workers’  real  wages decreased by 49 percent between 1974 and 1978,  
while the number of industrial workers fell by 36 percent, from 1,165.000 in 1975 to 
740.000 in 1982 (Tedesco and Barton, 2004). The gap in income distribution between 
higher and lower brackets widened. In Greater Buenos Aires the richest 10 percent 
increased its share of national income from 33 percent to 37 percent, while the share 
of the poorest 40 percent declined from 16 percent to 14 percent (World Bank, 1988). 
Poverty also increased substantially during the period. Between 1974 and 1982 the 
numbers of structurally poor, defined as those with severe problems of housing and 
social infrastructure, and unable to cover their basic needs, increased by 49 percent 
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(Tedesco and Barton, 2004). A study by the National Institute of Statistics and Census 
concluded that 5.5 million inhabitants had unsatisfied basic needs (referred to in 
Midre, 1992).  
Crucially, while the population in need of social welfare and services increased, 
public resources for education, health and housing declined markedly during the 
military era (see Table 4.2). The result was a sharp deterioration of social services and 
aid that predominantly benefit lower income groups – primary education, public 
hospitals, preventive health care, slum improvement, low-cost housing and family 
allowances for poor households. In the absence of sufficient investment, the physical 
infrastructure of public education and healthcare decayed. In the housing sector 
FONAVI was nearly paralyzed, leading to a huge housing deficit. Indeed, by the time of 
the return to democracy in 1983, all social service sectors had suffered from severe 
deficiencies and rapidly deteriorating quality that disproportionately hit the popular 
sectors (see World Bank, 1988; Jáuregui and Lozano, 1990). 
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Table4.2IndexofRealSocialPublicPerCapitaExpenditures,bycategory,1970-1990
Year Education Public 
health 
 Social 
security 
Housing  Social 
welfare 
  
Pension 
fund 
Family 
allowances 
Total 
1970 82.7 84.0 57.3 31.5 63.0 71.4 141.7 74.6 
1971 82.9 86.7 62.0 40.6 81.3 74.0 118.3 76.2 
1972 82.7 83.5 57.7 25.1 100.2 62.6 114.5 70.1 
1973 105.3 99.5 73.4 52.7 105.3 72.1 97.8 83.0 
1974 129.0 114.7 93.8 95.5 191.1 97.1 131.0 109.4 
1975 126.0 117.2 85.2 126.9 214.9 75.5 108.8 100.3 
1976 75.9 100.0 71.5 93.7 131.2 76.1 80.3 80.5 
1977 71.9 92.2 67.1 46.1 147.6 73.1 94.8 75.7 
1978 89.1 104.6 75.0 57.8 165.0 75.3 99.0 83.9 
1979 89.6 91.0 83.8 51.3 119.6 81.1 87.8 83.9 
1980 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1981 95.6 108.7 132.8 54.3 108.7 100.4 79.9 101.6 
1982 77.0 88.1 113.1 62.2 77.8 74.2 53.3 80.3 
1983 95.7 101.0 116.0 95.7 95.7 77.3 68.3 90.4 
1984 115.3 117.0 109.4 83.6 133.7 84.8 57.3 97.3 
1985 100.6 101.2 110.4 71.9 159.7 90.9 54.8 95.3 
1986 107.2 108.7 110.2 77.7 155.3 88.5 79.9 98.4 
1987 118.0 102.7 112.2 84.8 154.2 94.8 72.7 102.6 
1988 109.6 77.7 115.9 70.0 139.9 84.9 40.0 91.9 
1989 91.8 83.7 97.0 54.9 157.0 60.4 40.4 75.9 
1990 77.5 73.2 91.6 58.1 77.5 72.5 33.2 73.2 
Source: Reproduced from Beccaria and Carciofi (1995) 
 
Re-democratization generated high expectations that the new regime would deal 
with this social debt. These hopes had been further encouraged by campaign promises 
to improve the living conditions of the poor (Midre, 1992). Hence, when the new 
democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín assumed power it was under strong pressure 
to rapidly satisfy the welter of accumulated demands for social “compensation”. The 
widespread popular mobilizations calling for social improvements that had began to 
build up towards the end of the military era added a sense of urgency for the Radical 
administration to manage the social question. A mobilized civil society that had begun 
to seek redress for its submerged aspirations and demands could hardly be ignored by 
the newly elected democratic government. 
At the same time, the economic situation inherited from the military regime made 
dealing with the social question difficult. Alfonsín’s government assumed office with 
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inflation running at an annual rate of 600 percent. In addition, the fiscal deficit of the 
nonfinancial public sector stood at 15 percent of GDP, while the Central Bank faced 
arrears on interest payment on the external debt that far exceeded its hard currency 
reserves (Smith, 1992). As a result of the “nationalization” of the private external debt 
in 1982, the state had become responsible for servicing the bulk of the entire external 
debt, both public and private. Between 1976 and 1982, public debt increased by 407.5 
percent  and  private  debt  by  364.5  percent  (Tedesco  and  Barton,  2004).  In  1983,  the  
Argentine foreign debt reached $46.5 billion (Murillo, 2001).  
This was obviously an enormous drain on state finances and put constraints on 
social policy. Increasing social spending was difficult, not least as international 
creditors put pressure on Argentina to meet its debt obligations rather than to invest 
in social services (Tedesco and Barton, 2004). The debt crisis gave the multilateral 
lending institutions and the Reagan administration important leverage over the 
Argentine policymaking process. Short of hard currency, Argentina had to engage in 
negotiations with these Washington-based institutions over how to restructure its 
external debt and was thus susceptible to their influence.  
Hence, when assuming the presidency in December 1983, Alfonsín faced a 
formidable challenge. One the one hand, the high expectations that many groups in 
society had vested in the immediate returns from the democratization process put 
pressure on the Radical government to increase social spending and reverse the 
neoliberal policies of the military regime. On the other hand, the transition to 
democracy coincided with the onset of the debt crisis, which put considerable 
economic constraints on social policy. In many ways, the situation resembled that of 
Chile a few years later, where the Aylwin administration was confronted with the 
difficult dilemma of maintaining macroeconomic stability while meeting urgent social 
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demands. Yet, the two countries chose to handle the situation very differently. As we 
saw in Chapter 3, in Chile President Aylwin envisaged a strategy of piecemeal social 
reform contingent on maintaining macroeconomic stability, while carefully ruling out 
any return to the old corporatist social policy approach. In Argentina, by contrast, the 
Alfonsín administration essentially reintroduced the corporatist social policy approach 
in combination with a heterodox strategy of stabilization. Why this very different 
approach to deal with the social question compared with Chile? 
Two factors help explain this different approach in Argentina, both legacies of the 
military debacle. Firstly, in stark contrast to Chile, where the armed forces were 
exceptionally successful in controlling the terms of transition and establishing a 
tutelary democracy that limited the ability of the new administration to implement 
redistributive policies, in Argentina the collapse of the military government aborted 
any attempts to place such constitutional prerogatives on the incoming democratic 
government. As a result, the Alfonsín government was under no real pressure from 
domestic conservative forces to stick to neoliberal policies. In Chile the institutional 
prerogatives that maintained military tutelage and conservative influence over the 
political process forced the new democratic government to adopt a non-
confrontational stance towards the conservative opposition, whereas in Argentina the 
Alfonsín administration had no such need to pander to conservative interests. To the 
contrary, the economic chaos left behind by the military regime seemed to speak for a 
radical change of course in economic and social policy.  
Indeed, demands for a new direction were strong throughout society and the 
government did little to pre-empt such pressures. If anything, remarks such as that of 
the triumphant presidential candidate himself – “con la democracia también se come” 
– only fuelled the already pent-up expectations for social compensation. The urge to 
196 
 
pre-empt and limit social demands was not as strong in a democratic regime with few 
institutional prerogatives of the Chilean kind where the new political leaders went out 
of their way to avoid the exacerbation of social demands for fear of upsetting the 
conservative forces. By contrast, in the type of democracy established in Argentina, 
with strong institutions of vertical accountability and weak institutions of horizontal 
accountability, political leaders had strong incentives to enact expansionary economic 
and social policies. In the absence of “tutelary powers”, “reserved domains” and the 
like,  following  a  populist  strategy  did  not  seem  to  directly  undermine  the  goal  of  
democratic consolidation. Hence, Alfonsín, whose campaign promises had included 
measures to improve worker’s earnings, resisted pressure from the IMF and the World 
Bank to pursue austerity and market liberalizing measures. Instead, he took a 
confrontational position vis-à-vis private creditors and the multilateral lending 
institutions. Upon assuming office, the new Radical administration adopted an 
expansionary program that included increased wages, together with close state control 
of credit, exchange rates, and prices. The Radical government also quickly reversed 
some  of  the  social  policy  reforms  enacted  by  the  military  government,  such  as  
reinstating the previous contribution system of FONAVI. In addition, it allowed for a 
steady increase in social expenditures without adjusting the tax intake to a 
corresponding level.   
Secondly, in contrast to Chile, in Argentina the process of dismantling corporatism 
had not been concluded at the time of re-democratization. Although unions had been 
targets of harsh political repression during military rule and the decline in industry had 
weakened organized labor, with the transition to democracy the power of union 
leaders was partly restored. For the Radical government this was particularly 
problematic since most trade unions remained under Peronist leadership. As a result, 
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the Radical government faced a labor movement capable of provoking considerable 
disruption to any policies of structural reform. Indeed, Alfonsín had to contend with no 
less  than  13  general  strikes  and  nearly  3,000  other  strikes  in  various  sectors  of  the  
economy that were driven by union demands for increases in salaries and social 
benefits (Epstein 1992). Faced with a resurgent labor movement, the government was 
forced into negotiations with the trade-union leaders. Under such circumstances, 
abandoning the corporatist social policy model, even if it was increasingly unfit to care 
for the rising ranks of informal workers, proved difficult.  
Hence, under Alfonsín, Argentina made no great strides toward social welfare 
reform. Pent-up expectations and demands occasioned a sharp increase in social 
expenditures – spending that went into the traditional statist and corporatist welfare 
schemes. The re-emergence of strike activity also compelled Alfonsín to adopt a 
strategy of negotiation with the unions. Indeed, an agreement was reached with an 
important group of unions – the so-called fifteen that included the most powerful 
private and public-sector unions. In evaluating this agreement, Romero (2002: 267) 
writes: “From the unions’ point of view, the reasons for participating in the 
government were obvious, almost insultingly so; they included passing the collection 
of laws that ruled trade-union activity – rights to legal status, collective bargaining 
procedures, rules about union control of social service programs – in terms similar to 
those established in 1975. In exchange for these important concessions, the 
government, which sacrificed long-standing objectives, obtained little in return – only 
a relative social truce, because the trade-union opposition remained totally divided, 
and a promise of future political support that never really materialized”. In sum, 
despite Alfonsín’s dislike of corporatist style of politics, his government proved unable 
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to dismantle corporatism and was forced to give into a host of union demands 
preventing any substantial change to the corporatist welfare arrangements.  
Unable  to  reform  the  system,  problems  quickly  began  to  emerge  as  a  result  of  
inflation, problems in the labor market, and the growth of the informal sector. The 
public housing system was nearly paralyzed as a result of administrative weaknesses. 
Informants testify as to how initiatives to reform public housing programs ran into 
opposition from construction companies. The government also failed to reform the 
pension system that accounted for a high and increasing proportion of government 
expenditure, while approximately 30 percent of the elderly over retirement age, most 
of whom belonged to low-income groups, did not have access to pension benefits 
(Lloyd-Sherlock, 1997b). The health system also continued to suffer from quality 
deterioration and a high degree of inefficiency, despite the increases in public health 
expenditure. Inefficient management of the obras sociales produced worsening 
financial imbalances for which they received subsidies from the state. Yet these 
subsidies continued to be distributed in a discretionary fashion and subject to political 
pressures. The obras sociales of the politically most powerful unions received the most 
subsidies reflecting the continuation of the corporatist social policy approach 
(Queisser, Larrañaga and Panadeiros, 1993). The system not only contributed to drain 
the state of fiscal resources and generate financial disequilibria, but also led to 
reduced coverage for the increasing ranks of poor households outside the formal labor 
market. Acknowledging the problem, experts within the Alfonsín administration 
formulated a proposal for a system that would integrate resources from the obras 
sociales and the public sector in order to increase efficiency and more effectively cover 
individuals not employed in the formal sector. The proposal was introduced to 
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Congress by the Radical government in 1985, but failed to prosper chiefly due to 
strong opposition from trade unions (Lo Vuolo and Barbeito, 1994).  
A rare social welfare initiative that prospered under Alfonsín was the National Food 
Program (PAN). PAN was launched soon after the presidential elections and was the 
first food program in Argentina with national coverage. Between 1984 and 1989 it 
served  around  1,200,000  families  at  a  cost  of  over  US$150  million  per  annum  
(Martínez Nogueira, 1995). The principal aim of the PAN was to provide basic food 
necessities to low-income groups. However, unlike the targeted programs later 
adopted during the Menem administration as well as in Chile under Aylwin, the PAN 
was set up to be administered in a centralist fashion, without the emphasis on 
participation, demand-orientation and competitive tendering associated with the 
pluralist approach. At the time, the new social policy ideas associated with the pluralist 
approach had yet to seriously break through.  
Its potential to garner votes among the swelling ranks of low-income groups made 
the PAN object for intense political struggle. Accusations of politically motivated 
mismanagement of the PAN were frequently raised. The Radical government was 
accused of clientelistic manipulation of the program and there were numerous stories 
and rumours about fraud connected with the PAN (see Midré, 1992). Indeed, some 
studies show how the PAN was captured by topocrats in certain provinces (Alvarez 
cited in Midré, 1992; Tenti Fanfani, 1989). Generally, most analysts seem to agree that 
the PAN was used in a clientelistic fashion by the Radical Party.78  
Corroborating the argument made in this thesis, such political abuse appears to be 
directly related to Argentina’s regime institutions. In a context of weak horizontal 
accountability, those responsible for implementing the PAN operated with wide 
                                                             
78 For a representative view, see Prévôt Schapira (1996). 
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discretion in handling food parcels and selecting beneficiaries. Repetto (2001: 115) also 
stresses this point when arguing that, ““En líneas generales, pueden observarse varios 
problemas al analizar ex post la implementación del PAN, muchas de los cuales derivan 
de la falta de control efectivo sobre los responsables del programa”. In the absence of 
strong horizontal controls and oversight agencies, such as Chile’s parliamentary control 
committees and Office of the Comptroller, Argentina was lacking mechanisms for 
preventing political abuse in administrating the PAN. This argument finds support in 
interviews with experts that confirm how essentially no controls existed that would 
have deterred those responsible for distributing the food parcels from clientelist 
practices.  
Weak horizontal accountability gave policymakers wide discretion not only with 
regard to the PAN, but more generally in allocating all sorts of social funds. Various 
studies of the Ministry of Health and Social Action emphasize its corruption (Lloyd-
Sherlock, 1997b). It also bears mentioning how politicians enjoyed wide discretion in 
distributing benefits from FONAVI and the Banco Hipotecario Nacional, and how such 
discretion helped sustain clientelist networks. Without the kind of oversight agencies 
equipped with the necessary mandate and clout to control compliance with the norms 
for issuing benefits and terms for construction, political abuse was hard to prevent. 
When asked about mechanisms of control, housing policy experts emphasized their 
weakness combined with the difficulty of preventing political and corporatist capture. 
During the 1980s, FONAVI funds amounted to about 1 percent of GDP. Annual 
revenues averaged US$600 million that theoretically should have been sufficient to 
construct low-cost housing for 60,000 households. Yet housing was provided to only 
30,000 households per year and generally failed to adequately respond to the needs of 
the poorest sectors due to high administrative costs, lack of competitiveness between 
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the companies contracted for the housing construction and general inefficiencies in 
fund management. In addition, FONAVI suffered from financial problems as a result of 
the evasion of the employers’ compulsory FONAVI contributions. Also, contrary to 
regulations, reimbursements accounted for only 1 percent of FONAVI revenue as 
defaulting on the payments was having no consequences for the provinces (World 
Bank, 1988; Queisser, Larrañaga and Panadeiros, 1993). Interviews with housing policy 
experts and officials confirm that the decentralization of FONAVI to the provinces 
during the Menem era only acted to heighten these problems as topocrats were able 
to strengthen their control over FONAVI benefits. 
The PAN contributed to the Radical triumph in the September 1985 congressional 
elections by helping the party make inroads among low-income sectors, but in the long 
run the inability of the Alfonsín government to solve the problem of governance 
spearheaded its resignation in June 1989. By the mid-1980s, the Radical government 
was forced to change their methods and adopt stabilization measures as fiscal 
conditions turned for the worse (see Smith, 1992; Margerithis, 2000). In this, Alfonsín 
attempted to make use of the strong presidential powers embedded in Argentina’s 
democratic regime. A series of economic programs that increasingly moved towards 
orthodox solutions were imposed by decree without much regard for consensus-
building or horizontal mechanisms of accountability. The change in course had been 
prepared in secrecy by a new technical team of economists from the sub-secretary of 
planning at the Ministry of the Economy, headed by Juan Sourrouille. Their plans 
reflected important changes in policy ideas that were closely linked to the growing 
interaction with international actors such as the IMF and the World Bank (Teichman, 
2001). However, having failed to rein in the trade unions, the new policies were hard 
to enforce despite decree powers. The government had to make a number of 
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concessions to the corporate interests that compromised its efforts to bring the 
economy under control (Smith, 1992). The continuation of the corporatist social policy 
approach, epitomized by the Social Pact of 1987, only contributed to undermine 
stabilization measures. Though succeeding in momentarily achieving social peace, 
corporate interests were able to stonewall policies that might affect them.  
At the same time, the inability to contain inflation and extend welfare coverage to 
the swelling ranks of self-employed and nonunionized workers weakened government 
legitimacy. It was not enough with PAN. The failure of the health, housing and pension 
systems to care for the really needy translated into growing disenchantment with the 
Radical government that culminated in the food riots of 1989 (Serulnikov, 1994). 
Crucially, Argentina’s federal system also constituted a formidable obstacle to the 
implementation of policy change. For political reasons, provincial governors were 
reluctant to cut social spending and forego the corporatist model of social policy. 
Alfonsín was also forced to negotiate with the provincial Senators who, for reasons 
explained in Chapter 2, are usually the pawns of the provincial governors and thus 
defended topocratic interests. In any event, by taking loans from locally controlled 
banks,  the  provinces  were  able  to  evade  austerity  measures  (Lo  Vuolo,  1991).  This  
helped undermine the basis for policy change.  
In a climate of increasing economic deterioration and growing inflation, the 
Radicals were soundly beaten by the Peronists in the 1987 elections. Bereft of its 
majority in the chamber of deputies the Alfonsín administration ventured into 
paralysis. New economic programs gave the government momentary respite, but 
because the Peronists did not support any deep transformations, the government’s 
new neoliberal orientation lacked credibility. One disaster followed another. “As the 
spectre of a Peronist victory in 1989 elections grew, capital flight and financial 
203 
 
speculation soared, culminating in a hyperinflationary burst that brought the economy 
to  the  brink  of  collapse”  (Levitsky  and  Murillo,  2005:  26).  As  real  wages  collapsed,  
public order disintegrated. The series of riots and lootings in May and June 1989, as 
crowds of newly impoverished people, desperate for basic provision, ransacked 
supermarkets throughout Gran Buenos Aires meant the final blows to the Radical 
government.  
In late June 1989, Alfonsín resigned the presidency six months before the end of 
his mandate - leaving behind a socioeconomic legacy that was negatively impressive.79 
During  his  reign,  GDP  per  capita  had  shrunk  by  more  than  10  percent.  The  total  
external debt had increased from US$45 billion in 1983 to US$63 billion in 1989 and 
the inflation rate exceeded 4,000 percent. This economic disaster was accompanied by 
worsening social conditions. During the period, formal employment opportunities 
decreased sharply, producing a rise in open unemployment and informality. Despite 
the resistance of organized labor, real wages fell by almost 25 percent between 1983 
and 1989 due to the high inflation and the contraction of formal employment. Poverty 
levels were substantially higher than at the beginning of the Alfonsín era. The 
proportion of households with incomes below the poverty line grew from 7.6 to 28.5 
percent during the 1980s. At the same time, the provision of social services was almost 
interrupted by hyperinflation. It was of little surprise that the 1989 elections saw the 
Radicals swept from office. Under the leadership of newly elected president Carlos 
Menem, the Peronists were back in power.    
 


                                                             
79 For an analysis, see Beccaria and Carciofi (1995). Also Lloyd-Sherlock (1997b).  
204 
 
SocialWelfareReformunderMenem
The 1989 crisis spearheaded a major reorientation of social policy. Under Carlos 
Menem, the corporatist social policy approach was abandoned in favor of new 
principles that emphasized privatization, decentralization and selectivity (targeting) for 
social provisions. In addition, social policies turned towards cooperating with non-
governmental and grassroots organizations, shunning the traditional corporatist 
networks of social governance. Hence, to the surprise of his followers and adversaries 
alike, the new Peronist president embraced social reforms that were directly opposed 
to the interests of organized labor, Peronism’s foremost socio-political ally. 
From the beginning of the 1990s onwards a number of social reforms were enacted 
that aimed to dismantle the corporatist social policy model. Deregulating the labor 
market  was  an  early  priority.  Through  a  series  of  laws  and  decrees  the  government  
introduced successive measures of “labor flexibility” in order to lower labor costs and 
ease the hiring and firing of workers (see Cortés and Marshall, 1999; Acuña and 
Tuozzo, 2000). As Levitsky (1995: 12) has noted, “the sum of the government’s labor 
reforms – particularly the deregulation of collective bargaining, flexibilization of shop 
floor regimes, and the privatization of the pension scheme - amounts to the 
dismantling of the corporatist model of labor relations that had been in place since the 
1940s”.  
In education, healthcare, and housing the government accelerated the process of 
decentralization began under the military regime. FONAVI was transferred to the 
provinces as part of the 1992 Fiscal Pact. The provinces were also made responsible for 
secondary education, completing the process started in the 1970s at the primary level. 
In the public health sector, the transfer of the national hospital network to the 
provinces  was  completed  in  1992.  A  number  of  measures  were  also  taken  to  
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progressively reduce the role of the state in social service production. An important 
initiative was the creation of so-called “self-governing public hospitals”, which were 
supposed to generate their own resources. There were also reforms promoting 
competition and deregulation of the obras sociales. Though this process stalled in the 
legislature, important steps were taken by executive decree in the direction of 
deregulation. In addition, the government undertook a comprehensive reform of the 
social  security  system.  The  new  system  was  designed  to  allow  the  private  sector  a  
major role in the national insurance regime. In short, the old public pay-as-you-go 
regime was replaced by a “mixed” system that combines privately administered 
insurance funds with a basic guaranteed public pension. The aim was to progressively 
replace the public system of payments with a “totally private” system of individual 
fully-funded schemes along the lines of the Chilean model.  80  
At the same time, a number of targeted assistance programs were launched to 
ameliorate  the  effects  of  this  retrenchment  of  the  corporatist  social  state.81 Initially, 
the emphasis of these targeted programs was mainly on distributing goods – food, 
school and construction supplies – directly to families and schools, or through grass 
roots organizations such as community soup kitchens. Towards the mid-90s, the 
administration put increasing emphasis on local capacity building, NGO-cooperation 
and the introduction of more participatory practices in the administration of these 
programs. The new programs were designed to successively replace the traditional 
universalistic welfare schemes with a more flexible, pro-poor and participatory 
assistance approach that could respond more effectively to diverse needs and 
                                                             
80 For details on the social reforms during the 1990s, see Cortés and Marshall (1999); Barbeito and 
Goldberg (2007); Lo Vuolo (1997); Repetto and Alonso (2004).   
81 For a comprehensive discussion of these new targeted anti-poverty programs, see Chapter 6. 
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demands. Only at the national level, as we shall see in Chapter 6, around 70 new anti-
poverty programs were established during the ten years of the Menem presidency.  
The structural and ideological transformations that accompanied the deep 
socioeconomic crisis that Argentina underwent in the end of the 1980s go a long way 
in explaining this new direction in social policy initiated by the Menem administration. 
First, the changes in economic and social structure associated with the collapse of the 
state-led model undermined the corporatist mode of social governance. The 
hyperinflationary crisis had forced Argentina on a radical track of economic 
restructuring widely viewed as the fastest and most far-reaching reform program in 
Latin America. Harsh austerity measures were bundled with ambitious structural 
reforms that included trade liberalization, the privatization of various economic 
entities and services previously provided by the state, and the deregulation of most 
economic activities.82 Under the Convertibility Plan of 1991, the Argentine peso was 
pegged  to  the  US  dollar  on  a  1:1  level,  a  measure  that  tied  the  size  of  the  money  
supply to the availability of reserves. This new economic model put boundaries on 
social policy options. Convertibility required strict fiscal discipline. This entailed cuts in 
social spending. Not least, the bankrupt social security system had become increasingly 
burdensome for the public coffers. With the opening up of the economy to global 
market forces, labor costs needed to be cut in order to enhance domestic 
competitiveness - particularly as currency devaluation was not an option with 
convertibility. Thus, under the new economic model, the corporatist welfare 
arrangements needed to be dismantled. Initiatives to reform the labor market and the 
pension system were clearly driven by such economic pressures.  
                                                             
82 See, for instance, Acuña, Galiani and Tommasi (2007).  
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At the same time, hyperinflation and neoliberal policies accelerated the class-
structural changes in effect since the 1970s. The Argentina society that emerged from 
the end of the 1980s was much more heterogeneous and fragmented that the one 
that had facilitated the rise of corporatism. Politically, organized labor was no longer 
the indispensable ally for Peronism that it had been in the past. As many scholars have 
shown, economic dislocation wreaked havoc on a mode of political representation that 
was rooted in the labor and popular mobilizations that accompanied the process of 
state-led industrialization in the middle of the twentieth century (e.g. McGuire, 1997; 
Levitsky, 2003). The wrenching process of economic restructuring substantially 
weakened the power of unions as organizations (Table 4.3). As union membership fell, 
the ability of labor unions to provide the Peronist party with grassroots activists, a 
strong collective identity and loyal voters became far weaker.  
 
Table4.3  UnionizationinArgentina,1970s-1990s
Year Union 
Members 
(Thousands) 
Unionization 
Rate 
(%) 
1975 5000.0 58.8 
1985 4000.0 36.3 
1998 3600.0 25.7 
Source:  Cardoso (2005) 
 
 
Concomitantly, the significant growth of the informal sector provided a political 
incentive for Menem and the Peronist party more broadly to target the swelling 
constituencies of non-unionized workers and urban poor.83 That Menem understood 
this is clearly shown by his “neopopulist” rhetoric that directly appealed to workers in 
                                                             
83 See the arguments by Roberts (1995) and Weyland (1996b). 
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the informal sector and low-income families outside the formal labor market. The need 
for a new mode of social governance was underlined by growing instances of protest 
and popular uprisings against the deteriorating social conditions, which threatened 
governability in many Peronist controlled provinces. As will be shown in Chapter 6, 
targeted social programs were often set up both at the national and provincial level to 
appease such protest and ensure governability. In general, Peronist politicians, 
including President Menem, got increasingly worried about their political support as 
the rise in unemployment and poverty showed no signs of abating despite the 
economic recovery. Cushioning the effects of this rising social question was an 
important motive behind the decision to create the Secretariat of Social Development 
that was made responsible for the design and coordination of new anti-poverty 
programs (see Chapter 6). More broadly, the new anti-poverty approach provided an 
opportunity to renew some of the organizational and programmatic bases of 
Peronism. It provided an instrument through which ties could be built to the wealth of 
voluntary organizations that had emerged around “subsistence” issues in conjunction 
with the hyperinflationary crisis. NGOs in particular appeared as a useful substitute for 
the troublesome corporatist organizations. Indeed, interviews with policymakers show 
that the new social policy approach was considered a good way to adapt to this new 
social landscape.  
Second, the content of the reformist agenda was to a great extent determined by 
the ideas that scholars, policymakers and the international community had come to 
share with regard to “best practices” in social policy. As explained earlier in this study, 
by the end of the 1980s, international actors had begun to push for the reformulation 
of the social policy approach in Latin America. Corporatist welfare arrangements had 
come under increasing criticism and the new consensus view of social policy among 
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international experts stressed the principles of privatization, decentralization and 
selectivity. In Argentina, the intense relationship with the World Bank was 
instrumental for the adoption of these new social policy ideas. During the 1980s, 
World Bank officials had already been cultivating policy actors in Argentina in their 
attempts to press for policy change (Teichman 2001). Though attempts to reform 
social policy largely failed during the Alfonsín era, the formulation of the economic 
plans under Juan Sourrouille involved intense discussions with World Bank officials, 
including discussions of social reforms in such areas as social security and housing. 
Teichman  argues  (2001:  106):  “It  is  likely  that  these  discussions,  although  at  times  
conflictive, formed an important part of the social learning process. The experience 
certainly strengthened the resolve of Argentine officials inclined toward policy 
reform”.  
The severe socioeconomic crisis was also instrumental in bringing around many 
who were reticent among the political elite and in producing public support for far-
reaching changes84. A substantial part of the national leadership of the two main 
parties acknowledged the necessity of undertaking substantial reforms. Indeed, both 
parties saw a growing influence of technocratic activists that helped disseminate the 
new social policy ideas. President Menem himself was one of the converts. The 
Alfonsín era that culminated in hyperinflation, social turmoil and political debacle had 
clearly demonstrated the flaws with the corporatist mode of social governance. “For 
Menem, the danger was that he would end up like Alfonsín, devoured by the 
maelstrom of a state in the process of disintegration” (Romero, 2002: 287). The 
restoration of state power required a neutralization of corporatism. The opportunity 
                                                             
84 Many scholars stress the importance of the hyperinflationary crisis in altering perceptions of the need 
for reform, see, among others, Beccaria and Carciofi (1995); Margheritis (2000); Teichman (2001).  
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resided in the fact that the crisis had weakened organized labor and that there was 
such a need for public order and stability that a major overhaul of the role of the state 
could be tolerated among the public and policymakers alike. In this, the new social 
policy ideas promoted by international actors provided the Menem administration 
with a recipe for how to renew social policymaking to fit the new socioeconomic 
structures and help restore governability.  
Under Menem, the close relationship between Argentina and the World Bank 
reached unparalleled proportions. Eager to mobilize funds amidst the severe economic 
crisis, the Menem administration invited the World Bank at the end of 1989 to become 
involved in its efforts to turn the country around. As such, the World Bank was deeply 
involved in social security, healthcare and labor reform.85 World Bank lending was also 
instrumental in financing the new targeted programs through which the Menem 
administration went about cushioning the effects of economic restructuring. Between 
the officials at the Secretariat of Social Development and the World Bank a close 
relationship of partnership and mutual understanding evolved that in many ways 
helped shape the new social policy approach. Indeed, as will be shown in Chapter 6, 
social technocrats at the SSD played a key role as interlocutors for the new pluralist 
social policy ideas and more broadly in shaping the social agenda during the 1990s. 
Yet even if these structural and ideological transformations provided important 
impulses for the Menem administration to initiate social reforms and helped to shape 
the content of these reforms, they cannot account for the political outcome of the 
reform process. Indeed, as was argued in the introductory chapter of this study, 
political institutions put strict boundaries on reform strategies and to a large extent 
                                                             
85 For  a  more  comprehensive  discussion,  see  Acuña  and  Tuozzo  (2000).  See  also  Cortés  and  Marshall  
(1999).  
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shaped the capabilities of policymakers to overcome vested interests in the process of 
implementation. In this, the type of democratic institutions that characterize Argentina 
in  important  ways  facilitated  the  enactment  of  social  reforms.  By  making  use  of  the  
extraordinarily strong powers vested in the Argentine presidency, Menem was able to 
drive through reforms despite fierce opposition from many quarters - from public 
servants, from Congress and from trade unions. The use of presidential decrees was 
the standard means by which the executive enacted reforms. As the issue of labor 
market reform lacked sufficient support in Congress, new legislation was imposed by 
presidential decree. These executive measures included new rules for collective 
bargaining that decentralized the negotiation process and eliminated state 
intervention, permitted the suspension of collective labor contracts in state owned 
industries, and made it possible for employers to change the conditions of work, fringe 
benefits and wages (see Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000).86 Similarly, executive decree powers 
were used to drive through measures promoting the deregulation of obras sociales 
(Acuña and Tuozzo, 2000; see also Repetto and Alonso, 2004). In addition, Decree 
2.184/90 that limited the right to strike for public-sector unions was instrumental in 
handling opposition from trade unions to privatization in healthcare and social 
security. Indeed, interviews with policymakers and experts confirm the view that 
Menem’s use of presidential decrees played a vital role in overriding opposition to 
social reforms. Such institutional manipulations also included the 1990 packing of the 
Supreme Court and the politicized appointment of federal judges, which ensured that 
reforms would not be blocked on constitutional grounds. In short, by providing the 
executive with wide discretionary powers, weak institutions of horizontal 
                                                             
86 Though some of the measures designed by the Ministry of Economy to introduce more flexibility to 
the labor market and diminish labor costs were obstructed in Congress, the president often threatened 
the use of his decree powers to bully reluctant congressmen to support his broader reform program. 
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accountability played an important role in facilitating the major overhaul of welfare 
arrangements enacted by the Menem administration.  
At the same time, Argentina’s regime institutions not only contributed to the swift 
dismantling of welfare corporatism, but also defined the peculiarities of the new mode 
of social governance. As was argued in Chapter 1, weak institutions of horizontal 
accountability offer plenty of opportunities to depredate public resources for 
clientelist ends. Together with strong institutions of vertical accountability, such a 
“delegative” type of democracy provides strong incentives for politicians to adopt 
clientelist strategies of social governance. Indeed, as we shall see in Chapter 6, the new 
pluralist social welfare arrangements were being manipulated to facilitate clientelistic 
incorporation of low-income sectors. Faced with electoral pressures, Menem made use 
of the new targeted programs to build clientelistic networks in which political loyalists 
were being rewarded with social benefits and participatory mechanisms fitted to co-
opt civil society organizations. Without strong agencies of horizontal control, Menem 
and his political allies were operating with wide discretion in allocating targeted funds.  
Under Menem, Argentina thus adopted a populist mode of social governance that 
helped maintain the traditional Peronist connections to the lower classes. Adding to 
this political outcome was Argentina’s decentralized federal system in which sub-
national actors, especially governors, exercise considerable influence over the 
execution of public policy, and which meant that Menem had to build alliances with 
such regional structures of power in order to implement his broader reform program 
and achieve his objective of re-election in 1995 and then again in 1999. Indeed, the 
need to secure the support of provincial governments entailed important concessions 
on the part of the Menem administration. The provincial social security systems – 
which are key tools of clientilistic policies in the provinces – were not subject to the 
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type of reform that the national social security system underwent (Gerchunoff and 
Torre, 1998). “Handouts” conceded by Menem to the provinces, such as the Fondo 
Conurbano that Governor Duhalde could administer with discretion, directly 
contributed to subsidize the rise of clientelism and consolidate local populist enclaves. 
The devolution of the National Housing Fund together with food assistance programs 
such as POSOCO and PROSONU in conjunction with the Federal Pact in 1992 similarly 
entailed a massive transfer of discretionary funds to the provinces that helped to 
finance the populist mode of social governance and maintained the traditional 
Peronist connections to the lower classes. During the negotiations over a revision of 
the Federal Pact in 2000 under the Alianza government, the central state also 
conceded considerable resources for poverty programs to the provinces in an attempt 
to obtain the political support of the powerful governors.  
 
   
CONCLUSION
The historical analysis conducted above shows the usefulness of adopting the political 
perspective and explanatory framework developed in Chapter 1 for understanding the 
politics of social governance. It clearly demonstrates how social policy in Argentina has 
been used as a strategic approach to manage state-society relations and the problem 
of governance. The process of formulating and implementing social policy changes has 
been a function of such political calculations in direct conjunction with the socio-
economic, ideational and political-institutional environment. Changes in economic and 
social structure have compelled the political elite to initiate reforms in order to be able 
to manage the potentially disruptive effects of such structural transformations. At the 
same time, this chapter demonstrates how such changes in the policy environment are 
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no guarantee that policymakers will have the capacity to implement reform (e.g. think 
of the many failed attempts to reform the corporatist model of social protection 
during the 1960s and 1970s). In conjunction with this, the analysis shows how the 
evolution of social welfare provision has formed an integral part of the development of 
state-society relations and the transformation of governance in Argentina. Indeed, for 
the popular sectors social policy has had a vital impact on their levels and forms of 
integration to political life. For political elites, social policy has provided a strategic 
asset in forging political support and social control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
215 
 
PartIII

THENEWPOLITICSOFPLURALISTREFORM
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
216 
 
CHAPTERFIVE
 
DEMOCRACYANDANTI-POVERTYPOLICYINCHILE87
 
Chapter 3 showed how the structural, ideological and institutional legacies of 
neoconservative authoritarianism effectively destroyed the political bases of 
corporatist social governance in Chile. For the new democratic government that took 
office in 1990 the corporatist social policy approach was no longer a viable option. 
Continuing the paternalistic approach of the military regime that had left in its wake a 
huge social debt, including five million poor, was also out of the question in the new 
democratic environment. Instead, the incoming government under President Aylwin 
opted for a pluralist social policy approach in which anti-poverty policy was given a 
central role. This chapter looks at the formulation and implementation of this new 
anti-poverty policy. It shows how despite the participatory discourse and the new 
mechanisms for incorporating civil society actors in the administration of anti-poverty 
projects, the political outcome of the new approach was a mode of social governance 
with a strong technocratic bent through which the state is able to control social 
demand making and set the terms for popular participation.  
The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section discusses the 
formulation of the new anti-poverty strategy, adding detail to the findings discussed in 
Chapter 3 concerning the adaptation of pluralist social reform. It shows how the 
transition to democracy ushered in a new emphasis on pluralism and state-NGO 
                                                             
87 The research for this chapter was mainly conducted in Chile during 2006. The bulk of the data comes 
from 17 in-depth interviews with government officials, policy consultants and civil society activists. For a 
list of these interviews, see the appendix. In addition, the analysis draws from a number of less formal 
discussions with activists and experts in Chile. Part of this chapter was published (Wigell 2010) in Gomez 
et al., eds. 2010. Participation for What?: Social Change or Social Control?. The Hague: ISS/Hivos/Oxfam-
Novib. 
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cooperation in social policymaking. This new emphasis represented a shift among the 
political parties of the center-left governing coalition from their former reliance on 
centralized administration and corporatism. Instrumental in producing this shift was 
the process of ideological redefinition that the parties of the Concertación underwent 
during military rule that helped prepare the ground for the new pluralist social policy 
ideas propagated by technocratic activists and experts, many of whom had taken 
refuge in NGOs and international agencies during the military era. The institutional and 
structural legacies of the Pinochet regime including the constraints embedded in 
Chile’s protected democracy and free market model discussed in Chapter 3 also helped 
shape the new approach in important ways. The implications of these factors were the 
preclusion of radical redistributive reform and, instead, a strong emphasis on poverty 
alleviation and social integration through participation. While the new anti-poverty 
approach did not constitute a fundamental reversal of the military regime’s principles 
of privatization, decentralization and targeting, it did incorporate a strong emphasis on 
social participation and state-NGO cooperation. 
The second section looks at the implementation of the new anti-poverty approach 
under the Aylwin administration. It shows how the new Ministry of Planning and 
Coordination (MIDEPLAN), which was inaugurated to assume a leading role in 
implementing and coordinating the anti-poverty strategy, failed to assume the role of 
a powerful social authority capable of implementing an integrated and coordinated 
approach to poverty alleviation. MIDEPLAN was not given sufficient backing by 
President Aylwin to assume a coordinating role, largely because of the fear among 
Aylwin’s advisors and Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley that it would become a new 
target for demand-making and rent-seeking that could come to jeopardize 
macroeconomic stability. Instead, the President opted for protecting the authority of 
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the  Ministry  of  Finance  (MoF),  while  MIDEPLAN  was  left  to  fight  poverty  chiefly  by  
overseeing a set of targeted social investment funds.  
Nevertheless, these social investment funds were important means in the attempt 
to channel resources for productive development projects to the poorest strata. The 
chapter looks particularly at the FOSIS program. FOSIS is an illustrative example of the 
targeting approach introduced by the Aylwin administration that sought to replace the 
paternalistic welfare measures of the military regime in order to make way for a more 
participatory and demand-driven approach. Yet, the analysis shows how the operation 
of FOSIS has remained in the hands of the techno-bureaucracy within MIDEPLAN. Such 
technocratic control is a function of Chile’s regime institutions. First of all, the strong 
institutions of horizontal accountability embedded in its protected democracy limit 
political discretion in the distribution of anti-poverty funds. Secondly, the centralist-
unitary system of government provides few means for sub-national actors to influence 
the policymaking process. Hence, as shown in the analysis, Chile’s regime institutions 
have helped technocratic experts in charge of FOSIS shield the program from political 
interference and clientelism, but at the cost of reducing the space for popular 
participation in the policymaking process.  
The third section extends the analysis of anti-poverty policymaking to the 
administrations of presidents Frei (1994-2000) and Lagos (2000-2006). During the Frei 
administration attempts were made to enhance inter-sectorial coordination in anti-
poverty policy and further decentralization so as to be better able to realize the 
participatory goals of the pluralist approach. However, these efforts largely failed 
because of resistance by the social line-ministries. Importantly, the Ministry of Finance 
vigorously opposed these efforts as it was perceived as a threat against the 
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technocratic and consensual style of governmental policymaking deemed to have 
served the goal of consolidating free market democracy well. 
A renewed effort to reinvigorate anti-poverty measures, in particular measures to 
eradicate extreme poverty, was made under the Lagos administration. The most 
important initiative was the Chile Solidario System (CS). CS was a direct response to 
the heightened concern over extreme poverty. President Lagos and his advisors were 
worried that the Concertación’s inability to deal with the issue was affecting its 
political credibility. Policy experts took up on the issue and the analysis shows how the 
program was designed through a highly technocratic process in consultation with the 
World Bank. As a result of this technocratic process, community and associative issues 
were largely left out of its operational lines, weakening the opportunities for 
community participation. But unlike many other conditional cash transfer programs in 
Latin America, it does not lend itself to clientelism. Again, Chile’s regime institutions 
help prevent clientelistic manipulation by eliminating the room for political discretion. 
The result has been a technocratic mode of social governance. 
 
 
NEWANTI-POVERTYAPPROACH:REFORMIMPULSES
Transitiontodemocracy
With  the  return  to  democracy  in  1990,  anti-poverty  policy  took  a  new  look  in  Chile.  
Shortly after taking office, the government of Patricio Aylwin created MIDEPLAN 
entrusted with designing policies aimed at overcoming poverty and coordinating social 
programs geared towards vulnerable groups in society (Law 18.989). Central to the 
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new anti-poverty policy strategy was the emphasis on social integration.88 The new 
government stance put emphasis on mitigating the exclusion of the poor and 
vulnerable through social participation and the promotion of local self-help efforts.  
This represented a significant shift from the military government’s approach of 
giving individual aid for basic needs. Progressive experts argued that providing social 
welfare to individual applicants, as the military government did, had contributed to 
stigmatizing the poor. Instead, the focus should be on promoting social investment - 
social and human capital – that would strengthen opportunities for social integration. 
The new anti-poverty approach sought to provide the poor with a voice and the means 
to participate in solving their own problems. It was argued that the poor do not 
represent a homogeneous group but face a variety of distinct situations and that the 
state needs to “respond with more flexible, decentralized, and participatory programs” 
(Raczynski, 2000: 132). The state would only set priorities and define programs that 
would then be implemented through decentralized bodies, municipalities, private 
entities and particularly NGOs and community organizations. Transferring program 
implementation to intermediary institutions such as NGOs, was seen as essential for 
incorporating the participation of the poor and helping to build new pluralist links to 
the popular sectors.  
The foundation for the new anti-poverty strategy had been laid during the 
deliberations over the Concertación’s program for the 1989 elections.89 Following the 
successful  plebiscite  in  1988  that  set  the  stage  for  the  transition  to  democracy,  the  
Concertación had gathered into a number of “policy commissions” that started 
elaborating on an electoral platform. Progressive elites, who after the military coup 
                                                             
88 For a detailed discussion of the Concertación’s early anti-poverty policy strategy, see Raczynski 
(1995b, 2000). 
89 See Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (1989). 
221 
 
had taken refuge in international agencies such as the IDB and various UN 
organizations as well as a variety of NGOs and research institutes, served as the base 
for these working groups (Loveman 1995). Referents explain how during the process a 
broad consensus emerged on the new anti-poverty strategy.90 Technical training and 
professional experience within the auspices of these NGOs and international agencies 
had helped to produce an ideological conversion to the new anti-poverty approach. 
Indeed, many of these experts were recruited by MIDEPLAN, which immediately in the 
aftermath of the transition to democracy started to implement the new anti-poverty 
policy (Loveman, 1995).    
 
Authoritarianlegacies,ideologicalconversion
The emphasis on pluralism and state-NGO collaboration represented a significant shift 
among the parties of the Concertación from their former reliance on centralized 
administration and corporatism. As we saw in Chapter 3, various factors account for 
this conversion. On a general level, an important factor was the ideological redefinition 
among progressive forces. The collapse of the Allende experiment and the trauma of 
military repression had fostered a process of self-critical reassessment and political 
learning that led to the abandoning of utopian projects and statist conceptions of 
socioeconomic development.91 “Parties from across the political spectrum expressed a 
commitment to addressing the needs of the poor, while affirming the importance of 
pluralism, political pragmatism, and autonomous social organizations” (Oxhorn, 1995: 
199). In specific relation to anti-poverty policy, referents interviewed for this study 
emphasize that at the end of military rule there was a general recognition among the 
                                                             
90 The work on the Concertación’s program was coordinated by Edgardo Boeninger (PDC) and Enrique 
Correa (SP) who also saw it as a process of identifying candidates for governmental posts (Boeninger 
1997). 
91 See, among others, Oxhorn (1995), Boeninger (1997), Roberts (1998). 
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parties of the Concertación of the need to continue with the decentralizing and 
targeting approach while reinforcing social participation and pluralism.   
Reinforcing this conversion to a pluralist anti-poverty policy approach was the 
professional experience of intellectuals and activists during the military era. As political 
party activity was banned and the activities of unions and community organizations 
were controlled or repressed by the military government, many progressives took 
refuge in research institutes and NGOs. By the mid-1980s a rich fabric of private 
research centers and NGOs had emerged to support grassroots efforts to cope with 
daily subsistence and for initiating civic programs in education, health care, housing 
and microproduction. These experiences provided progressives, who had previously 
looked  to  the  state  as  the  most  appropriate  agent  for  social  action,  with  a  learning  
process through which diversity, private action, and local initiative in social 
development came to be appreciated.92  
Additional impetus for the new anti-poverty approach was provided by aid donors, 
development specialists, and international financial institutions who recommended 
harnessing the creative potential of local and private initiative in anti-poverty projects. 
During the 1980s international agencies such as the IDB, the World Bank, and other UN 
or regional agencies had harbored Chilean professionals and political refugees. These 
organizations fostered a technocratic creed and helped to train experienced 
researchers and staff familiar with the pluralist policy paradigm (Loveman, 1995). By 
the  end  of  military  rule,  a  consensus  had  emerged  among  economists,  social  policy  
experts and the political class on the need to incorporate civil society organizations, 
                                                             
92 The literature on the importance of NGOs under military rule is vast. It includes Loveman (1995), 
Oxhorn (1995), Roberts (1998). See also Repetto (2001) who supports the argument that the experience 
provided a crucial impetus for the anti-poverty approach adopted by the Concertación. 
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particularly NGOs, in anti-poverty programs. In fact, fostering a consensus around the 
new anti-poverty approach had proved surprisingly easy during the process of 
elaborating the Concertación’s program. Across the policy commissions there was 
broad agreement that NGOs should be incorporated into policy implementation. This is 
clearly reflected in the Concertación’s program, which harbored an enhanced role for 
private and local initiative in anti-poverty policy as well as collaboration between 
public-sector entities, private development corporations and NGOs (Concertación de 
Partidos por la Democracia, 1989).  
However, the new approach adopted by the Concertación was not merely a 
voluntaristic reflection of political learning and ideological re-identification, but also “a 
rational adaptation to political opportunities and constraints as they were structured 
by an evolving external environment” (Roberts, 1998:44). As we saw in Chapter 3, the 
institutional constraints and social dislocations left behind by the military regime 
shaped the Concertación’s strategy in important ways, including its anti-poverty 
strategy. The labor movement which historically had formed the backbone of popular 
organizing strategies, especially on the Left, had been severely weakened. In order to 
cultivate support it was no longer feasible to build on corporatist networks as in the 
period before 1973. The locus of political activity had shifted to the base level. A 
myriad of autonomous social organizations had emerged in response to the repression 
of political parties and the labor movement under neoconservative authoritarianism as 
the urban poor attempted to recreate a public space for articulating their interests and 
identity (Oxhorn, 1995; Roberts, 1998).  
For the Concertación, this civil society activity presented an opportunity to 
reconnect with the popular sectors. Parts of the Left, in particular, viewed grassroots 
social organizations such as neighborhood organizations, Christian base communities 
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and women’s groups as an opportunity to re-launch a popular project and make 
inroads to a new potential social constituency “at a time when the political weight of 
organized labor had been diminished as a combination of political repression, 
economic crisis, and neoliberal reforms” (Roberts, 1998:24). For pragmatists having 
accepted the economic model and the irreversibility of the privatizations, the new anti-
poverty policy presented an opportunity to strengthen social governance. Anti-poverty 
programs and social investment funds administered through collaborative networks 
between state and society provided a means to integrate social organizations and 
cultivate political support. Economists, who were concerned with fiscal discipline, 
heralded collective self-help efforts as an alternative to direct state action (Boeninger, 
1997).  They  recognized  that  these  grassroots  groups  had  played  a  vital  role  in  
alleviating poverty during military rule. Sustaining these civic networks presented an 
opportunity to relieve the state from some of the burden of social action. As explained 
in Chapter 3, the institutional impediments bequeathed by the military regime 
constrained the Concertación’s political options. Concertación elites recognized that 
radical redistributive reform was not feasible and that the new democratic 
government would need to operate with limited budgetary resources (author 
interviews, 2006). This provided additional clout to arguments advocating outsourcing 
program implementation to social organizations.   
Crucially, as was discussed in Chapter 3, the new pluralist approach received 
backing from leading figures in the Aylwin government, who feared that poverty and 
inequality would prompt a wave of popular demands for immediate social benefits 
that would endanger economic and political stability. Within the PDC in particular 
there was preoccupation with the potential radicalization of the popular sectors as a 
result of their poverty. For prominent Christian Democrats the specter of social 
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mobilization constituted one of the primary threats to the consolidation of a 
democratic regime. The divisive practices that had led to the breakdown of democracy 
in 1973 needed to be avoided.93 Bearing in mind the tutelary role the military had 
reserved for itself during the negotiations over the transition to democracy, it was 
important to pre-empt populist appeals and social mobilization so as not to provoke 
the military and other conservative forces. The new anti-poverty policy was part of the 
strategy to control social demands and pressures. By reinforcing self-help efforts as an 
alternative to direct state action, the Aylwin government sought to moderate popular 
expectations. A crucial aim was to pre-empt popular pressures that could come to 
threaten macro-economic stability. Supporting private and local initiatives would serve 
to relieve the state from such pressures. By building new pluralist links to the popular 
sectors through associative welfare networks in which popular organizations played an 
active role in implementing social projects, the government sought to undercut the 
attractiveness of populist appeals.  
 
 
FROMRHETORICTOREALITY:IMPLEMENTINGREFORM
newinstitutionalframework
After taking office in March 1990, the Aylwin government took a series of measures to 
institute the new anti-poverty approach. One of its first initiatives was to convert the 
old National Planning Office (ODEPLAN) into a new ministry, the Ministry of Planning 
and Coordination (Law 18.989). MIDEPLAN was entrusted with designing policies 
aimed at overcoming poverty and coordinating social programs geared towards 
vulnerable groups in society - children, youth, women, the elderly, and the disabled 
                                                             
93 For a discussion of the breakdown of democracy, see Valenzuela (1978) and Oppenheim (1999). 
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and ethnic groups. A number of agencies dependent on MIDEPLAN was created for 
targeting the poor and vulnerable, such as the National Women’s Bureau (SERNAM) 
and the National Youth Institute (INJ). Later a special fund for financing projects 
benefiting the disabled (FONADIS) was also set up (Law 19.284), as well as the National 
Council for Indigenous Development (CONADIS) responsible for coordinating and 
implementing special projects benefiting indigenous peoples (Law 19.253). From the 
perspective of anti-poverty policy the most important agency was the Social 
Investment and Solidarity Fund (FOSIS) inaugurated together with MIDEPLAN.   
In line with the new anti-poverty policy strategy, these agencies were set up to 
operate as intermediaries – financing projects that originate at the local level, assisting 
in capacitating target groups in finding ways to solve their own problems, and 
incorporating social organizations into associative welfare networks for fighting 
poverty and social exclusion. Each of these agencies designs programs for its target 
group. Their design was influenced by international experience with multisectorial 
investment funds. Indeed, many of the experts that played a key role in setting up the 
new agencies had hands-on experience with the development of social investment 
funds in Bolivia and Guatemala during the 1980s (Graham, 1994).    
FOSIS and these other agencies do not execute projects themselves but rely on a 
network  of  NGOs  and  community  organizations  that  were  set  up  to  act  as  
intermediaries. The most important mechanism that has been used for outsourcing 
project implementation is competitive bidding.94 MIDEPLAN calls for bids in which 
NGOs, social organizations, the private sector, and sometimes municipalities submit 
project proposals that compete in terms of technical quality and cost-benefit ratio. At 
                                                             
94 For a discussion of the bidding mechanism, see Raczynski (1995b). 
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least in theory, the process allows for a participatory and decentralized approach in 
which anti-poverty projects are tailored to local needs. The central government only 
defines the terms of competition in which these public and private agents at the local 
level compete among themselves by presenting proposals that respond to the needs of 
the population. The process should improve efficiency as proposals undergo rigorous 
evaluation by specialists contracted or subcontracted by MIDEPLAN and funding is only 
granted to the most competitive projects.  
The bidding mechanism was formulated as part of the strategy to institute a 
pluralist policy model in contrast to the centralized, paternalistic and corporatist social 
policy model historically applied in Chile. According to referents interviewed for this 
study, an important impetus was the need to consolidate the myriad of autonomous 
social organizations, particularly NGOs, which had emerged during the military era. 
MIDEPLAN officials recognized that NGOs had played a vital role in alleviating poverty 
during the dictatorship. The aim was to help in sustaining this pluralism as well as 
fostering collaboration with civil society.  
One of the benefits of public-private collaboration was to relieve MIDEPLAN from 
some of the burden of social action, especially in a situation when it had to cope with a 
very limited budget. During its first year in operation, MIDEPLAN took over the austere 
budget of ODEPLAN that had been fixed by the military government. Since then, MOF 
has been reluctant to significantly raise MIDEPLAN’s budget. Guided by economic 
orthodoxy, officials at the MOF have argued that economic growth coupled with low 
inflation, not social programs, is the best remedy for poverty. Also, as a new ministry, 
MIDEPLAN has been weak in the intra-bureaucratic struggle over budget resources in 
comparison with the established service ministries (Repetto, 2001).      
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From the beginning, MIDEPLAN had a close relationship with NGOs. Professional 
staff from NGOs and research institutes were appointed to key positions in MIDEPLAN 
and to its dependent agencies such as FOSIS, as well as being called upon as 
consultants, part-time employees and informal advisors. Many of them also had years 
of experience in international agencies and had strong contacts to international 
support networks (Loveman, 1995). Most of them were economists and poverty 
specialists that had a common understanding of the anti-poverty policy strategy, not 
least since many of them had collaborated in formulating the new approach before 
taking office. They testify to having been well aware of the need for fiscal constraint. 
By increasing collaboration with international development agencies and focusing on 
facilitating associative networks, through which responsibilities for program 
implementation could be transferred to NGOs, MIDEPLAN could “do more with less”. 
Within MIDEPLAN the Agency for International Cooperation was set up to negotiate 
agreements with international donors and development agencies. These external 
resources proved instrumental for channeling investment into anti-poverty projects 
(author interviews, 2006).  
Hence, despite limited budgetary resources, MIDEPLAN assumed a central role in 
implementing the government’s new anti-poverty policy. It can be stated that the most 
important changes made by the Concertación to the social institutional framework 
were concentrated to this new ministry.95 MIDEPLAN also inherited important 
functions from its predecessor, ODEPLAN, with regard to evaluating social policies. 
Crucially, MIDEPLAN is in charge of the National Socio-Economic Characterization 
Survey (CASEN), a survey of households that provides information on the coverage of 
social programs and an in-depth study of the magnitude and characteristics of poverty 
                                                             
95 For a detailed discussion of these changes, see Molina (1996). 
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in Chile. MIDEPLAN is also responsible for the technical supervision of the social 
stratification measurement system or CAS card used for selecting beneficiaries of 
targeted subsidies (such as housing benefits and family allowances). In addition, 
MIDEPLAN plays an important role in evaluating social investment projects from all 
ministries and public agencies and in monitoring specific social programs for its pro-
poor impact (see Molina 1996).  
Nevertheless, despite MIDEPLAN’s leading role in anti-poverty policymaking, it 
bears emphasizing that MIDEPLAN failed to assume the role of a powerful social 
authority in charge of planning and coordinating social policies as a whole, as 
envisioned by parts of the Concertación. In the preparatory stages such a plan received 
important backing from President-elect Patricio Aylwin. Before taking office, he had 
asked  Sergio  Molina  to  prepare  an  initiative  on  how  to  convert  ODEPLAN  into  a  
powerful social ministry. Molina argued that in order to effectively fight poverty it was 
essential to plan and coordinate social spending between the different social 
ministries. His aim was to give MIDEPLAN, in addition to its targeting role, considerable 
authority to direct social spending and control for its pro-poor impact.  
By appointing Molina to take charge of MIDEPLAN, President Aylwin signaled the 
high priority his government reserved for the issue of instituting the new ministry. 
Molina was a highly respected Christian Democrat who had served as Finance Minister 
in the Frei government during the 1960s and who commanded considerable political 
clout. During the transition to democracy he had coordinated the campaign for the 
plebiscite in 1988 and played a leading role in the negotiations over the Concertación’s 
electoral platform. However, despite initial backing from President Aylwin and the high 
profile the governing alliance vested in MIDEPLAN, with some socialists in particular 
nurturing a vision of the new ministry acting as a counterweight to the MOF, 
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MIDEPLAN never gained the political weight necessary for taking a leading role in 
planning and coordinating social policies. The new ministry quickly came up against 
bureaucratic opposition from the traditional social ministries, who did not want to 
cede any control over policymaking or budgetary resources to MIDEPLAN – a struggle 
that continued under the governments of Frei and Lagos.  
MOF has been another source of opposition according to referents interviewed for 
this study. During the government of Aylwin, Finance Minister Alejandro Foxley was 
instrumental in undermining the authority of MIDEPLAN. Foxley argued that in order 
to preserve macroeconomic stability it was essential to protect the authority of the 
MOF over all budgetary matters. He and his aides were concerned over the specter of 
corporatist influence. Ceding any control over social spending to MIDEPLAN risked 
opening up a new target for demand-making, political pressure and rent-seeking that 
could come to jeopardize fiscal responsibility. He got important backing from Aylwin’s 
advisors at the Ministry General Secretariat of the Presidency who agreed on the 
importance of building a “wall of contagion” against populism and corporatist 
influence. Centralizing authority at the MOF was the best insurance against political 
and social pressures. Crucially, President Aylwin himself sided with his finance minister 
against Molina.  
The powerful role of the MOF was reinforced in the inter-ministerial committee 
that  was  set  up  to  coordinate  economic  and  social  policies.  The  committee  included  
the ministries responsible for social action as well as various public services with 
responsibilities in the social area. To the disappointment of Molina and MIDEPLAN, 
however, the chairmanship of the inter-ministerial committee was given to Finance 
Minister Foxley, to whom MIDEPLAN would function as a technical secretariat. Given 
Foxley’s  lack  of  time  and  interest  in  social  policies,  the  committee  only  came  to  
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function on an irregular basis “devoting its time to discussing a few specific problems 
rather than systematically analyzing and coordinating social policies” (Molina 
1996:160). On the whole, then, the issue of coordinating social programs remained 
unsolved under the Aylwin government. President Aylwin’s cabinet opted for shielding 
the power of the MOF and was not prepared to vest MIDEPLAN with sufficient power 
to  become  a  leading  social  authority  for  fear  of  corporatist  influence  over  social  
policymaking.96 Hence, having failed to institutionalize an integrated and coordinated 
approach to poverty alleviation, MIDEPLAN was left to fight poverty chiefly by its own 
means. 
 
Targetingthepoor
The most important social program to emerge from the new anti-poverty strategy was 
the Fund for Solidarity and Social Investment (FOSIS). FOSIS was established to channel 
targeted resources for productive development projects among the poorest strata. It 
does not directly implement projects, but operates as an intermediary agency 
providing financial resources and technical support to social investment projects that 
originate at the local level or incorporate the participation of the most deprived 
sectors in finding ways to solve their own problems. As such, FOSIS embodies the new 
pluralist approach introduced by the Aylwin administration that sought to replace the 
paternalistic welfare measures of the military regime.  
FOSIS was designed in 1989 by the technical teams responsible for anti-poverty 
measures in the preparation of the Concertación’s program. During the process of 
                                                             
96 Interestingly, parallels can be drawn to Argentina during the 1990s where coordination also suffered 
from bureaucratic infighting between MECON and SDS. As a new secretariat SDS came up against, on 
the one hand, the entrenched power of the established social ministries, and, on the other hand, and 
extremely powerful Ministry of Economy keen to protect its authority and its neoliberal agenda from 
any possible threats.   
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deliberation, several alternatives for organizing the anti-poverty effort were discussed 
(author interview, 2006). One proposition, mainly supported by economists, advocated 
a more centralized structure with subsidies targeted to the poorest groups. The 
proposition according to which FOSIS started operating, however, argued that it was 
not enough to increase targeted subsidies, but that to combat poverty required “a new 
way of doing things”. Its organization was inspired by international experience with 
social investment funds in the 1980s. The creators, such as Alvaro García and Nicolas 
Flaño, were technocrats with years of experience in international organizations or 
research institutes in Chile. In the words of Flaño, “el origen del FOSIS se vincula con lo 
que estaba pasando en América Latina a fines de la década de los 80, donde para 
enfrentar  la  crisis  de  esos  años  se  dio  inicio  a  este  tipo  de  fondos  como  una  
herramienta de emergencia, como instituciones que tendían a paliar los efectos de esa 
crisis” (Flaño 199?). In that, FOSIS is representative of the wider anti-poverty approach 
formulated by the Aylwin administration which was heavily influenced by the new 
pluralist conception of the state’s welfare role in Latin America at the end of the 
1980s.  
From the beginning, FOSIS has remained small in personnel and budget. By 1992, 
the organization had total personnel of 37 officials. This number remained more or less 
constant during the 1990s (Repetto, 2001:257). During its first four years in operation 
(the Aylwin era) its budgetary resources equaled $100 million, never exceeding 1 
percent of social public spending per year (Raczynski, 1995b: 217). MOF has been 
reluctant  to  commit  more  budgetary  resources  for  much  the  same  reasons  as  it  has  
not wanted to raise the budget of MIDEPLAN.  
Initially, the conservative opposition was worried that FOSIS would be used for 
setting up a clientelist network of loyal NGOs. Clearly, these worries were unfounded 
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as FOSIS has remained under strict technocratic control, a fact that will be discussed in 
more detail below. Nevertheless, given the strong role of conservative forces in Chile’s 
protected democracy, the government initially took great care to accommodate the 
interests of the opposition as well as to please international financial institutions. This 
led the government to protect the authority of the MOF who did not want FOSIS to 
become a drain on the treasury’s coffers. In addition, the sectoral ministries were not 
interested in giving up any turf to FOSIS. Despite limited financial resources, FOSIS 
quickly established a reputation for innovation and effectiveness in carrying out anti-
poverty projects. Administrative costs for the program did not exceed 7.5 percent of 
total costs during the initial stages (Schkolnik, 1995: 51). Towards the end of 1993, 
FOSIS  had  supported  more  than  5,200  projects  –  mostly  small  and  short-term  –  
selected from more than 12,000 project proposals of around 3,000 organizations 
(Raczynski, 1995b: 217). During these four years, these projects had in turn generated 
an additional $130 million from contributions by the beneficent organizations 
themselves, private foundations, and foreign donors (Ibid). 
FOSIS finances projects in three areas: microproductive enterprises, mainly in the 
informal urban sector and among small rural producers; social development, through 
technical training and empowerment of social organizations; and sectoral programs, 
through collaboration with sectoral ministries in targeting the poorest households 
(Raczynski and Romaguera, 1995:326). As mentioned before, FOSIS does not execute 
projects, but signs agreements with subcontractors and sponsors contests in which 
social organizations, NGOs, municipalities and private enterprises bid for project 
resources. Its sectoral programs (the third area), however, are formulated through 
negotiations between FOSIS and the specific sectoral ministries. The idea is that FOSIS 
would complement sectoral social policies, not substitute for them, in order to 
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effectively reach the very poor. Through its more flexible and demand-driven structure 
FOSIS could offer innovative solutions to social problems that the traditional sectoral 
ministries were incapable of because of their centralized structure and heavy 
bureaucracy. Such collaboration between FOSIS and sectoral ministries would create 
synergies and assure that  the socially  excluded would come to enjoy access to social  
programs. 
In practice, however, FOSIS had some difficulties in establishing a relationship with 
the sectoral ministries, and to some extent these problems of intra-sectorial 
coordination have continued well into the new millennium. This reflects the failure to 
institute a coordinating unit at inter-ministerial level, as discussed above. Bureaucratic 
opposition from the traditional ministries effectively undermined FOSIS efforts to 
carve a role for itself in complementing sectoral social policies. Given that MIDEPLAN 
had been denied an authoritative role in coordinating social policies, FOSIS was on the 
defensive in relation to sectoral social policies. Neither did the MOF come to its 
support, but opted instead to maintain its bilateral relationships with the sectoral 
ministries in order to preserve its authority and influence over social spending. From 
the  perspective  of  the  MOF,  as  well  as  the  Presidential  Office,  FOSIS  was  a  small  
program not worth causing dissent over that could open up new lines of division within 
the administration and possibly endanger the more general consensus on the 
government’s program of “growth with equity”. Hence, most of the projects supported 
by FOSIS during the Aylwin administration were in the first two areas: supporting 
microenterprises and social development in poor communities.  
 


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Technocraticgovernance
From the beginning, the administration of social programs such as FOSIS was in the 
hands of reform-minded experts. These technocrats had been recruited mostly from 
NGOs and research institutes as well as from international agencies. They shared a 
commitment to using technical criteria in administering and distributing anti-poverty 
resources. The structure of FOSIS is typical for demand-driven social investment funds, 
not only in Chile but in other countries as well. It is an autonomous entity set up within 
the planning ministry and led by an executive director directly appointed by the 
president of the republic and accountable to him/her. These social investment funds 
usually operate outside the traditional service ministries in order to avoid bureaucracy 
and corporatism (see Graham, 1994). Experience has shown, however, that there is a 
real danger of targeted social investment funds being captured by politicians for 
clientelist purposes and therefore thwarting the efficiency and equity goals that these 
funds are projected to further (Dresser, 1991, 1994; Penfold-Becerra, 2007; Piester, 
1997; Roberts, 1995). By most accounts, however, the targeting of social programs in 
Chile has been efficient and clientelism has not been a problem (Graham, 1994; 
Raczynski, 1995b; Repetto, 2001). According to referents interviewed for this study, 
partisan and political criteria have not entered into program operation. FOSIS has 
remained under firm technocratic control and its operations criteria technical rather 
than political.  
How did the reform-minded experts manage to shield FOSIS from political 
interference? In line with the argument made in Chapter 1, an important factor is the 
nature of Chile’s regime institutions that promote technocratic governance, so much 
so as to hamper some of the participatory objectives of the new anti-poverty policy. 
Chile’s centralist-unitary system of government in conjunction with the controls 
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embedded in its protected democracy leaves very little room for political discretion. In 
fact, unlike Argentina where politicians have almost routinely captured social funds, 
politicians in Chile have neither an incentive nor many opportunities to manipulate 
anti-poverty programs for private or partisan ends. A closer look at the functioning of 
FOSIS will illustrate what the explanation has to do with Chile’s regime institutions as 
they were instituted with the transition to democracy: 1) a centralized-unitary system 
of government; and 2) a protected type of democracy.     
As was explained in Chapter 2, local democracy in Chile is extremely 
underdeveloped. Chile’s centralized-unitary system of government does not provide 
much room for political maneuvering at the local level. To a large extent, municipal 
governments depend on the central government both financially and administratively 
(Nickson, 1995). The role of municipalities is more that of functioning as service 
agencies for central government policy than as autonomous political entities in their 
own right. This reflects Chile’s centralist political traditions that de-concentration 
during the military regime did not fundamentally alter (Valenzuela, 1977; Graham, 
1994; Raczynski and Serrano, 2001). During the military regime, municipal 
governments assumed some new functions in social policy. Before, local government 
had played no active role in the social sector as social programs were handled directly 
by the national ministries (Raczynski and Romaguera, 1995). Nevertheless, these new 
legal responsibilities were not intended to strengthen the political autonomy of 
municipal government vis-à-vis the central government. Instead, devolving 
responsibilities for managing education and health establishments, increasing the 
number of positions for professional and technical staff while reducing the number of 
service personnel, as well as applying the centrally defined poverty screening test (CAS 
card) were envisaged to “technify” local government, strengthening the technical 
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capabilities of municipalities for implementing centrally designed social policy 
(Castañeda, 1992). Indeed, decentralization was envisaged as a means to depoliticize 
state and society.  
When the Aylwin administration took office most mayors had been directly 
appointed by Pinochet and municipal elections were not held until 30 June, 1992. In 
1988 hundreds of mayors in some of the poorest communities had been appointed by 
the military regime in an attempt to control the transition to democracy at the local 
level (Graham, 1994). According to Graham (1994), this explains why FOSIS initially 
found it difficult to stimulate collaboration between community organizations and 
municipalities. In her view, FOSIS needed to bypass municipalities as relationships 
between mayors appointed by the military regime and community organizations were 
often antagonistic. However, even after the introduction of direct municipal elections, 
the role of municipal government in the formulation and implementation of FOSIS’ 
programs has been limited.97 This reflects the deep suspicion held at the apex of 
central government about the technical capabilities of municipalities to administer 
targeted social programs. FOSIS officials have been reluctant to cede responsibility for 
anti-poverty programs to municipalities, preferring instead to work directly through 
NGOs or by subcontracting technical personnel to administer collaboration with 
community organizations. This has prevented local “capture” of FOSIS, but at the same 
time, “associative networks” at the local level have rarely been formed or found to be 
performing well. In some cases there was even open antagonism between FOSIS, the 
municipalities and NGOs, particularly as mayors felt excluded from projects (author 
                                                             
97 For a discussion of the role of local government in anti-poverty programs, including FOSIS, see Concha 
et al. (2001). 
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interviews, 2006). Officials involved with other anti-poverty programs set up by the 
Concertación highlight similar issues.  
The central state also has the possibility of collaborating with the heads of regional 
government or the district governors, bypassing mayors that do not share its 
objectives concerning technical efficiency and social equity. In stark contrast to 
Argentina where social programs have been withheld from municipalities controlled by 
the opposition, no such partisan criteria were allowed to enter into the operation 
criteria of FOSIS. In fact, in those cases where FOSIS ended up excluding mayors from 
taking part in networks for administering FOSIS projects, they were mayors belonging 
to the governing alliance but who had refused to accept the operations criteria of 
FOSIS, or who had been found by the Comptroller General or the internal auditing 
mechanism not to comply with the rigid rules for managing projects (author 
interviews, 2006).    
A crucial factor is that FOSIS has not been subject to pressure from the central 
government to include political criteria in the way it manages its programs. Unlike 
Argentina, the Chilean president has no need to engage in “territorial politics”, fighting 
over local political turf or seeking the loyalty of provincial governors in order to get 
things done. In Chile, the heads of regional government are appointed by the 
president. Thus, he/she need not worry about commanding the loyalty of regional 
governments, and as a result there is no need for using social programs as bargaining 
chips in negotiations with the heads of regional government or doling them out to 
mayors in order for these to be able to build a political base independently from and 
against the regional caudillo (see Chapter 6 on Argentina). Indeed, the lack of real 
political clout of local government in conjunction with the binomial electoral system, 
which has had the effect of making elections highly uncompetitive, has made for a 
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system  that  is  immune  to  local  political  pressure  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  in  
Argentina. In Chile, poor people’s links to intermediary political institutions such as 
political parties, which could help articulate and formulate local demands more 
effectively, are very weak (Olavarría, 2003). 
The limited political role of local government is reflected in how FOSIS and other 
social programs work – technocratic governance characterizes the administration of 
these programs at all levels. Program design and management of funds have remained 
heavily centralized. A typical example is the Entre Todos program. Raczynski (1995b) 
explains  how  it  was  designed  in  1991  by  a  professional  team  within  FOSIS  that  had  
previously worked in the third sector with social development projects. “The team was 
relatively small, came from the private sector – principally NGOs – and initially was 
unfamiliar with public sector procedures” (Raczynski, 1995b: 248). The program built 
on the earlier experience of the professional team supported by policy studies and a 
detailed technical preparation within this subgroup of FOSIS. Raczynski (1995b: 248) 
concludes that “the program shows some success in the extension work but did not 
achieve links with the municipalities”. In general, collaboration in program design 
between FOSIS and municipalities has been extremely rare.  
The various programs set up by FOSIS have been formulated in a top-down 
manner by FOSIS officials, without much input from local government or lower 
administrative units. In this process, information systems and policy studies carried out 
by  poverty  specialists  contracted  by  FOSIS  or  MIDEPLAN  forms  an  integral  part.  An  
advisory board for FOSIS composed of professionals and academics in the field was 
also constituted in order to strengthen expert input in the process of designing 
programs. Its role has remained limited, however, functioning more as a deliberative 
forum for approving decisions already taken by FOSIS officials (author interview, 2006). 
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In any case, local government has had a very limited role in program design.98 
According  to  Raczynski  (2000:  139),  “programs  are  designed  by  the  central  
government, are top-down, and arrive at the local level in search of predefined 
beneficiaries. The local level is a mere recipient for programs”. 
The effect of Chile’s regime institutions on anti-poverty policy can further be seen 
in how the project competition mechanism works. Once a program has taken shape, 
FOSIS calls for bids in which social organizations, NGOs, the private sector and 
municipalities present project proposals that compete on the selection criteria that 
were formulated during the process of design. Project proposals are subjected to 
technical evaluations and selected on the basis of their quality. The criteria are highly 
technical having been formulated by FOSIS officials and poverty experts. Evaluation of 
proposals is carried out by FOSIS or subcontracted to private sector consultants.  
At first, the opposition feared that political criteria would come to steer the 
selection process. These worries quickly subsumed while even the opposition 
conceded that the process of selecting projects was done technically rigorously 
without political interference. After that, the main critique concerned the lack of 
decentralization that according to the opposition (and, indeed, many social policy 
specialists) has rendered it difficult to adjust programs to local needs. As local 
governments have no discretion in selecting projects or beneficiaries, the anti-poverty 
approach has remained inflexible and bureaucratic. That is the other side of the coin – 
rigid rules formulated by central level technocrats and rigorously monitored for 
adherence by a strong and fiercely independent CG as well as carefully designed 
internal control mechanisms. But while the opposition readily admits that mechanisms 
                                                             
98 For  a  discussion  of  the  role  of  local  government  in  social  programs  across  the  social  sectors,  see  
Raczynski and Serrano (2001). 
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of horizontal control, such as CG as well as Parliament, have been effective in curtailing 
corruption and preventing the discretionary use of anti-poverty funds, it maintains that 
vertical mechanisms at the local level for articulating particular needs and monitoring 
results are weak. This critique has been mounted most sharply by the conservative 
Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and should be understood against the backdrop 
that UDI, partly thanks to the favored position it came to enjoy amongst poor 
communities during the military regime, has remained strong at the municipal level 
and would, therefore, like to see more power over targeting social programs being 
transferred to the local level.  
Notwithstanding, the opposition’s critique about insufficient decentralization is 
shared by prominent social policy specialists (Raczynski and Serrano, 2001). In their 
view, the lack of decentralization has hampered community participation and the 
formation of associative welfare networks at the local level. Ultimately, this makes it 
difficult to respond to the various situations of poverty and social exclusion. Or as the 
analysis of eight social programs carried out by Concha et al. (2001: 187) affirms: “los 
programas son estandarizados, rígidos, definen soluciones homogéneas y muestran 
poca flexibilidad para responder a la diversidad de situaciones de pobreza”.  
The Concertación has not been deaf to this critique. Indeed, in the mid-90s, 
democracy at the regional level was somewhat strengthened by creating regional 
governments and transferring some functions of social policy to these.99 The regional 
level continues, however, to be led by a head of regional government who is appointed 
by the president. Also, the counselors who make up the Regional Council are indirectly 
elected through the municipal governments. The regional extension offices of the 
                                                             
99 For a discussion of the functions of regional government and how they have been strengthened, see 
Serrano (2001).     
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ministries and central state agencies (such as FOSIS) continue to play a dominant role 
in regional policymaking. For instance, MIDEPLAN has a technical secretariat, the 
SERPLAC that is in charge of coordinating its policies and programs at the regional and 
local levels. As some responsibilities for the selection of project proposals were 
devolved to the regional level, SERPLAC was put in charge of the technical evaluation, 
guaranteeing that the projects selected apply with the technical standards formulated 
by MIDEPLAN (or some of its dependent agencies such as FOSIS). In fact, in 1998 it was 
proposed that SERPLAC would cease to be part of MIDEPLAN and instead become 
dependent on the regional government. However, the initiative was blocked by the CG 
who was worried about potential politicization of SERPLAC. It demonstrated the strong 
authority the CG commands in enforcing horizontal accountability in Chile. The 
downside has been a technocratization of social policy. 
In sum, at no stage in the process do politicians have much opportunity to use 
these project funds for patronage, as funds are either distributed directly from FOSIS 
to NGOs or the private sector, or are devolved through the technical secretariats at the 
local government level where SERPLAC is in charge of coordinating project execution. 
The centralized-unitary system of government ensures that sub-national actors do not 
have much leverage over the process, let alone means to capture these funds. 
Topocrats are extremely weak. Strong institutions of horizontal accountability guard 
against any misconduct in distributing these funds. The scrutiny provided by the CG 
helps deter politicians from using funds for personal or partisan interests. In addition, 
the Chilean legislature also performs an important role in preventing misuse. As was 
shown in Chapter 2, the strong congressional powers of the conservative opposition 
embedded in Chile’s protected democracy enhance transparency and oversight of 
social programs, and help set limits on political discretion. At the same time, the 
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technocratic bent in administering funds has hampered some of the participatory goals 
of the pluralist anti-poverty approach. The rigid rules for allocating funds and the firm 
technocratic control of program execution does not encourage flexibility and local 
innovation in dealing with situations of vulnerability that may vary greatly across 
different localities. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that because of the highly 
technical requirements for participation, those most in need of assistance but who lack 
the capabilities for taking advantage of the participatory opportunities provided by the 
system of contract-based funding, remained excluded (author interviews, 2006). 
Indeed, while poverty was reduced substantially during this period, inequality did not 
decline and the number of “indigents”, i.e. people living in situations of extreme 
vulnerability, remained high.  


FROMFREITOLAGOS:REFORMINGTHEREFORM
TheNationalPlantoOvercomePoverty
The limits of the anti-poverty approach implemented by the Aylwin government were 
clearly recognized by the incoming Frei government. From the beginning, Frei declared 
that his administration would put poverty eradication on top of its agenda.100 The new 
government announced a National Plan to Overcome Poverty that attempted to 
reform the administration of social programs by better coordinating the targeting of 
anti-poverty assistance.101 “For the first time, an official inventory of sectoral 
programs, infrastructure programs, and productive programs targeted at the poor was 
taken” (Raczynski, 2000:135). 
                                                             
100 See, for instance, his first message to the nation in May 1994 (Frei Ruiz-Tagle 1994). 
101 For a more detailed discussion of this plan, see Repetto (2001). 
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The  goal  of  the  National  Plan  was  to  rapidly  advance  in  relieving  the  number  of  
poor and eradicate extreme poverty by 2000. The plan revolved around four main 
orientation criteria: 1) investing in people; 2) generating community participation; 3) 
inter and intra-sectorial coordination; and 4) decentralization (Repetto 2001). To 
implement the National Plan as well as to coordinate social policies more effectively, 
President Frei inaugurated the Inter-ministerial Social Committee (CIS) that was 
constituted by twelve cabinet ministers as well as by a number of executive directors 
and heads of secretariats in connection with the social area who were invited as 
permanent participants. The priority given to the topic is illustrated by Frei’s decision 
to chair the CIS himself. MIDEPLAN was again made responsible for the technical 
coordination of the committee’s work. In addition, Frei set up a citizen’s council, the 
National  Council  to  Overcome  Poverty,  to  serve  as  a  societal  counterpart  to  the  CIS.  
The National Council was composed of individuals representing a cross-section of civil 
society actors, including religious leaders, academics, persons associated with labor 
unions and employer’s associations, NGOs, grassroots organizations and the private 
sector, as well as the media and former politicians. The purpose of the National 
Council was to advise the CIS on the implementation of the National Plan, as well as to 
facilitate  the  incorporation  of  societal  actors  in  the  process.  Hence,  the  Frei  
administration clearly recognized the need for an integrated, coordinated approach to 
poverty alleviation in order to be able to eradicate extreme poverty. 
Furthermore, the regional authorities were also instructed to create social 
committees that under the leadership of the heads of regional government and 
coordinated by the SERPLACs would start to elaborate and execute Regional Plans to 
Overcome Poverty in concordance with the National Plan. The initiative was to further 
decentralization and institute a flexible approach to poverty alleviation that better 
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adjusted  to  local  needs.  On  the  basis  of  a  Territorial  Map  of  Poverty  prepared  by  
professionals at MIDEPLAN, 71 municipal districts were also selected for special 
attention on the basis of their high poverty ratios. For these districts a Special Program 
for Municipalities was designed. Each of these municipalities would be given additional 
resources and asked to coordinate a Municipal Program for Overcoming Poverty under 
the direction of the head of regional government, who would also be responsible for 
monitoring results and delegating various aspects of coordination to the governors, 
who in their turn would be assisted by technical secretariats as well gubernatorial 
councils representing civil society actors. As such, the organizational structure for 
coordinating the National Plan was being replicated at the regional and gubernatorial 
levels.  
This decentralized effort had some limited success, but implementation proved 
extremely difficult. A major problem was again the structure of the Chilean regime that 
makes the local level dependant on the central agencies. Local governments do not 
have many resources for social policy of their own, and depend in the last instance on 
decisions taken by the sectoral ministries that make implementation slow and difficult 
to coordinate at the local level. Interestingly, mayors were also largely left out of from 
program implementation, reflecting the distrust for municipal government and the 
centralist legacies of the Chilean state (author interviews, 2006).  
Unfortunately, the central level also failed to institute the integrated and 
coordinated approach envisaged by the National Plan to Overcome Poverty, which 
added to the difficulties at the local level. Again, the coordination effort was made 
difficult because of the entrenched sectoral interests that resisted any “interference” 
with their policy domains. Referents emphasize how the traditional social ministries 
(education, health, and housing) preferred to implement their own policies and 
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programs. Already the failed effort to coordinate social policies during the Aylwin 
administration had demonstrated MIDEPLAN’s lack of authority in enforcing the 
traditional social ministries to comply with an integrated anti-poverty approach. The 
renewed effort by Luis Maira, who had been appointed Planning Minister by Frei upon 
taking office, also failed in this respect. In a key position was the powerful Minister of 
Finance to whom protecting the insulation of socioeconomic decision making from 
what he perceived as corporatist interests and populism was a central issue. In 
particular,  the  views  of  the  MOF  clashed  with  those  of  the  National  Council  to  
Overcome Poverty.    
The  Council  had  been  set  up  to  integrate  civil  society  in  the  process  of  
implementing the National Plan.102 As  already  noted,  the  Council  was  composed  of  
representatives of different societal sectors and political currents. The Council was 
assisted by a technical  committee that  was made up of  22 experts  and specialists,  as  
well as an Executive Secretariat integrated by a small number of professionals. In the 
view  of  the  Executive  Secretary,  the  role  of  the  Council  was:  a)“be  the  voice  of  the  
poor”; b) “do concrete things”; and c) “to interpellate the state and the government” 
(quoted in Repetto, 2001: 282). According to Repetto (2001), in practice, the Council 
was looking to institute a space for deliberation and initiating proposals for how to 
overcome extreme poverty, as well as collaborating with the authorities in the 
execution of the National Plan in order to add civil society initiatives into the process. 
In its report, published in August 1996, the council set forth a number of 
recommendations for how to deal with the structural problems of poverty (Consejo 
Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza, 1996).  
                                                             
102 Repetto (2001) draws attention to the paradox in the way civil society participation is incorporated – 
as a result of a top-down initiative by the government itself.   
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The recommendations made by the Council’s report were not viewed favorably by 
the Frei administration, especially not by the MOF. The report stressed that the fight 
against poverty cannot be separated from the broader issues of social equity, such as 
redistribution of income, the level of social spending, and the promotion of equal 
opportunities via education, health care and employment. The document also 
emphasized developing an enhanced role for civil society, where community 
organizations would have a more participatory role in the formulation of anti-poverty 
programs, rather than being passive recipients of programs formulated by central-level 
governmental agencies. Crucially, the report recommended establishing a ”social 
authority” within the government to coordinate social programs (Consejo Nacional 
para la Superación de la Pobreza, 1996). These recommendations were vigorously 
opposed  by  the  MoF  as  well  as  by  some  of  Frei’s  advisors  who  perceived  them  as  a  
threat against the technocratic and consensual style of governmental policymaking. As 
a result, the proposals were largely ignored and the Council ceased to meet. Instead, it 
was transformed into a foundation (the National Foundation to Overcome Poverty) 
with responsibility to oversee some lesser anti-poverty programs.    
Little by little, the issue of instituting an integrated and coordinated effort to 
combat extreme poverty lost political momentum. An internal document prepared by 
MIDEPLAN and signed by Planning Minister Luis Maira was leaked to the press in the 
beginning of 1996 (referred to in Repetto, 2001). The document signaled MIDEPLAN’s 
frustration over the poor state of coordination among the social sectors, the 
inexistence of governmental proposals and new instruments for protecting children 
and for eradicating poverty among the rural population, as well as the lack of a unified 
official discourse concerning the government’s social objectives. As the diagnostic 
became public, it gave rise to a heated political debate that revealed the internal 
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cracks within the governing coalition, particularly between Planning Minister Maira, 
who was backed by progressive elements within his Socialist Party, and some elements 
of the PDC that were critical of Maira and MIDEPLAN (Repetto, 2001). 
The conservative opposition added political heat to the debate. The opposition 
vigorously criticized the government for the failure to coordinate social policy, 
centralism in assigning social funds that was illustrated by the lack of municipal and 
communal participation, excessive bureaucratization that translated into elevated 
administrative costs and the failure to target enough social resources towards the 
poorest sectors of the population. Bearing in mind the strong political power wielded 
by the conservative opposition, especially in the Senate, Frei came under intense 
pressure to reorganize the social agenda. The emphasis on equity and the eradication 
of poverty through social programs was downscaled in favor of an agenda that 
stressed facilitating economic growth and equality of opportunities, principally through 
educational reform. Perhaps tired of the bureaucratic infighting or the outdrawn 
deliberations, Frei ceased in 1996 to preside the CIS, which was converted into the 
Committee of Social Ministers presided by MIDEPLAN. In practice, the new Committee 
was composed of officials of lesser rank. Departing from the original idea of 
coordinating social programs, it merely became a forum for the change of information 
instead (Molina, 2003). In the process, the role of MIDEPLAN was further weakened 
and Maira was replaced as planning minister by the more pragmatic Roberto Pizzarro 
who concentrated on the targeting effort in detriment of the more ambitious goal of 
intra-sectorial coordination.  
In  sum,  the  National  Plan  to  Overcome  Poverty  had  largely  failed.  Despite  some  
successes with furthering decentralization and redirecting resources towards the very 
poor, the coordination effort had been unsuccessful. Indeed, towards the end of his 
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mandate,  Frei  completely  lost  interest  in  the  issue  to  the  point  when  he,  in  1998,  
announced his intention to close down MIDEPLAN altogether. At this point, Pizzarro 
made way for German Quintana (PDC) who was brought in to execute the closedown. 
Nevertheless, with elections coming up in 2000, forces from within the governing 
alliance were able to convince Frei not to carry it through (author interview, 2006). 
MIDEPLAN was saved but its authority was restricted to administrate its own social 
programs, such as FOSIS. Again, the structural and institutional constraints imposed by 
Chile’s regime had served to strengthen the MOF in particular, to the detriment of a 
more inclusive and integrated anti-poverty approach.   

The“ChileSolidario”System
A renewed effort to reinvigorate the poverty agenda was made when the 
administration of Ricardo Lagos took office in 2000. The new administration wanted to 
focus more effectively on the issue of extreme poverty. Although the CASEN survey 
showed that rates of poverty had been falling throughout the 1990s, the numbers 
revealed  a  slowing  down  of  poverty  reduction  towards  the  end  of  the  1990s.  In  
particular, the number of extremely poor had remained more or less constant from 
1996 onwards. An investigation by MIDEPLAN also revealed how this group of indigent 
households actually received lower levels of social subsidies than non-indigent poor 
households (quoted in Palma and Urzúa, 2005). In other words, the targeting of social 
assistance was somewhat misdirected and required urgent reform.  
On the basis of this information, in 2000 the Social Division of MIDEPLAN started 
elaborating on an integrated strategy targeting families in extreme poverty. The 
strategy had three main objectives: 1) “to offer services rather than await the demand 
for them”; 2) “to work in networks”; and 3) “to focus on the family as the focal unit” 
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(Palma and Urzúa, 2005: 17). These objectives marked a change from the previous 
targeting approach that had relied on community participation through the bidding 
mechanism and intermediaries such as NGOs. FOSIS, for instance, provided funding 
and resources on the basis of competitive bidding for projects that were managed by 
social  organizations.  In  this  model,  the poorest  are at  a  disadvantage as they are the 
ones  that  are  often  least  able  to  articulate  demands,  design  projects  and  access  
funding. Those who are most urgently in need of assistance are those who have most 
difficulties in accessing assistance in such as competitive model. Instead, the new 
strategy was designed to search out these indigent families and assign them 
personalized help on the basis of their particular needs to allow them to recover their 
own capacity to resolve their situation.   
The first step was a pilot project, the Bridge Program (Programa Puente), designed 
in  2001  by  officials  at  FOSIS.  The  Bridge  Program  was  designed  to  offer  psychosocial  
support to families living in extreme poverty. In the beginning, the National Budget 
Office at the MOF was critical of the program, and managed to block the initial plan to 
implement the program nationwide (Palma and Urzúa, 2005). Finally, it agreed to 
finance a one-year pilot program that was first to be implemented in four regions, 
after which the results would be evaluated and the program extended. These four 
regions were selected by FOSIS in order to test its function in regions of different size 
and level of infrastructure (author interview, 2006). The program operates according 
to the assumption that people in extreme poverty who are cut off from existing social 
networks need help with developing a set of social skills in order to take advantage of 
these public and private networks. 
At the same time with the development of the Bridge Program, the National 
Budget Office in consultation with the World Bank was formulating a system of social 
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protection for  the very poor.  “Its  aim was to coordinate better  the sectoral  and area 
aid, to apply homogeneous criteria on focalization and selection of beneficiaries so as 
to avoid duplicating work, and in general to make the best possible use of the public 
resources  destined  to  this  sector”  (Palma  and  Urzúa,  2005:  19).  In  April  2002  the  
Presidential Office organized a debate that included ministers, government agencies, 
the President and his advisors, as well as a whole range of experts and research 
institutes. It was agreed that the question of extreme poverty needed a new plan, but 
opinions clashed over how to go about it. In particular, there was disagreement 
between the MOF and its Budget Office who favored income subsidies through a 
voucher system, and MIDEPLAN who favored capacitating programs, such as the 
Bridge Program (Ibid). Nevertheless, with some encouragement from President Lagos, 
a team was formed with technical staff from MIDEPLAN, FOSIS and the Budget Office 
who together managed to design what was to become “the Chile Solidario System” 
that includes elements of both a direct aid approach as well as giving weight to psycho-
social skills development.  
Chile Solidario is defined as a “system of social protection for families in extreme 
poverty, that combines aid and skills development in an integrated approach” 
(MIDEPLAN quoted in Palma and Urzúa, 2005). Families are chosen on the basis of the 
CAS-2 card, a sophisticated tool for measuring social stratification. Those selected are 
invited to take part by accepting to sign an agreement to work with the program to 
improve their situation through the range of support services on offer by the local 
social network. The system guarantees preferential access to social programs as well 
as standard family allowances. In addition, a bonus is given to the female head of 
households provided that the family meets the contract they signed. The amount of 
this bonus decreases over a period of 24 months in the program. An important 
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element of the system is the psychosocial support provided through FOSIS’s Bridge 
Program. Through this program every family that has agreed to be included in the 
system is assigned a social worker, called “family support”, that during a 24 month 
period makes regular visits to the family in order to stimulate social skills development, 
monitor progress and establish a link between the families and local social networks. 
The family support staff is usually drawn from local public agencies. The Bridge 
Program operates with the municipality’s consent, so that FOSIS signs an agreement 
with the municipal government giving it responsibility for coordinating the family 
action unit of professional staff who provide the family support function. If necessary, 
FOSIS may also assign family support staff. In that case, these are ”recruited through 
competitive public tender within the municipality, and hired by mutual agreement 
between the coordinator of the family action unit and the FOSIS representative for the 
programme” (Palma and Urzúa, 2005: 22).  
According to Palma and Urzúa (2005), the process of formulating the Chile 
Solidario program was helped by the fact that in spite of the disagreements over the 
best way to organize the poverty alleviation effort these two groups of actors shared a 
common technocratic understanding of poverty as a multidimensional issue.103 Most 
members of the team were skilled professionals with a background in policy studies 
and had held technical posts in public agencies or worked in consultancies, research 
institutes or NGOs. Bringing the different actors closer was also helped by a workshop 
held by a well-known NGO, Asesorías para el Desarrollo,  to debate the issue of social 
protection for the extreme poor. As a result, the team managed to develop a common 
theoretical-ideological understanding that formed the basis for the team’s work of 
formulating the Chile Solidario System that was presented by Lagos in his State of the 
                                                             
103 For a discussion of the process of initiating CS, see also Teichman (2008; 2009). 
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Nation address to Congress in May 2002 (Lagos, 2002). All in all, the formulation stage 
of Chile Solidario is well in line with the framework developed in Chapter 1. 
Transformations in the socioeconomic structure contributed to highlight the problem 
of extreme poverty to which the Lagos administration felt necessary to respond in 
order to preserve its social credentials. The specific measures the government took to 
address this issue were designed by policy experts with support from the World Bank. 
From their deliberations emerged the Chile Solidario system that rapidly went into 
operation given the high priority the president had set on the issue.     
The role of Chile’s regime institutions can be seen in the process of implementing 
Chile Solidario. A crucial hindrance to its implementation that the Lagos administration 
needed to deal with was the conservative opposition. The Right was worried that the 
program would be used in a clientelistic manner instead of effectively helping in 
eradicating poverty. But as was shown in the case of FOSIS, Chile’s strong institutions 
for enforcing horizontal accountability helps keep the executive in check and, thus, 
prevents it from using social programs for clientelist ends. Through its strong position 
in the legislature, especially in the Senate where the conservatives still retained a 
majority, the opposition was a constant worry for the Lagos government (author 
interview, 2006). It was partly for this reason that the administration took great care in 
designing sophisticated auditory procedures and mechanisms for monitoring results as 
part of the legal project for setting up the Chile Solidario System that was presented to 
the legislature and passed as Law 19.947 in 2004. 
Another crucial element has again been the strong control exercised by the Office 
of the Comptroller General (CG). Informants emphasize how the CG provides a 
powerful mechanism of deterrence with regard to any misuse of program resources. 
Indeed, the deterrent is literal as the CG keeps a permanent office in MIDEPLAN and 
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has offices in all regions of the country. This also helps the opposition to keep a check 
on executive power as it can file petitions that the CG is obliged to investigate. 
MIDEPLAN  as  well  as  its  regional  offices  are  under  constant  control  by  the  CG  and  
officials at MIDEPLAN and FOSIS are regularly asked to provide information on the 
administration of Chile Solidario (author interviews, 2006).  
The critics readily admit that Chile Solidario has not been captured for clientelism, 
but still criticize the system for not having enough mechanisms for monitoring results 
or, even better, enforcing accountability on the basis of performance. They stress that 
the control upheld by the CG is only of a legalistic nature, to prevent the legal misuse 
of program resources. A more fundamental problem, according to these critics, is that 
the centralized nature of program administration does not permit “social 
accountability”, or in other words, allow the citizens and their organizations to monitor 
the performance (author interviews, 2006). Also, as it became obvious that Chile 
Solidario is not used for maintaining clientelist networks, the opposition started to 
direct the bulk of its criticism at the lack of decentralization and local third sector 
participation in the system. MIDEPLAN, and particularly FOSIS as the agency in charge 
of the Bridge Program, retains the control in administering the Chile Solidario System. 
Again, officials at the central level have been reluctant to devolve more responsibilities 
to the local level for fear that municipal governments lack resources to administer the 
program as well as sufficient institutions for evaluation and control (author interview, 
2006). This reluctance is made possible by the centralized-unitarian structure of the 
Chilean political regime. 
Hence, program administration has remained in the hands of the techno-
bureaucracy at MIDEPLAN. As a consequence, according to MIDEPLAN sources, three 
mayors refused initially to take part in Chile Solidario as they were not allowed to 
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directly manage any resources. Indeed, the structure does not allow mayors any 
discretion, or as an official at MIDEPLAN put it: “los espacios de discrecionalidad son 
super-pocos,  no  hay  espacio  para  cambiar  las  metas”  (author  interview,  2006).  
Mayors, or local governments in general, depend on the central level and if they refuse 
to play by the rules set by these central agencies, they can simply be bypassed. 
MIDEPLAN has assigned at least one professional in each region to coordinate and 
monitor the execution of the Chile Solidario system. FOSIS is responsible for executing 
the Bridge Program at all levels, although at municipal level the family action unit is set 
up by agreement between FOSIS and the respective municipality. A central complaint 
by the municipal authorities has further been that they are not allowed to manage the 
database of beneficiaries. Instead, reports must be requested from the central level. 
Overall, Palma and Urzúa (2005: 34) maintain that “the process of designing and 
executing Chile Solidario has thrown up inter- and intra-sector tensions, and strains 
between central government (the Planning Ministry in this case), and local government 
(municipalities). These have their origin partly in the cultural differences between 
organizations but also in power struggles among agencies and among individuals – turf 
fights, disputes over resources, personal leadership battles, attempts by local 
governments to use the program for political ends, or, on the contrary, opposition to 
what some see as interference that limits the municipality’s own activities”.  
Hence the program brings to the municipal level a highly individualized and 
technocratic  approach  to  deal  with  extreme  poverty  that  leaves  very  little  space  for  
political maneuvering at the local level. This has contributed to prevent clientelism, but 
at the same time, an important consequence of the approach has been the lack of 
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community participation.104 At  the  community  level,  the  program  is  implemented  by  
social workers drawn from public agencies. Community organizations are not actively 
involved in the workings of the Chile Solidario. As a result of the technocratic trajectory 
through which the Chile Solidario was set up, its design did not include community and 
associative issues in its work. Its focus is on the family without attempting to create 
links with others in similar situations. Critics maintain that CS could achieve its 
objectives more successfully by opening out beyond “intra-family relations to 
encourage greater associativity and participation in the community” (Palma and Urzúa, 
2005).  
  
 
CONCLUSIONS
Democratization in Chile ushered in a new anti-poverty approach. It formed part of the 
broader shift to a pluralist social policy approach that the Concertación undertook 
during the 1990s. The new approach did not constitute a fundamental reversal of the 
military regime’s principles of privatization, decentralization, and targeting, but it did 
incorporate a strong emphasis on participation and civil society incorporation in anti-
poverty policymaking. 
Under the Concertación, state-civil society collaboration in anti-poverty 
policymaking has increased, although the control wielded by technocratic reformers 
who have actively tried to discard the old corporatist approach means that labor 
unions have largely been excluded from such collaboration. Instead, the role of NGOs 
has been strengthened, particularly in the process of implementing anti-poverty 
programs.  At  the  same  time,  by  inviting  NGOs  to  compete  for  anti-poverty  funds  on  
                                                             
104 This point is also taken up by Sandbrooke et al. (2007) and Teichman (2008; 2009).   
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the highly technical terms defined by MIDEPLAN technocrats, NGOs are provided with 
strong incentives to downplay some of their earlier political functions as advocacy 
groups  for  subaltern  sectors  and  reduce  their  demands  on  the  state.  As  Foweraker  
(2001) shows, the specifically political activity of NGOs in Chile has declined and the 
consequence has been less grassroots mobilization. NGOs act as “transmission belts” 
for government social policy and have lost “their edge as defenders of the excluded 
and impoverished” (Foweraker, 2001: 861).  
In the same vein, social movements and grassroots organizations have undergone 
a process of depoliticization. The highly centralized and technocratic nature of anti-
poverty policymaking does not leave much room to articulate grassroots pressure on 
decision-making.105 As opportunities to challenge decision-making are few, citizens 
have few incentives for collective action. At the local level, as political considerations 
are no longer a feature of the social service delivery system, incentives for political 
mobilization have weakened. Before 1973, political activity on the part of subaltern 
sectors was required in order acquire social services and goods through the system of 
political spoils in which mayors organized chains of favors and political loyalties linking 
politicians at the national level with local constituents. As has been shown in this 
chapter, Chile’s new regime institutions effectively prevent such clientelist 
machinations. Instead, the technocratic nature of the new anti-poverty approach 
ensures that access to community development funds “becomes associated with 
maintaining a safe distance from the machinations of politics, where the rewards of 
participation are less certain” (Greaves, 2004: 223). The highly technical terms on 
which access to funds are based means that political organization is devoid of tangible 
meaning. Indeed, studies of community activism show dirigentes deliberately avoiding 
                                                             
105 For a similar view, see Teichman (2009). 
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politics (Pont-Lezica, 1997; Greaves, 2004). Leaders of community organizations are 
more in need of developing technical expertise than relations with politicians. 
“Therefore, neighbourhood leaders who before 1973 were political brokers between 
the constituents and the politicians, have now become technocrats with enough skills 
to discuss technical aspects of projects and of their execution with their fellow 
neighbours, authorities and professionals” (Pont-Lezica, 1997: 214). Greaves (2004: 
225-226) argues that the focal point of active citizenship in post-authoritarian Chile has 
become centered around activities associated with pursuing community development 
projects:  “going  to  the  ‘muni’  to  seek  projects  out,  writing  out  project  proposals,  
competing for projects, and working with NGOs that administer projects”.  
The impression becomes one of community groups incorporated into funding 
relationships with state agencies such as FOSIS through which the techno-bureaucracy 
in charge is able to set the terms for participation and control social-demand making. 
Popular participation is contained within the conceptual space envisioned by the 
techno-bureaucracy, stunting the transformative potential of truly participatory 
governance. Popular empowerment is further hampered because those most in need 
of assistance, but who lack the capabilities of taking advantage of participatory 
opportunities, remain excluded. What is worse, pluralistic competition between civil 
society  groups  for  access  to  project  funding  often  lead  to  atomization  and  
fragmentation of social organization. Indeed, tentative evidence suggests that the 
system of contract-based funding has helped institutionalize competitive relationships 
between subaltern sectors as community leaders and their organizations compete for 
the scarce resources offered by anti-poverty agencies (e.g. Raczynski, 2000). These 
competitive relationships work against social capital formation as some neighborhoods 
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may become included into anti-poverty programs, while other similar and adjacent 
neighborhoods are left out.  
To summarize, while the new anti-poverty approach has provided for pluralistic 
access to social benefits in Chile, scarce resources and technocratic control over the 
distribution of benefits has served to de-politicize anti-poverty policymaking making it 
difficult for subaltern sectors to demand encompassing social change. 
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CHAPTERSIX
 
ANTI-POVERTYPOLICYBETWEENCRISESIN
ARGENTINA106
 
In Argentina, pluralist anti-poverty policy gradually began to take shape under the first 
Menem administration. For Menem pluralist anti-poverty policy provided a means to 
manage the “new social question” while enacting radical economic reform. In this, the 
interests of Menem and technocratic reformers coincided. For technocrats it provided 
an opportunity to shift the emphasis in social policy towards more participatory 
practices in accordance with the new policy ideas promoted by international actors 
such as the World Bank and the IDB. With extensive links to international policy 
networks, these technocratic reformers were well-placed to tap international aid 
resources. Many of them also had worked in community projects and enjoyed great 
legitimacy at grassroots level, facilitating the building of networks with autonomous 
grassroots groups. Hence, through these reformers Menem would not only be able to 
bypass corporatist interests and tap international aid resources but also reinforce 
direct ties with the popular sectors. 
 Technocratic reformers were thus given vast authority to design new social 
programs. But, as this chapter shows, most of these programs ended up being 
captured by topocrats in their attempts to sustain clientelist networks. Also, from the 
perspective of technocratic reformers, the situation got worse towards the end of the 
                                                             
106 The research for this chapter was mainly conducted in Argentina during 2004, 2005 and 2006. The 
bulk of the data comes from 31 in-depth interviews with experts, government officials, policy 
consultants and civil society activists. For a list of these interviews, see appendix 1. In addition, the 
analysis draws from a number of less formal discussions with activists and experts in Argentina as well 
as from a review of two major newspapers (Clarín and La Nación). 
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1990s as Menem came under increasing political and social pressures and decided to 
follow a more direct populist strategy. 
Hence,  in  direct  contrast  to  Chile,  the  outcome  of  anti-poverty  reform  was  a  
populist mode of social governance in which targeted programs designed by 
technocrats ended up being captured for clientelist purposes. Unlike in Chile, social 
technocrats found regime institutions stacked against them as Argentina’s delegative 
democracy and decentralized-federal system of government provided politicians at all 
levels with wide discretion to manipulate social funds. This populist mode of social 
governance was important for sustaining economic reform during the 1990s by helping 
defuse popular protest and buy political support for the ruling party. Arguably, it also 
left several problematic legacies that undermined long-term governability and helped 
sow the seeds of the 2001 crisis.  
The chapter is organized in three sections. The first section analyzes the factors 
that led to the adoption of pluralist anti-poverty policy. It shows how the variables 
presented in Chapter 1 help explain pluralist anti-poverty reform. The second section 
looks at the most important programs and measures implemented within the confines 
of anti-poverty policy. It demonstrates how technocratic reformers came to play a key 
role in the design of anti-poverty policy, but also how they often struggled to control 
the process of implementation. The third section shows how a struggle between 
técnicos and políticos erupted as a result of the enormous growth of social programs 
and how, eventually, anti-poverty policy was turned into a means for populist 
governance.   



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THENEWPOVERTYAGENDA:PLURALISTREFORM
As we saw in Chapter 4, the major structural and ideological transformations that 
accompanied the hyperinflationary crisis form a critical backdrop in understanding the 
adoption of pluralist social policies in Argentina, including a new emphasis on poverty 
alleviation. During the 1980s, Argentina had suffered a 20 percent drop in per capita 
GDP. In 1989 and 1990, annual inflation was in four digits, and in the former year 47 
percent of the population was estimated to be living below the poverty line. Amidst 
this crisis, Argentina embarked on a radical course of economic reform that helped 
restore economic growth and stability. Indeed, between 1990 and 1998 per capita GDP 
expanded by 47 percent, in spite of the temporary contraction in 1995 resulting from 
the Mexican crisis. Annual inflation was brought down to single digits from 1993 
onwards (see Annex 2, Table A.2).  
Yet, despite these economic successes, poverty and inequality did not decline on a 
sustained basis. By the mid-1990s it had become evident that the growth pattern 
pursued by Argentina had failed to produce significant social improvements. Between 
1988 and 1998 income inequality in Argentina increased from 0.46 to 0.50 as 
measured by the Gini-coefficient. Poverty remained extensive, despite declining from 
its peak following the worst hyperinflation in 1989. Between 1993 and 1996 urban 
poverty again increased to 28 percent. Similarly, urban unemployment trended 
upwards from 1991 onwards reaching an unprecedented 17.5 percent in 1995 (see 
Annex 2, Table A.4). Together these elements combined to strengthen the perception 
that market reform was failing to provide sustained prosperity, employment, poverty 
reduction, and greater economic equality. As a result, the Menem administration came 
under increasing pressure from critics demanding greater emphasis on social policy.  
263 
 
In shaping the new social policy approach, the influence of the World Bank and the 
IDB was important. Bank officials encouraged Menem to institute new targeted 
programs so as to be able to cushion the effects of structural adjustment and 
economic liberalization. Crucially, the World Bank and the IDB found important 
interlocutors for the new pluralist social policy ideas among domestic technocratic 
activists. Such activists played a key role in driving the new poverty agenda. Highly 
trained and with excellent connections to both international lending institutions as 
well as the new civil networks organized around issues related to poverty, these 
technocratic activists were recruited by the Menem administration to oversee the new 
anti-poverty effort.  
The ruling PJ also saw the growing influence of such activists, many of whom were 
critical of corporatism and wanted to distance Peronism from its close association with 
the trade union movement. The collaboration of union leaders with the military 
government had helped discredit the trade union movement and from the perspective 
of the new grassroots activists and leaders, corporatist organizations had grown 
increasingly unrepresentative of the urban popular sectors. Many of these activists 
supported the PJ’s “renewalist” movement, helping it gain prominence over the party’s 
traditional trade union wing by the late 1980s. Peronism thus saw the increasing 
influence of party activists that were critical of the corporatist welfare arrangements 
and that advocated bypassing the corporatist organizations in the distribution of 
welfare benefits and services in favor of grassroots organizations.107 
As we shall see, a key group of technocratic activists was the team formed around 
Eduardo Amadeo, an influential renovador with close connections to the IFIs, who took 
                                                             
107 For a discussion of the transformation of Peronism, see, among others, Martuccelli and Svampa 
(1997), McGuire (1997), and Levitsky (2003).   
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charge of the new National Secretariat of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo 
Social de la Nación,  SDS)  in  1994.  By  insisting  on  bringing  with  him  his  own  team  of  
policy  specialists  and  NGO  activists,  he  was  able  to  form  a  highly  cohesive  team  of  
social technocrats that shared a deep commitment to the pluralist ideas and practices. 
With strong backing from the World Bank and the IDB, the Amadeo team stepped up 
the new anti-poverty effort.  
Also, in line ministries, such as in the health and labor ministries, financial aid from 
the  World  Bank  and  the  IDB  helped  to  set  up  new  programs  that  took  over  some  
important tasks and responsibilities from the more traditional administrative units, 
helping to alter policy focus and procedures in a pluralist and pro-poor direction. In 
this process, technocratic control over social policy was strengthened at the expense 
of corporatist organizations and the traditional welfare bureaucracy. Technocratic 
experts were deployed to run the new programs and units in close collaboration with 
IFI officials, providing these policy change teams with the insulation and leverage 
required to advance anti-poverty reform.      
To Menem, the recruitment of technocrats to oversee his new anti-poverty effort 
was precisely motivated by the need to bypass vested interests and resistance against 
reform. Being insulated from legislative and interest group pressures, as well as from 
routine bureaucratic processes, deploying technocratic change teams allowed for the 
displacement of conflict over reform and the swift enactment of new programs. 
Technocratic reformers also enjoyed the confidence of the international financial and 
donor community allowing Menem to tap these international sources for funding. 
Moreover, many of these technocratic activists had extensive links to the new civil 
society actors, helping the forming of relations to NGOs and grassroots organizations. 
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 It  may also be worth recalling the argument of  observers  such as Roberts  (1995)  
and Weyland (1996b; 1999a) about the affinities between populists and technocratic 
reformers. Menem’s strategy was to concentrate decision-making power in the 
executive and attract mass support among the impoverished and informal sectors so 
as to be able to enact drastic market reform without provoking massive unrest. With 
their aversion against vested interests, bureaucratic inertia and corporatist 
arrangements, technocratic reformers were natural allies for Menem in pursuing this 
neoliberal populist strategy.  
Indeed, as has been argued earlier in this study, deeply political considerations 
reinforced the new focus on pluralist social policy ideas and poverty relief within 
Peronism more generally. The spread of unemployment, informality and poverty had 
resulted in new social constituencies that would not be served by the old corporatist 
social policy approach. These class-structural changes led many Peronist incumbents to 
support the shift to targeted anti-poverty measures and the bypassing of corporatist 
organizations in the distribution of welfare benefits and services in favor of grassroots 
organizations to allow the party to rearticulate its links with the lower classes. As 
Levitsky (2003) has showed, Peronist leaders were quick to undertake far-reaching 
changes in the party’s structure and strategy so as to be able to adapt coalitionally to 
the changing social landscape. This explains the surprising lack of intra-party resistance 
to the shift from a corporatist to a pluralist social policy approach. The new anti-
poverty programs contained valuable resources that could be used in co-opting the 
new popular organizations that had started to mushroom in the 1980s. Indeed, 
Menem’s foremost allies within Peronism were governors from the poorer interior 
provinces to whom the emphasis on targeting and decentralization provided an 
opportunity to get their hands on new patronage resources.  
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Hence, as in Chile, the shift toward a greater emphasis on poverty alleviation and 
local participation in social policy was not merely a voluntaristic reflection of 
ideological re-identification or the epistemic power of policy experts, but also a 
rational adaptation by politicians to the changing environment brought about by 
socioeconomic crisis and adjustment. By shifting to a pluralist social policy approach 
Menem sought to construct a new socio-political coalition capable of sustaining the 
economic reforms amidst growing social dislocations. This new pluralist approach 
emerged gradually as Menem’s attention to social issues grew. From 1993 onwards as 
the growing social dislocations put pressure on Menem to step up the social effort, 
pluralist anti-poverty was given a central role in Menem’s governing strategy. 
 
 
FROMSOLIDARITYBONDSTOPLANTRABAJARǣREFORMEFFORTS
EarlyMeasures
In July 1989, when President Alfonsín handed over power to Menem, the Argentine 
state was virtually bankrupt and the national currency in shambles. Clearly, restoring 
economic stability was the first priority of the new government. Hence, during the first 
years of the Menem administration most efforts revolved around economic policy. At 
the same time, the country was suffering from an acute social crisis that threatened 
governability and would thus have to be addressed by more direct social welfare 
measures as well. With wages that did not meet basic necessities, the specter of new 
riots and lootings, like the ones that a little earlier had sealed the fate of Alfonsín, must 
have worried the government. Therefore, during the initial stage of the Menem 
administration, a host of targeted assistance programs were launched to manage this 
new social question. 
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One of the first initiatives of the new Menem administration was the National 
Solidarity Emergency Bond.108 The idea was to issue bonds to destitute families that 
could serve as payment for basic necessities in shops and supermarkets. As such, 
beneficiaries could select food and other basic necessities according to their own 
preferences. Moreover, in accordance with the new ideals, the role of the state would 
be limited as transportation and packing would be taken care of by shops and 
supermarkets.  
The program would also be decentralized. Local committees, so called Emergency 
Councils, were set up at the municipal level, headed by the mayors and involving civil 
society actors such as Caritas, which were made responsible for implementing the 
program and the distribution of Solidarity Bonds. “La idea es que en todos los casos va 
a  estar  el  intendente,  los  comerciantes  y  los  curas,  porque  ellos  están  en  todos  los  
pueblos…Lo de los curas es bueno, porque son los únicos que tienen estructura previa 
de distribución, tienen buen contacto con la gente que siempre les cuenta sus 
problemas, y además sería raro que se queden con algo” (a program official quoted in 
Grassi, 2003: 240).109 Program design stipulated that funds would be distributed to the 
Municipal Emergency Councils in accordance with the poverty map prepared by INDEC. 
The funding would emanate from voluntary contributions110 collected  through  a  
campaign organized by a private foundation - Fundación de Acción para la Iniciativa 
Privada (AIP) – that involved business leaders and counted with the support of the UIA. 
In fact, the whole operation had originally been launched as a private initiative by the 
                                                             
108 For a detailed discussion of this initiative, see Grassi (2003). See also Midré (1992).   
109 As a result of pressures from provincial governments the administrative structure of the program was 
later changed, strengthening the role of the provincial governments at the expense of the municipal 
level. 
110 Later, on the initiative of José Luis Manzano, leader of the Peronist group in the House of Deputies, a 
special tax was introduced on the profits of the 1,000 most affluent enterprises in the country in order 
to raise more funds for the Solidarity Bond program. 
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AIP, but was quickly adopted by the new administration.111 The final shape of the 
program was also heavily influenced by experts in the United States with whom the 
new Secretary of Social Action, Rubén Cardozo, held discussions in July 1989. The 
presidential decree (400/89) establishing the program was signed by Menem on 
August 2. In the end of August, the National Emergency Solidarity Bond was officially 
launched in Rosario, one of the cities most affected by the food riots.  
Program implementation was swift, helped by the fact that policymakers enjoyed 
wide discretion in distributing Solidarity Bonds. Yet, such discretion also tempted 
incumbent politicians to abuse them for political gain. Very soon after its official 
launch, a series of scandals erupted that revealed how the Solidarity Bonds were 
abused by Peronist politicians for clientelist purposes.112 In the most notorious case, a 
maverick Peronist deputy accused several of his colleagues, including Secretary 
Cardozo, of corruption. The scandal revealed a Peronist scheme for capturing Solidarity 
Bonds, so that their distribution would solely be controlled by members of the Peronist 
bloc. In the press, unnamed Peronist politicians were quoted defending the strategy: 
“Los radicales tuvieron el PAN y lo supieron utilizar políticamente, nosotros teníamos 
los Bonos y estábamos acotados. De esta manera, podíamos repartir en nuestro 
nombre los bonos y quedábamos bien con la gente” (Grassi, 2003: 244). Several of the 
Peronist deputies were suspected of being implicated in fraud. A substantial portion of 
the Solidarity Bonds had disappeared and from the report presented by the Minister of 
Health and Social Action it could be seen that only one third of the amount available in 
the Solidarity Fund actually had been used to meet the needs of the poor. Two-thirds 
                                                             
111 Presumably, the proposal appealed to the government in a variety of ways. Strapped for cash and 
inheritor of an extremely volatile social situation, the government welcomed any additional funds by 
which new riots and lootings could be prevented. Also, by collecting contributions from “those who 
have more”, the new government could claim to be promoting solidarity “towards those who have less”, 
and thus raise its social credentials (Midré, 1992). 
112 For a discussion of these scandals, see Grassi (2003) and Midré (1992). 
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were  used  to  cover  for  administrative  costs.  Despite  a  torrent  of  criticism  from  the  
opposition and the media, no sanctions were applied demonstrating the weakness of 
horizontal accountability mechanisms. The President proclaimed his unqualified 
support for the minister and officials in the MSAS were told not to provide any 
information on the matter. With the Peronist bloc in control of Congress, and with no 
state  agency  commanding  necessary  clout  to  take  up  the  matter,  no  investigation  or  
overall evaluation of the Solidarity Bond program was ever made. In any case, 
following the bad publicity surrounding the Solidarity Bonds, the government decided 
to transfer the program to the provincial authorities in April 1990, and eventually it 
was terminated (Grassi 2003). 
After this first experience, the government decided to abandon all efforts to 
implement a massive food program. Instead, a host of new targeted assistance 
programs were launched over the next few years to deal with the question of poverty. 
In general, these programs were presented as a “new social policy” that focused on 
mitigating poverty by providing the means for self-help instead of delivering state-
produced aid to destitute individuals as had traditionally been the approach. The new 
programs would seek to strengthen opportunities for social integration through 
investment in work-training, micro-enterprising and community organization. 
Emphasis was put on attacking the causes of poverty, rather than its consequences, by 
strengthening poor people’s capacities and by promoting grassroots organization.113  
During the reign of Ermán Gonzales as Minister of Health and Social Action,114 Plan 
Llamcay was launched that centered on providing low interest loans and training for 
                                                             
113 For  an  analysis  of  the  role  of  social  participation  in  these  programs,  see  González  Bombal  et  al.  
(2003), and Thompson (1995b). 
114 The first Minister of Health and Social Action in Menem’s government, Julio Corzo, died in an air 
crash in October 1989.   
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unemployed workers to set up micro-enterprises.115 In this instance, several smaller 
programs were initiated for different productive categories such as family farms, 
sewing shops, small factories and the like. In addition to providing start-up loans and 
tools, the programs would assist with commercialization of the products. The 
government also created the Programa de Políticas Sociales Comunitarias (POSOCO) 
and the Programa Social Nutricional (PROSONU)  to  target  specific  groups  in  state  of  
vulnerability, acknowledging how the poor is a diverse group with distinct needs to 
which the state has to respond with more flexible and varied means. This line of action 
was further strengthened with the Programa Federal de Solidaridad (PROSOL), created 
by decree in 1992. PROSOL was essentially set up as a multi-sectorial investment fund, 
much in the same vain as FOSIS in Chile, that would not execute projects itself but 
instead constitute a means for outsourcing project implementation to lower tiers of 
government, the private sector and grassroots organizations. Tendering and 
competitive bids would constitute mechanisms for the assignation of resources in 
order to ensure transparency and economic efficiency. PROSOL thus clearly formed 
part of the attempt by which the administration sought to strengthen the anti-poverty 
effort by way of a more pluralist approach for managing social needs and demands.  
An important program developed in the early 1990s was the Mother and Infant 
Nutrition Program (Programa Materno Infantil y Nutrición, PROMIN) that constituted 
the government’s response to the deteriorated situation regarding maternal child 
health and nutrition, and the main program through which the government sought to 
fulfill its commitments defined by Argentina’s approval of the International Convention 
for Children’s Rights in 1990. PROMIN appeared as the flagship program of the Menem 
administration for the transformation of social governance in the early 1990s. 
                                                             
115 For a discussion of Plan Llamcay, see Grassi (2003).  
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According to the World Bank, the program “would initiate a process of expanded 
coverage and efficiency improvements in the delivery of social services which are at 
the core of the Government’s follow-up strategy to complement ongoing economic 
and public sector reform programs” (World Bank, 1993).  
Specifically, the goals of PROMIN were to extend coverage and improve the quality 
and efficiency in the delivery of primary healthcare services. It sought to achieve these 
goals by adopting a pluralist approach to guide its actions. Decentralization, 
participation and targeting were key institutional strategies through which PROMIN 
sought to improve on traditional delivery models of public healthcare, early childhood 
education and nutrition programs.116 The program was designed as a social fund that 
finances projects carried out by local governments and NGOs. It sought to expand 
participation by involving the target population and delivery agents in all stages of 
project development. Its participative methodology also involved a strong emphasis on 
skills training and facilitating social communication to improve practices. Targeting 
mechanisms sought to maximize the effectiveness of resources by concentrating them 
on areas with higher proportions of structural poor and by the competition factor that 
allocated more resources to better-performing provinces. Weaker provinces were 
given technical assistance to help with project design and implementation.  
It is evident that this approach was affected by the international discourse of the 
time promoted by the World Bank and other international development actors that 
favored pluralist ideas and practices in social development.117 Influenced by these 
pluralist ideas, but distrustful of vested interests in the Argentine bureaucracy, the 
government commissioned UNICEF in 1991 to help with program design. The 
                                                             
116 For a comprehensive description of PROMIN, see Idiart (2002) and Chiara and Di Virgilio (2005).  
117 The point was stressed by key informants interviewed for this research and is also emphasized in 
internal program documents such as Ministerio de Salud (2000).  
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preparations initially suffered from delays because of bureaucratic resistance and the 
priority given by the government to the resolution of the economic crisis. Strong 
backing from UNICEF and the team of new experts at the Ministry of Health and Social 
Action (MSAS) helped move the project forward (Ministerio de Salud, 2000).  
Yet  as  a  result  of  the  internal  resistance  to  the  new  program  among  the  more  
traditional bureaucratic elements within the MSAS, PROMIN was set up with strong 
autonomous organizational bases. This aspect was further strengthened by the 
important role the World Bank took in financing its operations. The World Bank was 
responsible for approximately 60 percent of PROMIN’s funding. As a consequence, 
PROMIN’s personnel were not part of the permanent bureaucratic structure of the 
MSAS, but were appointed under specific limited-term contracts requiring World Bank 
approval. This helped technocraticize PROMIN’s project management and ensure staff 
commitment to the new (pluralist) management principles.118 Indeed, program 
reviews generally recognize the comparatively high professional and technical capacity 
of procurement staff.  
The program was approved by minister Julio Aráoz in November 1992 and officially 
launched by decree in March 1993. Over the course of the 1990s, PROMIN expanded 
its target areas, more than doubling its estimated beneficiaries to over 1 million in 
1998  (Idiart,  2002).  At  the  same  time,  it  went  on  to  take  over  tasks  from  the  more  
                                                             
118 But, as Idiart (2002) point out, and confirmed by key informants for this study, the autonomous 
organizational bases of PROMIN led to coordination problems at the MSAS. PROMIN did not completely 
replace the traditional structures such as the old infant-maternity program – Programa Materno Infantil 
- which continued in place with its more centralized, statist and universalist characteristics, albeit with 
much reduced budgetary resources and drain of prestige. Although PROMIN went on to take over some 
responsibilities from the more traditional structures at the MSAS, the situation fed problems associated 
with overlapping, competition for beneficiaries and fragmentation. As we shall see, this phenomenon 
was not exclusive to this particular case, but became a recurrent theme more generally in social policy 
during the 1990s. 
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traditional social programs at the MSAS and, as a result, helped strengthen the 
pluralist approach at the MSAS despite considerable internal resistance. 
As such, these new programs marked the first steps in the new anti-poverty 
strategy that was developed during the 1990s. Informed by the new policy ideas and 
practices promoted by international actors and driven by technocratic reformers with 
links to international policy networks, the new programs shifted the emphasis from 
traditional state-based welfare schemes to more participatory and decentralized 
practices for fighting poverty. Yet, while technocratic reformers played an important 
role in shaping the reform effort, policy change was ultimately a result of political 
expediency. To the Menem government, the new approach provided a means to 
respond to increasing social demands without abandoning fiscal austerity, and thus 
adapt politically to the new socioeconomic conditions. In this, the interests of 
government politicians and technocratic experts coincided. By delegating authority to 
technocratic reformers, the Menem government was able to bypass vested interests 
and displace conflict over the new approach.  
The role of political interests in driving policy change can also readily be observed 
in  the  decision  to  decentralize  POSOCO  and  PROSONU  together  with  FONAVI  to  the  
provinces as part of the so-called Federal Pact in 1992.119 This decision formed part of 
a political trade-off in which Peronist governors, in return for control over these social 
programs, lent their support for Menem’s economic reform program. In this instance, 
one also notes the important role of regime institutions in shaping anti-poverty policy. 
The strong role of provincial leaders provided by Argentina’s deeply federal regime 
structure meant that they were able to hold the government to “ransom” in this 
manner. In combination with a delegative type of democracy, including weak 
                                                             
119 For a discussion of this agreement, see Tommasi and Spiller (2007). 
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institutions of horizontal accountability, it also meant that the decentralized funds 
could be distributed with wide discretion by provincial actors, without much need to 
pay heed to the principles formulated by federal state technocrats. As such, for 
instance, the principles for fund management stipulated by the law that decentralized 
POSOCO  and  PROSONU  were  not  respected  by  all  provincial  governments,  and  no  
measures were taken to enforce compliance. Similarly, in the case of FONAVI, the legal 
framework regulating the decentralized administration of the housing funds, which 
included requirements aimed at increasing transparency, participation and pluralist 
access to benefits, was ignored by the provincial governments.120 According  to  key  
informants interviewed for this study, the decentralization of FONAVI exacerbated 
problems relating to patronage and the inefficient use of funds. The substantial 
increase in administrative costs following decentralization would seem to corroborate 
those views (MECON, 2000). Newspaper reports also point toward widespread political 
abuse of FONAVI funds during the 1990s (e.g. Clarín, 18/12/1995). In the absence of 
mechanisms for enforcing compliance with the FONAVI law and transparency in the 
selection of beneficiaries, provincial governments were free to divert these funds to 
clientelist ends. 
Also, when turning to look beyond the formulation stage of programs such as 
PROSOL and PROMIN, the effect of regime institutions can be discerned. In the case of 
PROSOL, informants highlight the mismanagement of its funds, which is attributed to 
the lack of mechanisms of accountability and monitoring. No auditing was made of the 
US$88,000,000 subsidies distributed by PROSOL in 1992 and 1993 (López, 2003). An ad 
hoc commission for auditing the program was set up in 1994, but failed to improve the 
situation as its mandate was weak and dependent on the political authority (and will) 
                                                             
120 For a discussion of the decentralization of FONAVI, see Zanetta (2004; 2007). 
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of  the  Secretary  of  Social  Development.  As  with  the  case  of  the  Solidarity  Bond  
program, a lack of mechanisms of control seems to have provided for the discretionary 
use of these funds. No agency was authorized with necessary clout to oversee the 
distribution of funds and, if need be, redress acts of mismanagement.  
In comparison, PROMIN is viewed more favorably among social policy specialists 
interviewed for this study. Yet problems associated with a lack of compliance with the 
pluralist norms proscribed by program design are highlighted by informants and other 
primary sources (e.g. Ministerio de Salud, 2000). In particular, the participation of civil 
society  in  project  management  at  the  local  level  did  not  materialize  because  of  the  
reluctance of sub-national political actors to comply with the norms prescribing 
participatory procedures. Provincial governments were reluctant to cede control over 
project management to NGOs and resisted efforts by the policy experts in charge of 
PROMIN at the federal level to provide for procedures of social auditing.  
Another problem was overspending by provincial governments.121 Projects were 
executed that significantly departed from what had been agreed with the federal level 
without accounting for such changes. To this was added the effect of elections, which 
was reflected in a notable rise in sub-projects executed in the provinces. Evaluations of 
PROMIN also document irregularities and lack of compliance with targeting criteria at 
the local level (referred to in Idiart, 2002).  
Informants point to the lack of controls at the sub-national level that could have 
prevented such discretion, especially mechanisms for the opposition to hold sub-
national governments to account.122 As for federal government ministers, they were 
reluctant to put pressure on topocrats so as not to jeopardize political relations with 
                                                             
121 The funds provided by the World Bank had already been spent by 2000, three years before the 
projected termination of the program (Idiart, 2002).  
122 This point also comes up in an internal document given to the author in confidence (PROMIN, 2000?). 
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the provinces. Clearly, then, Argentina’s regime institutions provided topocrats with 
discretion in managing projects funded by PROMIN which resulted in significant 
departures from original intentions when projects were being implemented.   
In sum, while the policy specialists in charge of formulating the new programs 
during the first  half  of  the 1990s generally  seemed to have shared a commitment to 
the pluralist approach, they could often not prevent political interests from diverting 
these pluralist projects for clientelist goals. As we shall see, this became a recurring 
trend over the course of the 1990s.  
    
TheNationalSecretariatofSocialDevelopment
Towards the mid-1990s, in the context of a renewed upsurge in poverty, the Menem 
administration began to step up its anti-poverty efforts. Hitherto it had concentrated 
most of its energy on bringing inflation under control and rekindle economic growth, 
arguing that this was the best strategy for social improvement and poverty reduction. 
Efforts so far to redefine social welfare policies to emphasize poverty alleviation and 
create targeted programs to promote social integration had essentially remained 
isolated actions receiving little attention from president Menem himself.  
But as a result of rising unemployment and pauperization from 1992 onwards the 
social  question  could  no  longer  be  ignored,  particularly  as  it  occurred  at  a  time  of  
macroeconomic stability and growth. Menem recognized that improving the social 
situation required more direct efforts. Contributing to this newfound interest for social 
policy was an upsurge in social protest. The Santiagazo in December 1993 
spearheaded a period of accelerating social conflict that threatened governability in 
several internal provinces worst affected by the impact of austerity. As a result, 
Peronist governors preoccupied with the prospect of losing social control started to 
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call for more active social welfare policies. The rise of the center-left opposition 
movement Frente Grande in the 1994 constituent assembly elections sent Menem a 
similar  message.  It  showed  the  incumbent,  as  Weyland  (2002:  175)  asserts,  that  “his  
success in ending hyperinflation might not guarantee him lasting support nor ensure 
his victory in the presidential contest of 1995”.  
With the launch of the Social Plan in early 1993, the Menem government sought to 
strengthen its social credentials.123 The plan was presented by President Menem as the 
beginning of a second, “social” stage of transformation during which the shift to a new 
social policy approach would be intensified and the fight against poverty stepped up. It 
had been prepared on Menem’s request by ministers Gustavo Béliz (interior) and Julio 
Aráoz (health and social action), both strong advocates of pluralist reform. The plan 
stated the government’s intent “to consolidate a Copernican revolution in the 
administration of social investment” by way of decentralizing the execution of social 
programs, increasing the participation of civil society organizations, and improving the 
efficiency of social spending by better targeting towards the poorest and most 
vulnerable groups in society. Furthermore, the plan acknowledged the need for better 
monitoring of social funds and a more integral approach to avoid overlapping between 
the increasing amount of targeted programs. A Federal Social Cabinet led by the 
General Secretariat of the Presidency was created to coordinate the execution of the 
plan. With this the government sought to strengthen the role of the federal state in 
coordinating social actions and avoid problems of multiplicity. In practice, the Federal 
Social Cabinet failed to invoke any major improvements in the administration of social 
funds. On the whole, the 1993 Social Plan encountered resistance within the 
bureaucratic apparatus as well as within the governing party and achieved little in the 
                                                             
123 For a discussion of the 1993 Social Plan, see Grassi (2003a) and Repetto (2003).  
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way of implementing an integrated policy to combat poverty.124 As such, it did not 
have any visible effects on social governance. 
Acknowledging the failure of the 1993 Social Plan, the government in 1994 created 
the SDS under the Office of the President, charged with the responsibility of 
coordinating anti-poverty policy. To this effect, Menem decreed that parts of the 
Ministry  of  Health  and  Social  Action  would  be  transferred  to  the  SDS.  To  pre-empt  
attempts to obstruct reform, the President chose a loyal technocrat, Luis Prol, to head 
the new secretariat. However, under the austere budget conditions imposed by 
economy minister Domingo Cavallo, the SDS was allocated few resources from the 
national budget. As such, Prol struggled to establish the authority of the SDS. The 
reluctance of provincial governments and the sectoral ministries to cede any control 
over social policymaking complicated matters further for Prol. The president was also 
of little help as most of his energies were directed towards attaining constitutional 
reform that would permit his re-election. It was not until the actual elections began to 
draw nearer in 1995 when Menem began to devote more attention to issues of social 
welfare that the president and his advisors decided to raise the profile of the SDS 
(Repetto,  2001).  In  this,  an  important  decision  was  to  replace  Prol  with  Eduardo  
Amadeo - a respected economist belonging to the renewalist wing of the PJ.   
Under Amadeo the SDS took the lead in driving pluralist social reform. A new Social 
Plan (Presidencia de la Nación, 1995) was prepared by Amadeo that stressed the need 
to strengthen opportunities for social integration by way of mitigating conditions of 
exclusion and the promotion of participation. “Desde la Secretaría de Desarrollo Social 
nuestra tarea tiene dos ejes: la solución de carencias básicas y el fortalecimiento de la 
                                                             
124 In trying to institute the new pluralist practices, Beliz repeatedly clashed with Peronist topocrats and, 
eventually, had to resign not only from government but also from the Peronist party altogether. 
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sociedad civil.  No hay política social  que tenga éxito si  no fortalice a los  actores.  Por 
eso, en lugar de hacer política de arriba para abajo, clientelista y de entrega de 
comida, lo que hay que hacer es generar organización social para brindar a las 
personas la posibilidad de desarrollarse como personas” (La Nación, 1996/10/11). The 
1995  Social  Plan  proposed  a  host  of  criteria  and  actions  that  sought  to  strengthen  
targeting mechanisms, coordination and civil society participation in social 
policymaking. Central to this was the view that the state needed to respond with more 
flexible and participatory social programs in order to come to terms with the variety of 
situations of social vulnerability suffered by the low-income population.  
To implement pluralist reform, Amadeo gathered a highly technical team of policy 
experts that shared his pluralist ideas about social policymaking. Amadeo insisted on 
being able to recruit his own team as he did not want be dependent on the old 
bureaucratic structures that had been transferred to SDS from the MSAS and that he 
considered hopelessly bureaucratic and incompetent to implement the new pluralist 
approach. He explicitly wanted his team coming from outside the established welfare 
bureaucracy  so  as  to  provide  the  SDS  with  a  stronger  technocratic  profile  (author  
interview,  2005).  Many  of  the  members  of  this  new  team  had  extensive  links  to  
international policy networks as well as to the NGO universe. A key member of this 
team was Viviana Fridman, who had a long-standing relationship with the IFIs and was 
a close friend of Myrna Alexander, the World Bank representative in Argentina during 
the 1990s. Like Amadeo, Fridman had a background in the banking sector and had 
played an important role during the 1980s in the negotiations over Argentina’s 
external debt obligations. Her connections proved instrumental in negotiations for 
external funding for social development projects. Indeed, the Amadeo team 
established a very close relationship with the IFIs, especially the World Bank. 
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Cultivating good relations with the IFIs was a pragmatic response to the relative lack of 
national budgetary resources given to the SDS. The President, for his part, had nothing 
against such a relationship. External funds provided additional means to cushion the 
effects of market reform without jeopardizing economic orthodoxy. At the same time, 
there was a more fundamental reason for the close relationship between the SDS and 
the IFIs. It was a result of a common theoretical-ideological understanding of the 
problems at hand and how best go about solving them. Negotiations for loans were 
made easy by the shared conception of social development that placed importance on 
pluralist  practices.  Indeed,  according  to  Fridman,  for  the  Amadeo  team  the  IFIs  and  
their representatives in Argentina were “partners” with whom it shared a language 
and common priorities (author interview, 2005). 
The close relationship established with the IFIs brought important resources that 
were  used  to  set  up  new  social  programs.  In  1996,  SDS  already  administered  25  
programs, most of them IFI-funded. The common denominator for these programs, at 
least at the level of discourse, was their strong focus on civil society participation. The 
pluralist approach advocated by Amadeo and supported by the IFIs revolved around 
the idea of targeting funds to anti-poverty projects through a network of intermediary 
NGOs in order to avoid corporatist and political meddling. The inclusion of NGOs was 
designed to supplement state action in the implementation of programs and help 
promote self-organization at the grassroots level. Grassroots organizations were 
expected to contribute to social cohesion and integration by fostering a sense of 
“working for the collective good” and a “moral community among social actors” in line 
with theories of social capital.125   
                                                             
125 See, for example, Portes (1999). 
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A  key  program  was  the  National  Center  for  Community  Organizations  (Centro 
Nacional de Organizaciones Comunitarias, CENOC) that was set up to promote links to 
grassroots groups and their development into more formal organizations. One of its 
most important undertakings was the development of a database registering 
grassroots organizations and a program of capacity-building. The objective was to train 
grassroots civil groups in organizational skills, such as how to set themselves up as 
NGOs, as well as in development issues. Inclusion in the CENOC database became a 
condition  for  accessing  funds  from  any  SDS  program.  Curiously,  the  program  was  
headed by Amadeo’s wife, Beatriz Orlowski de Amadeo. She had been involved with 
assisting grassroots groups in La Cava, a slum area in the Buenos Aires province, during 
the  1980s.  To  CENOC  she  recruited  social  reformers  that  had  worked  in  community  
projects, many of them in La Cava, and that shared her (and her husband’s) pluralist 
conceptions about social development. Bringing with them a great deal of legitimacy 
among the grassroots, these social reformers were well placed to reinforce ties to 
autonomous social groups.  
The strategy was extended across the board of SDS activities. By incorporating 
social development experts who were well-known at the grassroots level and 
committed to the pluralist approach, the SDS sought to build links to the array of new 
autonomous social groups that emerged in the wake of the dismantling of 
corporatism. Moreover, this strategy was not only confined to the SDS. Within line-
ministries  a  host  of  new  social  programs  were  set  up  by  technocratic  reformers  and  
policy consultants with the support of the IFIs. To these programs social development 
specialists with links to the grassroots were recruited to administer projects so as to 
facilitate the building of networks with civil groups. Hence, from the mid-1990s the 
pluralist approach became the lynchpin of the new governance strategy whereby the 
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government sought to manage the “new social question”. From above, policy experts 
designed new pluralist welfare structures to reincorporate disaffected constituents 
and maintain governability at relatively low cost. From below, NGOs and grassroots 
organizations took advantage of these new structures and the opportunities for 
pluralistic inclusion they seemed to offer. Yet, as we shall see, this “alliance” between 
social technocrats and autonomous civil society organizations failed to produce lasting 
associative networks and a participatory mode of social governance. Argentina’s 
regime institutions permitted politicians, when the political weather changed, to 
capture the new social programs and, thus, set the basis for a populist mode of social 
governance.   
 
PlanTrabajar
As Menem began his second term in 1995, Argentina was emerging shaken from the 
“tequila effect”. The economy lurched into recession with unemployment soaring to 
17.5 percent and informalization approaching 35 percent (see Annex 2, Table A.4). 
Social protest became increasingly widespread and Menem began facing hardened 
opposition from within Peronism itself (see Levitsky, 2003). Under pressure to show 
some concern for the issue of unemployment, the government created the Plan 
Trabajar (Work Plan) in 1996.126  
In essence, Plan Trabajar did not fundamentally differ from earlier employment 
generation programs carried out by the first Menem administration (Giraudy, 2007). 
These programs had been co-financed by the World Bank and the IDB and designed to 
cushion the effects of structural change. They targeted unemployed workers in the 
                                                             
126 Between 1996 and 2001, there were three slightly different versions of the program as modifications 
were introduced to improve targeting: Plan Trabajar I, II, and III.  
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informal sector (i.e. who did not receive social security or any kind of unemployment 
benefit) by offering a salary in return for work in service projects administered by 
NGOs or municipal governments. The program provided the funds for hiring 
unemployed workers, while the executing organization provided the materials needed. 
The salary was offered for a limited term and individuals could not participate in more 
than  one  program  at  a  time.  The  programs  were  coordinated  by  the  federal  
government and administered by provincial governments. Funds were sent from the 
federal government to the provinces, leaving the provincial governments with 
considerable discretion to determine how funds are allocated to different 
municipalities and NGOs. Clearly, these programs were designed to bypass corporatist 
institutions while targeting the growing cohort of informal workers. However, until 
1995 expenditure on these programs remained low, amounting to around 0.1 percent 
of GNP (Márquez, 2000). 
 
Table6.1WorkfareProgramsinArgentina,1993-2002
Year Federal  
programs 
Provincial 
programs 
Total  
1993 26,236  0 26,236 
1994 33,365  1,071 34,436 
1995 48,909  377 49,286 
1996 62,083  11,438 73,521 
1997 126,264  23,938 150,202 
1998 112,264  69,064 181,140 
1999 105,895  56,326 162,221 
2000 85,665  110,775 196,440 
2001 91,806 191,017 282,823 
2002 1,282,000 115,486 1,397,486 
Source: Reproduced from Franceschelli and Ronconi (2005) 
     
 
Faced with double-digit unemployment and increasing social turmoil, the 
government had to step up its efforts. Plan Trabajar expanded the coverage, reaching 
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an average of 20 percent of the unemployed population between 1996 and 2001 
(Lodola 2005). The program was designed by a group of labor market experts at the 
MSAS together with economists from the World Bank and the IDB, institutions that co-
funded the program from 1997.127 In line with the new pluralist practices, mechanisms 
for competitive tendering were introduced requiring potential employers – municipal 
government,  NGOs  and  private  enterprises  –  to  present  community  or  social  
infrastructure projects to the provincial authorities, who with the assistance of 
technical staff and representatives of intermediate associations were to evaluate and 
authorize the most feasible proposals.128 In practice, the federal nature of Argentina’s 
system of government and the lack of institutional controls provided governors wide 
discretion to apply this mechanism in a highly arbitrary fashion giving rise to 
widespread accusations of clientelism and malpractice in the distribution of program 
funds. Indeed, evaluations indicate that the formal requirements for beneficiary 
selection and the distribution of funds were not properly enforced (SIEMPRO, 1997; 
CELS, 2003).  
Plan Trabajar quickly became the keystone around which relations between the 
state and the rising cohort of unemployed workers played out. President Menem and 
the Peronist governors used benefits from Plan Trabajar to institute clientelist 
networks and dampen protest by unemployed workers. There seems to be a wide 
consensus among policymakers and scholars of widespread clientelism in the 
allocation of benefits from Plan Trabajar. In an analysis of Argentina’s main 
newspapers, Ronconi (2002) finds that a majority of articles regarding Plan Trabajar 
report allegations of corruption and clientelist practices. Studies show that 
                                                             
127 Congress had no formal role in the process of initiating the program. Nor did Congress exercise any 
oversight of its implementation according to referents interviewed for this study. 
128 For a detailed description of the design, see Chiara and Di Virgilio (2005). 
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beneficiaries were asked to prove some kind of party affiliation and to attend political 
events backing ruling parties and governors in order to maintain their monthly 
subsidies (Oviedo, 2001). In many instances, local political brokers withheld part of the 
benefit to finance political organization (Fachelli, Ronconi and Sanguinetti, 2004). 
Interestingly, these clientelist practices seem to have fuelled the piquetero 
movement.129 Many piquetero organizations were explicitly formed to circumvent 
clientelistic party machines and political brokers, and gain direct control of the 
subsidies handed out by the state (see Svampa and Pereyra, 2003; Delamata, 2004). 
But more importantly, political manipulation in the allocation of benefits from Plan 
Trabajar seems to have directly induced individuals to participate in pickets 
(Franceschelli  and  Ronconi,  2005;  Garay,  2007).  As  it  became  evident  that  the  
allocation of benefits did not correspond exclusively to pre-defined technical criteria 
but that a large measure of political discretion existed in the procedures for selecting 
beneficiaries, people had an incentive to engage politically to better their chances of 
receiving the benefit. Franceschelli and Ronconi (2005: 13) explains how eligible 
individuals, realizing that filling in the application form was not a sufficient condition to 
receive benefits, had two options: “One option they had was to solicit a benefit to a 
local political bosses, and in the lucky event of receiving the benefit, to accept the 
conditions imposed. A second option was to try to become politically powerful in order 
to obtain the benefit themselves and impose their own terms when bargaining with 
the government”. The blocking of roads as a political tactic thus emerged in direct 
conjunction with the political manner in which the state handled benefits from social 
programs, especially Plan Trabajar. 
                                                             
129 The term piqueteros (picketers) refers to organized groups of unemployed workers and informals 
who block strategic roads as a political tactic to obtain concessions from the state.  
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Indeed, the tactic seemed to work. More and more benefits from Plan Trabajar 
and other targeted programs had to be used to buy off piquetero organizations. The 
decision in June 1996 to dampen a protest by unemployed workers in the province of 
Neuquén by using benefits from Plan Trabajar set a precedent for future conflicts 
(Giraudy, 2007). It strengthened the perception that access to benefits was a matter of 
political strength, not of fulfilling formal requirements. From 1996 to 2001, an 
escalating cycle of road blockades and workfare benefits can be observed (see Table 
6.1 and Annex 2, Table A.7). As the state responded to protests with workfare benefit 
provisions, it triggered further demands generating “a pattern of protest and 
negotiation that strengthened these groups and dramatically expanded social policy” 
(Garay, 2007: abstract). In 1997, street blockades were already a more frequent type 
of demonstration than strikes (see Annex 2, Table A.7). Resources from Plan Trabajar 
contributed to empower piquetero organizations by reinforcing their structures and 
facilitating the recruitment of new members. As such, they also became key actors 
that political leaders sought to integrate into partisan politics. In the provinces new 
workfare programs were set up in order to co-opt these unemployed groups. In the 
case  of  the  Buenos  Aires  province  a  massive  struggle  erupted  over  the  control  of  
benefits from Plan Barrios Bonaerenses between Peronist brokers and piquetero 
organizations (see Svampa and Pereyra, 2003).   
Hence, from the original pluralist project little was left. New linkages were 
established between the state and unemployed workers, but these were far from the 
sort of “associative networks” that were supposed to characterize a new participatory 
governance. Instead, workfare programs were expanded by populist politicians fuelling 
intense political mobilization as well as clientelism, in a pattern more reminiscent of 
the populist era albeit with different actors. Technocratic reformers complain about 
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how the program was captured by political interests and how the high level of 
discretional power enjoyed by provincial governors made it impossible to control the 
process of implementation. Mechanisms to enforce compliance with rules for the 
selection of beneficiaries were non-existent. And while the UCR and FREPASO 
mounted heavy criticism of the way Plan Trabajar was being implemented, as long as 
they were in opposition, they were without means to do much about it. In Argentina’s 
delegative democracy the ruling Peronist Party faced no such constraints as the 
Concertación in Chile.  
 
 
FROMTÉCNICOSTOPOLÍTICOSǣPLURALISTREFORMSGONEAWRY
The 1990s in Argentina is characterized by an enormous growth of social programs 
oriented towards poverty alleviation. In 1996, the federal government already 
executed a total of 50 programs targeting poor and vulnerable groups (SIEMPRO, 
1996). In parallel with this growth of federal social programs, sub-national 
governments also executed a host of new programs within their own jurisdictions. On 
the one hand, this growth in anti-poverty programs followed naturally from the 
pluralist notion of the poor not being a homogeneous group, but rather facing a 
variety of distinct situations of vulnerability and that solving the problem of poverty 
thus required a variety of programs targeted towards distinct vulnerable groups and 
situations. Enabling this growth were the program loans made by the World Bank and 
the IDB. On the other hand, as can be discerned from above, it was also an outcome of 
politicians’ efforts to come to terms with escalating social protest and their attempts 
to re-establish clientelist links to the popular sectors in the wake of the dismantling of 
corporatism.  
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While the SDS played a major role in the design of new targeted programs, 
Amadeo and his team, nevertheless, considered that the low level of integration and 
coordination between different federal programs and among national and sub-
national programs was hampering the anti-poverty effort. As in Chile, studies revealed 
problems associated with overlapping, competition for beneficiaries, fragmentation 
and lack of cooperation among programs. To successfully tackle poverty a more 
coordinated effort seemed essential. With a view to this, Amadeo tried to arm the SDS 
with more authority to coordinate anti-poverty policy.  
From the perspective of the SDS, one problem was the federal and delegative 
nature of the Argentine regime. Sub-national governments enjoyed wide discretion 
with regard to the implementation of federal social programs. The SDS had few means 
to enforce compliance with rules for the selection of beneficiaries and the distribution 
of funds. Topocrats routinely discarded pluralist practices in favor of clientelist 
machinations. Funds were also transferred to other uses depending on political 
circumstances in the province. To this was added the reluctance of many sub-national 
governments to provide information about the distribution of funds. Provincial 
governments repeatedly declined to give details over the use of federal social funds to 
the SDS referring to their autonomous powers granted by the federal constitution.130 
Lack of monitoring mechanisms at the sub-national level made it impossible for the 
SDS  to  keep  track  of  beneficiaries  such  as  how  many  and  who  they  were.  In  many  
instances, municipalities simply lacked the technical capacity to comply with the rules 
for administering federal social programs.  
                                                             
130 A proposal by senators Yoma, Pichetto and Muller to modify the National Law for Financial 
Administration to obligate the provinces to present documentation corresponding to the execution of 
social program funds and in case of their failing to comply, possibilitate the President’s Office to 
withdraw funding, failed to prosper in the Senate (Dinatale, 2004).   
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Surveys conducted by SIEMPRO confirm these problems. Irregularities were found 
on numerous occasions in the manner federal programs were administered at the sub-
national level.131 Governors were found blatantly ignoring the rules for program 
administration. Yet, as Menem depended on the support of provincial party bosses for 
the  enforcement  of  his  program,  few  measures  were  taken  to  rein  in  provincial  
discretion in handling federal social funds. On the contrary, Peronist governors put 
pressure on President Menem to decentralize more social funds to the provinces to be 
able to deal with the incipient social crisis and unemployment. 
In  July  1996,  after  a  meeting  in  Santa  Fe  between  the  federal  government  and  
Peronist governors, the Federal Council for Social Development (Consejo Federal de 
Desarrollo Social, COFEDESO) was set up within the SDS to coordinate anti-poverty 
policy with the provinces. It was comprised of the ministers for social development in 
the provincial governments and chaired by the SDS. Amadeo considered it an 
opportunity to strengthen the authority of the SDS, gain more influence over program 
implementation, and more effectively be able to enforce rules for program 
administration.  
Yet, the effort failed almost completely. COFEDESO never became an effective 
platform for the inter-jurisdictional coordination of anti-poverty policy. The provincial 
governments were not willing to give up any authority over local anti-poverty policy. 
At best, COFEDESO functioned as a forum for the exchange of information. Most of 
times its meetings were used by the provincial governments to mount criticisms over 
federal policies. Interviews with functionaries at the SDS reveal how COFEDESO was 
quickly turned into another ambit for provincial demand-making and the articulation 
of pressure on the federal government to decentralize more social funds.  
                                                             
131 See also Dinatale (2004) for a discussion of irregularities found in reports and evaluations. 
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As  seen  from  the  perspective  of  the  policy  experts  at  the  SDS,  the  problem  with  
populist social governance in the provinces only grew worse toward the end of the 
Menem  era.  Federal  grants  for  social  programs  helped  maintain  local  systems  of  
patronage and clientelistic relations. The negotiations over provincial fiscal 
adjustment, and the threat to withdraw from any agreement, was a potent weapon in 
the hands of governors demanding greater discretion over federal grants for social 
programs.132 Indeed, federal transfers to the provinces grew throughout the 1990s 
(see Gibson and Calvo, 2001; Manzetti, 2009). In the absence of federal control 
mechanisms as well as local mechanisms for enforcing horizontal accountability, 
topocrats in provinces such as Santiago del Estero and San Juan could easily make use 
of central government transfers to buttress local clientelist networks that ran counter 
to the pluralist practices and participatory mechanisms advocated by the policy 
experts at the SDS.133 Neither did they show much enthusiasm with reining in social 
spending in general as the Argentine system of fiscal federalism generated perverse 
incentives to “overspend” in order to milk the central state for stabilization subsidies 
and so called “co-participation” funds.134   
A  short  look  at  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires  serves  to  illustrate  these  
developments. In Buenos Aires Governor Duhalde used federal transfers invested in 
the Fondo Conurbano to equip a vast clientelist network that consolidated his grip of 
the province. The Fondo Conurbano was created as a result of an agreement between 
Menem and Duhalde, in which Menem guaranteed to supply Duhalde with 
extraordinary resources to tackle social problems in the province in exchange for 
political loyalty. Delegative democracy allowed Duhalde to allocate these resources 
                                                             
132 For a discussion, see Spiller and Tommasi (2007). 
133 See, for instance, Beard Liikala (2002), Bill Chavez (2003), and Gibson (2004).  
134 For a discussion of Argentina’s ”fiscal labyrinth” and how it generates ”economic populism” at the 
provincial level, see Saiegh and Tommasi (1999). See also Remmer and Wibbels (2000). 
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with almost complete discretion. Repetto (2000: 608fn.15) notes how Duhalde held 
meetings every Saturday with loyal mayors in which “de acuerdo con reglas de juego 
absolutamente informales y de índole coyuntural (pero siempre donde la úlitma 
palabra la tenía el propio Duhalde), se iba determinando la asignación de los recursos 
previstos para esa semana”. The bi-cameral commission that was supposed to control 
the administration of the Fondo Conurbano had no real powers and held only a 
consultative function. Mechanisms for enforcing horizontal accountability in relation to 
the use of these funds were absent.135 According to Repetto (2000: 609): “Una vez más 
el Poder Legislativo se encontró sin herramientas para controlar el Ejecutivo”.  
A major part of the resources from the Fondo Conurbano were administered by the 
Women’s Provincial Council (Consejo Provincial de Mujer) under the command of the 
governor’s wife, “Chiche” Duhalde. This entity was given control over the bulk of the 
province’s social programs. The most significant in both political and social terms was 
Plan Vida, a food distribution program launched in 1994 as the pet project of Chiche 
that used female volunteers – known as manzaneras – to distribute aid. Repetto 
(2001) estimates that by 1999 there were 30,000 manzaneras delivering milk, eggs, 
cereal  and  other  basic  goods  to  approximately  one  million  people.  Indeed,  a  major  
aspect of this program was the role played by the manzaneras as brokers between the 
provincial government and the beneficiaries, which contributed to create an extremely 
efficient and decentralized clientelist network that became one of the defining 
features  of  state-society  relations  in  the  province  of  Buenos  Aires.  Facing  no  
institutional checks in administering Plan Vida, Chiche enjoyed almost complete 
                                                             
135 International consultants also voiced their concerns over the lack of control: ”El fondo se apoya en 
mecanismos de excepción para lograr una mayor agilidad en su operatoria, previéndose la intervención 
a posteriori de los organismos de contralor. Esta agilidad se ve en la práctica entorpecida por la 
inseguridad de los funcionarios que deben tomar las decisiones, sobre un sustento legal elemental y en 
algunos casos ambiguos (UNDP report cited in Repetto, 2000: 609).  
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discretion in the handling of funds. Indeed, referents point to the fact that no records 
exist that would even show the amount of these funds and how they were allocated. 
What seems clear, however, is that in the distribution of benefits political logic 
trumped principles of pluralistic access. As for any participation-enhancing effects of 
Plan Vida, in the verdict of Repetto (2000: 611) “la participación social se vio limitada a 
la práctica a la vez atomizada y colectiva de estas mujeres, en detrimento de una 
organización comunitaria capaz de ir más allá del reclamo inmediato: atomizada en 
tanto se trataba de voluntarias que operaban cada una en su ámbito espacial; colectiva 
a partir de que conjuntamente respondían a la voluntad política de la esposa del 
gobernador”. Thus, despite in many ways its flexible, decentralized and targeted 
character, Plan Vida was a far cry from the kind of participatory governance expected 
by advocates of the pluralist approach. 
From the perspective of the policy experts at the SDS, another problem related to 
the lack of coordination at the federal level itself. In his Plan Social (Presidencia de la 
Nación, 1995), Amadeo had proposed the setting up of an intra-ministerial cabinet to 
coordinate anti-poverty policymaking between the various social ministries. Amadeo 
wanted the SDS to preside this cabinet, giving the SDS the role of a social authority 
with powers to define priorities in the assignment of social expenditures.136 The 
“balkanization” of the anti-poverty effort into a host of small targeted programs with 
questionable effect on poverty reduction, the realization that the programs were used 
to  sustain  clientelistic  networks  in  the  provinces,  and  that  social  actors  such  as  
piqueteros used these targeted interventions to “extort” the state for concessions, also 
led the Amadeo team to propose moving in the direction of more universalistic 
                                                             
136 Note the parallels with efforts in Chile to raise the authority of MIDEPLAN in coordinating social 
policymaking. 
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interventions. Amadeo managed to negotiate World Bank support for a proposal to 
create a single subsidy as insurance against unemployment and informal employment. 
In conjunction with this, SDS experts under the lead of Amadeo proposed the setting 
up at the SDS of a single register with all beneficiaries of federal subsidies to improve 
targeting and prevent abuse (see SIEMPRO, 1996b). 
However, this effort to initiate a more integrated approach in anti-poverty policy 
and give the SDS a stronger role in coordinating anti-poverty policymaking brought the 
SDS  into  conflict  with  the  MECON  who  saw  in  it  an  attempt  to  go  beyond  a  strictly  
neoliberal approach and worried that it could jeopardize the authority of the MECON 
over public expenditures.137 The  proposal  for  a  Subsidio Único Familiar thus came to 
nothing.  The  proposal  for  a  Sistema de Identificación Único de Familias Beneficiarias 
also failed to take off as provincial governors fiercely opposed such a single register for 
fear of losing their discretion over the selection of beneficiaries. As for the initiative to 
set up an intra-ministerial cabinet, it brought Amadeo into conflict with the Office of 
the Cabinet Chief (Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros,  JG) over who would control the 
vast menu of targeted programs. Menem’s political advisors in the JG wanted to make 
better political use of these programs to support Menemismo in the legislative 
elections of 1997 and the subsequent presidential elections of 1999. Unlike in Chile, 
where the Ministerial Secretariat of the Presidency with a view to the constraints 
inherent in “protected” democracy took great care in avoiding populist social 
governance, Menem’s political advisors in the JG argued for a stronger populist project 
to counter political pressures arising in connection with a stronger opposition and the 
                                                             
137 Interestingly, officials at the MECON used IMF recommendations that were at odds with such a 
proposal as further legitimation for blocking the effort. It shows, in accordance with what Weyland 
(2003b) has argued, how IFIs may work at cross-purposes. Rather than representing a single “will”, IFIs 
often represent different ideas allowing domestic policymakers, as in this case, to lean against the ones 
that further their own interests.  
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intra-Peronist block that had started to form around Governor Duhalde. In this, the 
technocrats at the SDS were seen as an obstacle.  
In February 1997, shortly before the legislative elections, Menem decreed the 
creation of the Social Cabinet (Gabinete Social, GS) with the function of coordinating 
anti-poverty programs.  The JG was put in  charge of  the GS with the SDS only given a 
subordinate role. Referents testify as to how from the start the struggle between the 
JG and the SDS over the control of anti-poverty programs inhibited the work of the GS. 
As such, the GS largely failed in its role to promote better intra-ministerial 
coordination. The number of targeted programs continued to rise, reaching 70 in 1999 
(SIEMPRO,  1999).  However,  putting  JG  in  charge  of  the  GS  instead  of  the  more  
technocratic SDS signaled a change in the anti-poverty strategy toward a more direct 
political use of targeted social programs. 
In the legislative elections of 1997, Peronism lost heavily to the opposition parties 
united in the newly created Alianza coalition. Under the influence of his advisors, 
Menem decided to throw the técnicos at the SDS overboard and bring in the políticos 
with a view to the presidential elections in 1999. In February 1998, Jorge Rodríguez, 
head of the JG, asked for the dissolution of the SDS (Clarín, 21/2/98). Shortly after, in 
April 1998, Amadeo was replaced by Ramón Ortega, the former governor of Tucumán 
and a close Menem ally that was picked as the prospective presidential candidate of 
the Menemist faction for the 1999 elections. Under Ortega, the distribution of 
program funds became an important tool for gaining political support for Menemismo. 
The emphasis on pluralist practices was loosened in favor of more openly clientelistic 
machinations. The focus was on executing more direct interventions to cope with 
increasing social and political pressures rather than enhancing participatory aspects of 
programs. Other high-profile technocrats at the SDS, such as the head of the Sistema 
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de Información, Monitoreo y Evaluación de Programas Sociales (SIEMPRO), Irene 
Novakovsky,  also  came  under  fire  amidst  rows  over  the  future  direction  of  the  SDS.  
SIEMPRO was the technocratic heart of the SDS and the new administration wanted to 
downgrade its profile and prevent it from going public with reports that could 
politically harm Menemismo (author interview, 2005). In December 1998, as it had 
become clear that Ortega would not be supported by strategically important Peronist 
bosses for the presidential bid, he was replaced by José Figueroa in front of the SDS. 
Under Figueroa, all pretensions to uphold pluralist practices in program administration 
were dropped. Figueroa concentrated on making trips to the interior, bringing with 
him direct clientelist hand-outs in the form of food aid, construction supplies and 
workfare programs for the poor. As such, the SDS was turned into a mechanism for the 
execution of a populist strategy through which Menem and his allies sought to manage 
growing political and social pressures.      

PopulistGovernance
As we have seen, from the early 1990s technocratic reformers had begun promoting 
pluralistic social policy with a view to institute a new, more participatory mode of 
social governance. These technocrats sought to move social policy away from reliance 
on traditional corporatist and clientelist linkages toward measures that targeted the 
poor directly and provided for pluralistic access to social programs.138 With the help of 
international agencies such as the World Bank and the IDB, targeted social programs 
that stressed community participation and the participation of other private actors 
such as NGOs were designed to form the basis of this new social governance. The 
                                                             
138 According to Fox (1994: 158, fn. 21): “Access to social programs can be considered pluralistic when it 
is not conditioned on political subordination.”  
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programs were supposed to allow for the “associative” inclusion of subaltern sectors 
into relatively apolitical networks that would link state and society on the social policy 
arena.  
In  practice,  as  we  have  seen,  most  of  these  programs  were  either  captured  by  
topocrats or delivered, as increasingly became the case after the mid-1990s, through 
Menem’s own clientelist channels. There is broad consensus among policymakers and 
scholars that these social programs have failed to effectively help the needy sectors of 
society escape poverty. Neither have they helped to install a more participatory mode 
of social governance and pluralistic access to social benefits. Studies and evaluations 
have found vast irregularities in the manner social programs have been 
implemented.139 Despite regulations and mechanisms designed to guarantee pluralistic 
access to these social programs, clientelist machinations have trumped pluralist 
practices in the selection of beneficiaries. In contrast to Chile, technocratic reformers 
in Argentina failed to protect pluralist reform from capture. 
This study argues that technocratic reformers in Argentina had regime institutions 
stacked against them. First of all, the political regime directly hampered technocratic 
reformers’ efforts to enforce compliance with the pluralist practices. As was already 
discussed in Chapter 2, delegative democracy provides Argentine political leaders, 
both at the national and the sub-national level, with wide discretion to politically 
manipulate social programs. According to most referents interviewed for this study, 
agencies of intra-state control such as the Sindicatura General de la Nación (SIGEN) or 
the Auditoría General de la Nación (AG) lack resources to properly monitor and control 
the administration of social programs, not to mention powers to sanction abuse. 
Evaluations carried out by the AG have found important irregularities and corruption in 
                                                             
139 For an overview, see Dinatale (2004). See also Vinocur and Halperin (2004). 
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the manner that a number of social programs have been implemented, but these 
evaluations have had no practical consequences as they have either been withdrawn 
following political interference or, having been approved and sent to Congress, 
hindered from being discussed by the congressional committee in charge (i.e. the 
Comisión Mixta Revisora de Cuentas).140 According  to  officials  at  the  SDS,  neither  
SIGEN nor AG played any significant role in the control of the implementation of social 
programs. On the whole, according to these officials, abuse could not be prevented 
other than by withholding program resources from being transferred, but this Menem 
did not want to do (author interviews, 2005; 2006). As for the World Bank and the IDB, 
organizations that provided the bulk of funding for these programs, they were 
primarily interested in seeing funds allocated on time. Whether programs were being 
implemented according to pluralist practices were of a lesser concern (Ibid). This issue 
also arose in interviews with officials from the IDB who confirmed that the level and 
timing of loan executions were their main concern (author interviews, 2005). With 
regard to the ability of the opposition to enforce congressional oversight mechanisms 
and checking for abuse in the allocation of social funds, it was limited due to the 
“hyper-presidentialist” characteristics of the Argentine democratic regime. Most social 
programs under Menem were executed by decree without the legislature having a 
chance to influence their design and enforce control mechanisms.  
Secondly, and relating to Menem’s unwillingness to withhold funds from being 
transferred to the provinces, the territorial regime has prevented technocrats from 
effectively implementing pluralist practices at the sub-national level. As was shown in 
Chapter 2, decentralized-federalism provides topocrats in Argentina with considerable 
influence over social program execution. Officials at the SDS testify about their deep 
                                                             
140 See Dinatale (2004) for details. See also Santiso (2008) for evidence of the politicization of the AG. 
298 
 
frustration with territorial politics. Mechanisms designed to invoke pluralist practices 
in administering social programs were continually subverted by local political interests. 
Facing weak agents of intra-state control and under pressure to respond to popular 
demands, topocrats had compelling incentives to make use of a “delegative mandate” 
to consolidate clientelistic networks in their respective “fiefdoms”. For topocrats, such 
as  the  Juarez  clan  in  Santiago  del  Estero,  Governor  Saá  in  San  Luis,  or  Governor  
Duhalde in Buenos Aires to mention only the most notorious examples, funds from 
federal social programs provided essential resources to sustain local party machines 
and populist projects. From the perspective of technocratic reformers at the SDS, even 
worse was the decentralization of programs such as FONAVI whereby the federal state 
lost all control over fund management. With regard to programs centrally 
administered by the SDS, officials complained about how local executives and party 
bosses  could  use  their  leverage  over  the  federal  government  to  have  auditory  and  
technical procedures for the administration of program funds relaxed. According to 
one program official, the federal government was even compelled by local executives 
to withdraw project funding where it contributed to strengthen autonomous civil 
groups at the expense of party networks (author interview, 2006). Clearly, the 
“political topography” of Argentina, in which sub-national political actors are provided 
with both incentives and opportunities to capture targeted programs for the local 
populist projects, constituted a major hindrance to technocrats’ efforts to implement a 
more pluralist and participatory social governance. As the power of the executive also 
depends on commanding a large enough coalition of topocrats, he/she needs to 
engage in territorial pork-barrel politics to ensure their loyalty. As such, Menem was 
hard pressed to turn a blind eye to the widespread abuse of targeted programs at the 
sub-national level. In fact, by giving allied governors funds to fuel their local party 
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machines  and  to  feed  Peronist  political  loyalties,  Menem  was  able  to  sustain  a  
“peripheral coalition” in support of his political program (see Gibson, 1997).   
Hence, as a result of Argentina’s regime institutions, efforts to institute a more 
participatory mode of social governance were subverted by political interests. Given 
the dismantling of corporatism, targeted programs provided a new means for Peronist 
leaders to reinforce clientelistic linkages, helping the PJ sustain its ties to the popular 
sectors and defuse popular protest in a context of neoliberal reform. Benefits from 
targeted programs were thus used to foster populist projects at the local level even 
when policies designed at the national level were obviously anti-populist. As Levitsky 
(2003) has showed, the PJ converted from having been a union-based party into a 
party based on the distribution of clientelistic benefits to the growing strata of 
informal and poor workers. During the 1990s, clientelistic networks linked to the ruling 
PJ became an increasingly important channel for state access. Through these 
“problem-solving networks” (Auyero, 2000) subaltern sectors were able to acquire 
goods and services in exchange for their political loyalty.    
Such populist governance carried risks as the new clientelistic ties helped politicize 
the linkages between the ruling elites and the subaltern sectors. The process whereby 
politicians variously dole out particularistic benefits in return for political loyalty or to 
dampen political protest feeds political mobilization that under the right circumstances 
may be turned against the incumbent elite. As Auyero et al. (2009) have showed, 
clientelist politics played an instrumental role in the massive uprisings against the 
ruling elites from the late 1990s onwards. Clientelist networks served as a mobilizing 
structure for the organization of protest. As the case of Plan Trabajar aptly 
demonstrates, the discretionary manner in which program benefits were handled 
generated incentives for collective organization on the part of unemployed and 
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community groups. Access to benefits also helped empower these groups making 
them “attractive partners for opposition labor unions, which sought to leverage 
discontent against the national government” (Garay, 2007: 34). What initially was 
conceived as a way to co-opt these rather small and isolated instances of autonomous 
organization thus ended up having the opposite effect by strengthening these groups 
and multiplying acts of protest.  
Ultimately, such populist governance also generated electoral costs for the ruling 
party. The opposition gained strength from the widespread discontent among the 
middle classes with clientelist practices and populism. The opposition focused much of 
its criticism on crucial features of the populist mode of social governance, particularly 
the endemic clientelism and politicization of social programs. Indeed, taking advantage 
of the growing dissatisfaction with social governance the Alianza easily won the 1999 
elections. By then, however, the populist mode of social governance was already firmly 
enmeshed within the political topography of Argentine federalism, making it hard for 
the new ruling coalition to depart from it. While it falls outside the scope of this 
chapter, it suffices to say that the attempts by the new government to revamp social 
governance failed in face of opposition from PJ topocrats who still controlled a 
majority of the provinces. In an effort to undercut the power of PJ clientelist networks 
and co-opt the piquetero movement, the De la Rúa government allowed piquetero 
organizations to have direct access, control and administration of social programs such 
as Plan Trabajar.  Yet,  this  strategy  only  contributed  to  increase  the  autonomy  and  
power of the piquetero movement vis-à-vis the government, which was demonstrated 
in  all  clarity  as  the  Alianza  fell  victim  to  its  own  strategy  in  December  2001,  when  
groups of piqueteros and middle-class protesters took to the streets disgusted with the 
ruling elite demanding “Que se vayan todos” (“Out with them all!”).    
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CONCLUSION
Though initially helping the consolidation of free market democracy, the populist 
mode of social governance that emerged under Menem arguably failed to ensure long-
term governability. In fact, it may have directly contributed to the unravelling of the 
neoliberal model under the Alianza government. As was argued in Chapter 1, populist 
modes of social governance are inherently unstable and prone to sudden outbursts of 
counter-mobilization. Indeed, the social, political, and economic collapse at the end of 
2001 highlighted the contradictions and the weakness of the populist mode of social 
governance that emerged in the 1990s. The chronic overspending derived from the 
need to finance clientelist networks, the perceived corruption of such clientelism, and 
the inconsistency between the economic imperatives of the neoliberal model and the 
politicization of state-society relations inherent in the populist mode of social 
governance all contributed to the 2001 crisis.  
The populist mode of social governance was important for the imposition of the 
neoliberal economic model during the 1990s. Presidential decree powers could not 
stem  the  prospect  of  rebellion  in  the  Peronist  party  or  massive  popular  protest  that  
potentially could have derailed economic reform and undermined governability. The 
clientelistic rewards inherent in the populist mode of social governance helped defuse 
popular protest and buy the support of provincial leaders. But it left several 
problematic legacies that put Menem’s successors in a difficult bind, particularly as 
economic conditions turned for the worse towards the end of the 1990s.  
The populist mode of social governance was sustained in part by accumulating 
public debt. Federal transfers to the provinces increased steadily throughout the 
decade with large amounts flowing directly into local patronage organizations. 
Desperate for the support of the powerful governors, the central state had few means 
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to enforce fiscal prudence on the provinces. Weak horizontal controls also ensured 
that provincial leaders were free to politically manipulate these funds, without much 
regard for structural adjustment or pluralist principles formulated by central state 
technocrats. Indeed, the logic of the system generated incentives to “overspend” in an 
effort to milk the central state for stabilization subsidizes and federal redistribution 
funds. Such overspending helped to increase the burden of federal debt while it 
simultaneously defused pressure at the provincial level for structural adjustment.  
The political manipulations of targeted funds also contributed to the dramatic rise 
in public hostility toward the political elite, which was manifested in the wave of 
protests and riots that culminated in December 2001. As public funds to finance 
clientelist exchanges dried up and structural adjustment in the provinces could no 
longer be postponed, the grassroots organizations and social movements that had 
been nurtured by clientelism turned against the system. Indeed, as Ayuero has shown, 
the very same clientelist networks set up to manage social demands and defuse 
opposition against neoliberal restructuring became instrumental in feeding the wave 
of protest and riots that shook the country from the late 1990s onwards (Ayuero, 
2005;  Ayuero  et  al.,  2009).  As  such,  the  populist  mode  of  social  governance  in  all  
likelihood helped sow the seeds of the 2001 crisis. 
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CHAPTERSEVEN
 
LOOKINGBACKANDAHEAD
 
The present study provides an analytic description of the transformation of social 
governance in Argentina and Chile. The analysis shows how major economic and social 
changes put pressure on political leaders to initiate social policy reform, and how these 
reform attempts are shaped by prevailing ideas and institutions. Crucially, it shows 
how similar policy reforms may result in different modes of social governance. In 
Argentina and Chile, despite similar policy reforms being implemented – e.g. 
corporatist reforms in the 1930s/1940s and pluralist reforms in the 1990s – the result 
has not been a convergence in the mode of social governance between the two 
countries. This study argues that contrasting regime characteristics account for most of 
this divergence. Figure 7.1 summarizes the core features of this argument.  
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Figure7.1ThePoliticsofTransformingSocialGovernance
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Prior studies have not provided a satisfactory framework for understanding 
diverging modes of social governance. In this study I provide a set of new conceptual 
and analytic tools for looking at the politics of transforming social governance. The 
comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile demonstrated the value of these tools by 
showing how they can account for the similarities and differences in social governance 
between the two countries. Previous analyses focus strongly on the external 
environment in explaining social policy change. While not dismissing the role played by 
international actors such as the World Bank and pressures of globalization, this study 
shows how the impact of external influences is filtered through domestic political 
contexts and constellations. Importantly, prior studies seldom look at how social policy 
reforms are actually being implemented. This study shows how pluralist anti-poverty 
reforms may have important unintended consequences as a result of “implementation 
gap”. Herein, my findings also challenge widely held assumptions that expect pluralist 
reforms to help to institute a more participatory mode of social governance.  
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Interestingly, almost counter-intuitively, the study shows how pluralist reforms 
have contributed to strengthen some state actors, most importantly topocrats 
(especially in Argentina) and social technocrats (especially in Chile). Implementing the 
pluralist social policy approach calls for technocratic experts to design new targeted 
and participatory mechanisms. Successfully administering targeted interventions 
requires technocratic skills and procedures. Also, mechanisms designed to strengthen 
participation and demand-orientation such as competitive bidding help to strengthen 
technocratic control over the allocation of benefits. As such, in both Argentina and 
Chile, technocratic experts had a key role in social governance during the 1990s. As we 
saw in the case of Argentina, however, the influence of technocrats was circumscribed 
by topocrats who were able to capture many of the pluralist social reforms and anti-
poverty programs. The pluralist approach with its emphasis on decentralization and 
targeted programs provided topocrats with valuable resources to strengthen clientelist 
networks and consolidate their grip on local political turf. Paradoxically, then, pluralist 
social policies may create opportunities for traditional elites to reassert their 
hegemony, particularly in places where institutions of horizontal accountability are 
weak.  As  we  saw  in  Chapters  3  and  4,  corporatist  social  policies  in  the  1930/1940s  
helped to destroy the powerbases of traditional elites and to strengthen popular 
actors such as trade unions. As corporatism was later dismantled in the neoliberal era, 
trade unions were severely weakened. Pluralist social reforms were then presented as 
a means to strengthen the ability of new popular actors such as NGOs and grassroots 
organizations to participate in social policymaking. But rather than launching 
“associative networks”, these organizations were usually incorporated into either neo-
clientelist  networks  as  in  Argentina,  where  they  have  often  been  enlisted  to  act  as  
middlemen in doling out particularistic benefits to political loyalists, or into neo-
306 
 
pluralist networks as in Chile, where they are incorporated into funding relationships 
on the highly technical terms set by the techno-bureaucracy and in the process come 
to downplay political advocacy functions and reduce their demands on the state.  
Obviously, with only two countries on which to draw, the insights that rise from 
this study needs to be examined critically by testing them against other cases. As for 
generalizing, the present study merely aspires, in the spirit of Malloy (1979: 4), to 
“present findings that will be theoretically suggestive for future comparative analysis”. 
Indeed, the study raises a number of important questions for future research. 
First of all, the role of regime institutions in shaping social governance needs to be 
further examined. One question concerns the effect of political regime. For instance, 
this study showed how the type of democracy aids in explaining the mode of social 
governance in Argentina and Chile. “Delegative” democracy in Argentina provides 
incentives (and opportunities) for political leaders to strategically manipulate social 
funds for populist purposes in helping to install a populist mode of social governance. 
By contrast, “protected” democracy in Chile provides political leaders with neither 
incentives nor much discretion to manipulate social funds in a populist fashion. 
Instead, protected democracy induces Chilean political leaders to follow a highly 
technocratic trajectory in implementing social reforms in which rational-bureaucratic 
criteria trump political considerations in the distribution of social funds helping 
institute a technocratic  mode of  social  governance.  Does this  apply to other cases of  
delegative and protected democracies as well? Importantly, this study did not include 
a case of full-fledged “liberal” democracy in which institutions of both vertical and 
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horizontal accountability are strong.141 Future studies should include cases of all types 
of democratic regime to find out the exact effects on social governance.  
Another question concerns how territorial regime affects the politics of 
transforming social governance. This study showed how territorial regime directly 
affects the ability of technocratic reformers to implement pluralist reform. The 
Argentine case suggests that in decentralized-federalism topocrats constitute a 
formidable obstacle to the successful implementation of pluralist anti-poverty reform. 
By contrast, in centralized-unitarism, as the Chilean case suggests, topocrats are weak, 
paving  the  way  for  technocratic  reformers  to  assert  control  over  the  process  of  
implementing pluralist anti-poverty reform. Future research also needs to incorporate 
other types of territorial regime to the comparative analysis. This study lacked cases of 
decentralized-unitarism as well as centralized-federalism (see Figure 1.1, Chapter 1). 
Moreover,  modes  of  social  governance  may  vary  widely  at  the  sub-national  level.  In  
cases of decentralized-federalism such as Argentina and Brazil we can expect variation 
in how social governance is being conducted between different sub-national units. 
Such variation is presumably less prominent in centralized-unitary regimes such as 
Chile and Uruguay. What about centralized-federalism or decentralized-unitarism? A 
comparison of sub-national units should also bring obvious benefits in terms of being 
able to use intra-national comparisons that make it easier to establish control over 
alternative explanatory variables.142 
Secondly, the role of policy sector needs to be further examined. Chapters 3 and 4 
of my study adopted a cross-sectoral perspective, conducting a historical analysis of 
key social policies with a view to the transformation of social governance in Argentina 
                                                             
141 Nor did this study include any cases from the ”limited” democratic category depicted in Figure 1.2, 
Chapter 1. 
142 For a discussion of the ”subnational comparative method”, see Snyder (2001).  
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and Chile. Chapters 5 and 6 then turned to give specific focus to anti-poverty policy in 
the contemporary era. As such, however, the study does not shed enough light on the 
role that sectoral variation may play in the politics of transforming social governance. 
Does the mode of social governance differ between sectors? Studies that specifically 
compare different policy sectors should improve our understanding of the politics of 
transforming social governance. By including in the comparative analysis of Argentina 
and Chile another policy sector, such as housing or healthcare, the argument made in 
this study could be put to the test through controlled case comparison.  
Finally, future research should reserve more attention to “different actors’ 
capacities for political participation and civic engagement” (Shadlen, 2004: 11), 
particularly dynamics of collective action and organization building among the 
subaltern sectors. This study puts emphasis on state actors in social governance. There 
are good reasons for such an emphasis. As explained above, the pluralist social policy 
approach may, somewhat paradoxically, contribute to strengthen state actors such as 
topocrats and technocrats. The dismantling of corporatism has led to a weakening of 
social actors such as trade unions. Under corporatism, states provided unions with 
organizational support and access to resources in exchange for their submission to the 
system  of  corporatist  controls.  As  we  saw  in  Chapters  3  and  4,  the  corporatist  social  
policy approach helped strengthen societal interests and demand-making to the point 
when they spiralled “out of control” (Kurtz, 2004b: 271). The efforts by 
neoconservative dictatorships to restore governability hinged on deactivating these 
societal actors through repression and prohibitions against socio-political organization. 
The structural changes coupled with the decline of the state-centric matrix have 
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helped exacerbate the weakening of societal actors’ organizational and mobilizational 
capacities.143  
Potentially, the pluralist approach may help generate organizational and 
mobilizational  capacity  among  subaltern  sectors.   As  we  saw  in  Chapter  6,  Plan 
Trabajar contributed to form common interests and identities among piqueteros in 
Argentina, helping them overcome barriers to collective action (Garay, 2007). In this 
instance, politicians provided workfare benefits in exchange for unemployed workers’ 
submission to the system of clientelist controls. Again, it contributed to foster 
coordinated action among previously isolated sectors, helping unleash social forces 
beyond the control of the state, culminating in the crisis of 2001. While often having 
unintentional consequences, state responses to societal demands are thus clearly an 
important determinant of different societal actors’ capacities for collective action and 
political participation. 
Yet, the literature on social movements and collective action has showed that the 
bases of different actors’ capacities for political participation not only depend on state 
structures and policies but also on variables such as the party system, class structures 
and organizational as well as cultural traits.144 These are variables that are not given 
much room in this study. Future research would benefit from looking more closely at 
how these variables affect the opportunities and capacities of the poor to govern 
themselves.   
   
 
 
 
                                                             
143 For discussion, see Collier and Handlin (2005). 
144 For an overview, see Tarrow (1998). 
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APPENDIX1
 
 
 
SELECTEDINTERVIEWS145 
 
Argentina
 
Amadeo, Eduardo. 2005. Diputado Nacional (PJ – Province of Buenos Aires, 1991-94) 
and ex-Secretario de Estado de Desarrollo Social. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Acuña,  Carlos.  2004.  Ex-Program  Manager,  PROMIN.  Expert  on  social  policy  in  
Argentina. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Bombarolo, Félix. 2006. Consultant; and ex-Coordinador de Planificación y Gestión, 
PAGV-SDS. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Cravino, María Cristina. 2006. Poverty and housing policy expert. Interview by author. 
Buenos Aires. 
 
De Paula, Aldo. 2006. Civil society activist (Madre Tierra). Interview by author. Buenos 
Aires. 
 
Díaz Muñoz, Ana Rita. 2005. Consultant; ex-Coordinadora General, PAGV-SDS. 
 
Fara,  Luis.  2005  and  2006.  Ex-Director  de  Cultura-ATE;  ex-Gerente  de  Asistencia  
Técnica and ex-Coordinador Nacional, PROMIN-MSAS. Interviews by author. Buenos 
Aires. 
 
Fernández Wagner, Raúl. 2006. Slum settlement and housing policy expert. Interview 
by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Fernández, Roque. 2006. Ex-president of the Central Bank and ex-Minister of the 
Economy. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Forni, Pablo. 2005. Poverty and civil society expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Fridman, Viviana. 2005. Ex-Coordinadora de la Unidad de Financimiento Internacional 
de la Secretaría de Desarrollo Social;  ex-Subsecretaria de Proyectos Sociales de la 
Secretaría de Desarrollo Social. Interview by author. Buenos Aires.  
 
García Delgado, Daniel. 2005. Administration expert. Interview by author. Buenos 
Aires. 
 
Goytia, Cynthia. 2006. Housing policy expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
                                                             
145 In addition to the interviews listed here, a number of more informal discussions with social activists 
and representatives of civil society organizations were conducted by the author.  
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Langsam,  Martin.  2004.  Ex-official  at  the  Social  Expenditure  Unit  –  Ministry  of  the  
Economy. 
 
Leiras, Marcelo. 2005. Public policy expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Levy,  Esther.  2005.  Trade  union  activist  (CTA)  and  social  policy  expert.  Interview  by  
author. Buenos Aires. 
 
López Levy, Marcela. 2005. Civil society expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Martínez de Jiménez, Lydia Mabel. 2006. Ex-Directora Nacional de Políticas 
Habitacionales and ex-Directora de Planificación Habitacional, Subsecrataria de 
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda – SDS. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Meisegeier, José María (Padre ”Pichi”). 2006. Jesuit priest; community activist; 
President of el Secretariado de Enlace de Comunidades Autogestionarias (SENECA). 
Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Novakovsky, Irene. 2005. Ex-Coordinadora, SIEMPRO-SDS. Interview by author. Buenos 
Aires. 
 
Peruzzotti, Enrique. 2005. Civil society expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Pessino, Carola. 2006. Ex-advisor to the Minister of the Economy and Undersecretary 
of  Public  investment  and  Social  Expenditure  –  MoE;  ex-Secretary  of  Fiscal  Equity  –  
Jefatura de la Gabinete; ex-General Coordinator of the National Tax and Social 
Identification System (SINTyS). Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Puppo, José María. 2005. Ex-Resident Representative, IDB-Argentina. Interview by 
author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Rocha, José. 2006. Civil society activist (Madre Tierra/FTV). Interview by author. 
Buenos Aires. 
 
Rodríguez, Raul Pedro. 2006. Director de la Dirección Control de Gestión del FONAVI. 
Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Rodulfo, María Beatriz. 2006. Ex- Directora Nacional de Políticas Habitacionales and ex-
Directora Nacional de Programas para la Emergencia Habitacional, Subsecretaria de 
Desarrollo Urbano y Vivienda – SDS/MSALyAS. Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
Saba, Roberto. 2005. Public policy and legal expert. Interview by author. Buenos Aires.  
 
Sabra, Mariel. 2005. Ex-Civil Society Liaison, IDB-Argentina. Interview by author. 
Buenos Aires. 
 
Solla, Alejandra. 2005. Consultant; ex-Asesor de Capacitación, CENOC-SDS. 
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Tedeschi, Sebastián. 2006. Coordinador del Programa de las Américas del Centro por el 
Derecho a la Vivienda contra los Desalojos (COHRE). Interview by author. Buenos Aires. 
 
 
 
Chile 
 
Arriagada, Patricia. 2006. Ex-Jefa de Comité, Asesora Técnica y Jefa de la Subdivisión 
Jurídica en la División Toma de Razón y Registro; ex-Jefa de la División Municipalidades 
– Contraloría General. Interview by author. 2006.   
 
Bowen,  Sebastián.  2006.  Civil  society  activist  (Un  Techo  para  Chile).  Interview  by  
author. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Camhi, Rosita. 2006. Poverty and social policy expert. Ex-Coordinadora de Programas 
Sociales  –  ODEPLAN.  Ex-Asesora  de  la  Fundación  Miguel  Kast.  Interview  by  author.  
Santiago de Chile. 
 
Díaz Silva, Juán. 2005. Trade union leader (FENPRUSS). Interview by author. Porto 
Alegre. 
 
Etchegaray, Alberto. 2006. Ex-Ministro de Vivienda y Urbanismo; ex-Presidente del 
Consejo Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza. Interview by author. Santiago de 
Chile. 
 
García, Alvaro. 2006. Ex-Ministro Secretario General de la Presidencia; ex-Ministro de 
Economia; ex-Subsecretario de Planificación – MIDEPLAN. Interview by author. 
Santiago de Chile.  
 
Horst,  Bettina.  2006.  Local  government  and  housing  expert.  Ex-Consejera  (UDI  –  
Gobierno Regional Metropolitano de Santiago); Ex-Jefa del Area Monetaria en el 
departamento de Estudios – Banco Central. Interview by author. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Irrarázaval, Ignacio. 2006. Poverty and civil society expert; ex-Miembro del Consejo 
Ciudadano para el Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil. Interview by author. Santiago 
de Chile. 
 
Mercado, Olga. 2006. Ex-Profesional del Departamento del Estudios Sociales and del 
Departamento de Planificación y Gestión del Territorio– MIDEPLAN. Interview by 
author. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Molina, Sergio. 2006. Ex-Ministro de Planificación y Cooperación. Interview by author. 
Santiago de Chile. 
 
Navia, Patricio. 2006. Political Scientist. Interview by author. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Palma, Andrés. 2006. Diputado Nacional (DC – Región Metropolitana); ex-Director 
Ejecutivo del Programa Chile Barrio; ex-Ministro de Planificación y Cooperación. 
Interview by author. Santiago de Chile. 
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Pérez Díaz, Cecilia. 2006. Ex-Jefa de Estudios and ex-Directora Ejecutiva de la 
Fundación Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza. Ex-Ministra de Planificación y 
Cooperación; ex-Ministra del Servicio Nacional de la Mujer. Interview by author. 
Santiago de Chile.   
 
Razcynski, Dagmar. 2006. Social policy expert; ex-Consejera en el Consejo del FOSIS; 
ex-Directora Ejecutiva de CIEPLAN. Interview by author. Santiago de Chile. 
 
Rodriguez, Alfredo. 2006. Civil society activist. Director del SUR. Ex-Asesor de Alberto 
Ethegaray en el Ministro de Vivienda y Urbanismo. 
 
Sepúlveda Ocampo, Rubén. 2006. Housing policy expert. Interview by author. Santiago 
de Chile.  
 
Walker, Ignacio. 2005. Diputado Nacional (DC – V Región de Valparaíso); ex-Ministro 
de Relaciones Exteriores; ex-Director de CIEPLAN; ex-Asesor de Edgardo Boeninger en 
la Secretaría General de la Presidencia. Interview by author. Helsinki, Finland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 
 
APPENDIX2
 
 
 
ECONOMICANDSOCIALINDICATORS


 
TableA.1MacroeconomicIndicatorsforChile,1980-2006
Year GDP Growth Inflation¹ 
(Greater 
Santiago) 
External Debt 
1980  7.9  11 207 
1981 6.2 9.5 - 
1982 -13.6 20.7 - 
1983 -2.8 23.1 - 
1984 5.9 23.0 - 
1985 2.0 26.4 20 403 
1986 5.6 17.4 - 
1987 6.6 21.5 - 
1988 7.3 12.7 - 
1989 10.6 21.4 - 
1990 3.7 27.3 18 576 
1991 8.0 18.7 17 319 
1992 12.3 12.7 18 964 
1993 7.0 12.2 19 665 
1994 5.7 8.9 21 768 
1995 10.6 8.2 21 736 
1996 7.4 6.6 22 979 
1997 6.6 6.0 26 701 
1998 3.2 4.7 31 691 
1999 -0.8 2.3 34 112 
2000 4.5 4.5 36 477 
2001 3.4 2.6 38 527 
2002 2.2 2.8 40 504 
2003 3.9 1.1 43 067 
2004 6.0 2.4 43 517 
2005 5.6 3.7 44 934 
2006 4.6 2.6 47 590 
Source (the autor has received permission by ECLAC to include this material): Matías Holloway and 
Salvador Marconi, “América Latina y el Caribe: series históricas de estadísticas económicas, 1950-2008” 
serie Cuadernos estadísticos, No. 37 (LC/G.2415-P), Santiago de Chile, Comisíon Económica para América 
Latina  y  el  Caribe  (CEPAL),  agosto  de  2009.  Publicación  de  las  Naciones  Unidas,  No.  de  venta:  
S.09.II.G.72.; ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (various years3), 
Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe/Statistical yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Santiago de Chile. United Nations Publication.  
Note: ¹Average annual growth of consumer prices. ²Total disbursed external debt  
(includes public and private as well as debt with the IMF). 3See list of references for specific source 
referencing. 
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TableA.2MacroeconomicIndicatorsforArgentina,1980-2002
Year GDP Growth Inflation¹ 
(Greater 
Buenos Aires) 
External Debt² 
1980  1.5 - 27 162 
1981 -5.4 131.3 - 
1982 -3.2 209.7 - 
1983  4.1 433.7 - 
1984  2.0 688.0 - 
1985 -6.9 385.4 49 326 
1986  7.1    81.9 - 
1987  2.6  174.8 - 
1988 -1.9  387.7 - 
1989 -6.9        4923.5 - 
1990 -1.8        1343.9 62 233 
1991  10.6   84.0 61 334 
1992  9.6   17.5 62 766 
1993  5.7     7.4 72 209 
1994  5.8     3.9 85 656 
1995 -2.8    1.6 98 547 
1996  5.5    0.1 110 613 
1997  8.1    0.3 125 052 
1998  3.9    0.7 141 929 
1999 -3.4  -1.8 145 289 
2000 -0.8  -0.7 146 575 
2001 -4.4  -1.5 140 273 
2002 -10.9 41.0 134 340 
Source (the autor has received permission by ECLAC to include this material): Matías Holloway and 
Salvador Marconi, “América Latina y el Caribe: series históricas de estadísticas económicas, 1950-2008” 
serie Cuadernos estadísticos, No. 37 (LC/G.2415-P), Santiago de Chile, Comisíon Económica para América 
Latina  y  el  Caribe  (CEPAL),  agosto  de  2009.  Publicación  de  las  Naciones  Unidas,  No.  de  venta:  
S.09.II.G.72.; ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (various years3), 
Anuario Estadístico de América Latina y el Caribe/Statistical yearbook for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Santiago de Chile. United Nations Publication.  
Note: ¹Average annual growth of consumer prices. ²Total disbursed external debt  
(includes public and private as well as debt with the IMF). 3See list of references for specific source 
referencing. 
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TableA.3UnemploymentandInformalityinChile,1980-2006(SelectedYears)
Year Unemployment 
 
Informality¹ 
1980 10.4 - 
1985 15.3 - 
1990 7.8 21.4 
1991 - - 
1992 6.7 - 
1993 6.5 - 
1994 7.8 - 
1995 7.4 - 
1996 6.4 22.0 
1997 6.1 - 
1998 6.4 22.9 
1999 9.8 - 
2000 9.2 23.7 
2001 9.1 - 
2002 9.0 - 
2003 8.5 22.4 
2004 8.8 - 
2006 - 20.2 
Source (the author has received permission by ECLAC to include this material): ECLAC (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (various years2), Anuario Estadístico de América Latina 
y el Caribe/Statistical yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile. United Nations 
Publication.; CEDLAS and the World Bank, Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/index.php). 
Notes: ¹Share of salaried workers in informal jobs (i.e. workers with no right to a pension). 2 See list of 
references for specific source referencing. 
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
TableA.4UnemploymentandInformalityinArgentina,1980-2002(SelectedYears)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source (the author has received permission by both ECLAC and CEDLAS to include this material): ECLAC 
(Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (various years3), Anuario Estadístico de 
América Latina y el Caribe/Statistical yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago de Chile. 
United Nations Publication.; CEDLAS and the World Bank, Socio-Economic Database for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/index.php). 
Notes: ¹Share of salaried workers in informal jobs (i.e. workers with no right to a pension).  
²Represents a large and increasing number of urban areas. 3See list of references for specific source 
referencing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Year Unemployment 
(Urban areas) 
Informality¹ 
(Urban areas)² 
1980 2.6 - 
1985 6.1 - 
1986 - 24.0 
1987 - - 
1988 - 29.9 
1990 7.4 - 
1991 - 32.5 
1992 7.0 31.2 
1993 9.6 31.9 
1994 11.5 29.1 
1995 17.5 33.1 
1996 17.2 35.1 
1997 14.9 36.2 
1998 12.9 37.9 
1999 14.3 38.3 
2000 15.1 38.5 
2001 17.4 38.7 
2002 19.7 44.1 
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TableA.5PovertyandIncomedistributioninChile,1987-2006(SelectedYears)
Year Poverty¹ 
 
Extreme 
Poverty 
% Share of 
Bottom 20%  
% Share of 
Top 20% 
Gini² 
1987 45.1 17.4 3.4 61.3 0.561 
1990 38.6 13.0 3.6 60.4 0.551 
1992 32.8 9.0 3.9 60.0 0.547 
1994 27.7 7.6 3.8 60.0 0.549 
1996 23.2 5.7 3.7 60.1 0.548 
1998 21.6 5.6 3.6 60.6 0.555 
2000 20.2 5.6 3.7 60.5 0.552 
2003 18.7 4.7 3.9 60.0 0.546 
2006 13.7 3.2 4.3 57.5 0.518 
Source (the author has received permission by CEDLAS to include this material): CEDLAS and the World 
Bank, Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
(http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/index.php). 
 Notes: ¹Individuals below the poverty line as a percentage of total population. Include individuals in 
situations of extreme poverty (SEDLAC misleadingly characterizes the category as “moderate poverty”, 
although the data is based on the CASEN household survey that lists the share of total poor under this 
category. See MIDEPLAN, Serie de análisis de resultados de la Encuesta de Caracterización 
Socioeconómica Nacional (CASEN) 2006. Santiago de Chile: MIDEPLAN, 2007). ²Calculated on the basis of 
household per capita income. 

TableA.6PovertyandIncomedistributioninArgentina,1980-2002(SelectedYears)
Year Poverty¹ 
 
Extreme 
Poverty 
% Share of 
Bottom 20%  
% Share of 
Top 20% 
Gini² 
1980 - - 5.9 45.7 0.393 
1986 - - 5.5 48.2 0.422 
1988 32.3 10.7  4.4 50.7 0.456 
1989 47.3 16.5 - - - 
1990  33.7  6.6 - - - 
1991  21.5  3.0 4.9 52.4 0.465 
1992 17.8  3.2 4.8 50.6 0.450 
1993 16.8  4.4 4.7 49.7 0.444 
1994 19.0  3.5 4.6 50.6 0.453 
1995 24.8  6.3 4.1 53.4 0.481 
1996 27.9  7.5 4.0 53.4 0.486 
1997 26.0  6.4 3.9 53.3 0.483 
1998 25.9  6.9 3.7 54.8 0.502 
1999 26.7  6.7 3.8 53.8 0.491 
2000 28.9  7.7 3.5 54.8 0.504 
2001 35.4 12.2 3.1 56.4 0.522 
2002 54.3 24.7 3.0 57.5 0.533 
Source (the author has received permission by CEDLAS to include this material): CEDLAS and the World 
Bank, Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean (SEDLAC) 
(http://www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/sedlac/eng/index.php). 
Notes: ¹Individuals below the poverty line as a percentage of total population in the area of Greater 
Buenos Aires. Include individuals in situations of extreme poverty (SEDLAC misleadingly characterizes 
the category as “moderate poverty”, although the data is based on the EPH household survey that lists 
the share of total poor under this category. See INDEC (www.indec.gov.ar). ²Calculated on the basis of 
household per capita income. 
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TableA.7Thisgraph,“SocialConflictinArgentina1982-2002(Numberof
DemonstrationsbyType)”,hasbeenremovedasthecopyrightisownedbyanother
organization.
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